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PREFACE 
The chapters in this volume were presented to 17th summer course of the 
International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts 
(ISODARCO) held at the Certosa di Pontignano (Siena), Italy, between 10 and 
20 August 1995. 
The realization of the School was made possible by financial contributions 
from a number organisations and the generous collaboration of several 
individuals. Without these, the course would not have been possible. Our 
deepest gratitude goes to: 
<«•• The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; 
Ms Annamarie von Hammerstein, Prof. Guido Modiano and Prof. Pietro 
Omodeo, Directors of the Course: 
"»• Prof. Simon Bekker and Dr. David Carlton, editors of the book; 
<-* The Physics Department of the University of Rome "Tor Vergata"; 
»«+ Prof. Maria Vegni, of the Biology Department of the University of Siena; 
-f The Regional Council of the Toscana Region; 
Ms Isabella Colace of the ISODARCO office in Rome. 
For their hospitality, we are indebted to Mr. Andrea Machetti and all the 
personnel of the Certosa di Pontignano. 
All opinions expressed in the chapters of this book are of a purely personal 
nature and do not necessarily represent the offical view of either the 
organisers of the School or of the organisations to which the writers may be 
affiliated. 
Carlo Schaerf 
(President of ISODARCO and Director of the School) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Simon Bekker 
After the Second World War, the globe became divided into two alternatives, 
capitalism and socialism, Washington and Moscow, the first and the second 
worlds. The idea of the Third World - developed in the early 1950s - offered 
a third alternative, a new way for the numerous newly-independent countries 
of the globe. General disillusionment with this third way developed rapidly 
as strategies of modernisation and economic development in developing 
countries failed to live up to their promise. A prime reason for this Third 
World failure was deemed to be ethnic conflict in these heterogeneous 
societies. Ethnic conflicts, accordingly, during this Cold War era, were 
perceived to be problems of the developing world. 
With the end of the Cold War all this has changed. Nation-states react 
defensively as local politics and global politics increasingly lead to the 
articulation of similar demands, for human and cultural rights and for equity 
in access to resources. These demands act as incentives for emergent groups 
- no longer confined within either the Western or the Eastern bloc - to assert 
their differences, to assert the uniqueness they experience, often in 
contradistinction to other groups within the same society. Such processes 
are apparent in Eastern Europe and other parts of what used to be the Soviet 
empire, in Western Europe and the Middle East, in the former first, second 
and third worlds. These processes have become universal. Racism and ethnic 
conflict, accordingly, allied as they are to these processes, have become global 
problems today. 
Part One of this book raises these issues at a general analytic level. Its four 
chapters select a number of ideas which underpin violent conflicts of this 
nature: 
«»• identity 
territory 
»-*• language 
nation 
•<-* state 
«•+ intervention. 
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The authors apply these ideas to a number of carefully selected historical 
examples to show how and why they are key elements in analyses of racism, 
xenophobia and ethnic conflict. Subsequently, while sharing this common 
framework of ideas, each author develops a particular theme. 
H&ken Wiberg introduces his theme by beginning with the 'identity budget' 
of an individual. Items in this budget typically include belonging to a family, 
to wider kin relations, to a language and religious grouping, to a nationality, 
and to a state. These items, he insists, are neither fixed nor given but are 
social constructions. Accordingly, heterogeneous societies find themselves 
in great danger when one item of the identity budgets of their members 
becomes predominant, for example when nationalist or state ideologies take 
hold. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Western and Eastern 
European societies in such straits. 
Klaus Gottstein addresses the same theme of ethnic conflicts in 
heterogeneous societies. His focus is on conditions for sustained conflict 
regulation and, in particular, on the environment within which ethnic 
protagonists face each other. Particular attention is given to the presence or 
absence of a common danger to both protagonists and the role that this 
common danger plays in conflict regulation. Numerous historical examples 
are cited as illustrations. 
Carl Kaysen seeks to uncover relations between nation, state and economy; 
between culture, order, and production in a single society. Modern 
economies improve under conditions of unrestrained factor mobility, skilled 
labour, and stable markets. Accordingly, those states which have succeeded 
in improving transportation and organisation (through technological 
development) and education (through nation-building) within an 
environment of political stability have played a critical role in economic 
development. Today, currents of globalisation are diminishing the relative 
importance of the roles of states and nations in economic performance. 
Mobility, labour and markets are becoming increasingly international. It is 
today's modern nationalisms, therefore, that pose a threat to international 
economic development. 
Since the end of the Cold War, major global powers have become particularly 
rcluctant to become involved militarily beyond their national borders. This 
is the point of departure of George Rathjens' chapter on an assessment of 
the recent history of military intervention in ethnic conflicts. The role played 
by international agencies and the United States, and the distinction between 
peace-keeping and peace-making are fundamental to this assessment. The 
dangers of continued engagement beyond the planned intervention period 
are underlined. 
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Part Two of the book embraces a number of case studies. Generalisations 
about the nature of ethnic conflicts are often misleading since there are wide 
variations across examples in demography, economic circumstances, ethnic 
manipulation, political systems, and - probably most importantly - histories. 
Accordingly, depth analyses of three different examples offer specific sets of 
explanations for particular cases. The examples selected address 
security and the peace process in Northern Ireland, 
»"*• democratisation and conflict in contemporary South Africa, and 
the rise of racism in political parties of five Western European countries 
- Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
The necessity to view policy on security as reflecting a relationship between 
the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland is a particularly important element 
in the first case study. After the first-ever universal general election in 1994 
in South Africa, the continuation of conflict in the predominantly 
Zulu-speaking north-eastern province of that country is highlighted in the 
second case study. In the third case study, it is the professionalisation of the 
parties of the xenophobic extreme right that is identified as a new and 
threatening political development in the European Union. 
The rise of a racist consciousness in Western European extreme right 
political parties which is addressed in Christopher Husbands' chapter in Part 
Two provides the bridge to Part Three of the book. Identities based on racial 
criteria are common in many societies of the modern world. Theories 
claiming that these identities are based upon biological and genetic factors 
are also common in these and other societies. Inferences are therefore drawn 
that these identities are fixed, immutable, and primordial in nature. 
Accordingly, it is argued, identities are not chosen but are inherited. 
The two chapters in Part Three address and refute these theories and their 
inferences. The authors - Guido Barbujani and Guido Modiano - are both 
trained geneticists and demonstrate by using contemporary genetic theory 
and data that anthropological definitions of human races - while identifying 
visible differences of genetic origin - do not identify significant genetic 
variation among them. Variations within such groups exceed variations 
across them. The authors conclude that individual identities and their ethnic 
and racial dimensions are social constructions, choices made by individuals 
and by groups, and that causal links between these social constructions and 
significant genetic factors have not been demonstrated. 
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IDENTITY, 
ETHNICITY, 
CONFLICT 
Hdkan Wiberg 
Introduction 
Much polemical argument has raged over whether the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia are 'ethnic', or are 'religious', or are something else. These 
arguments usually tell us more about the authors than about the former 
Yugoslavia, affirmation as well as rejection of such theses typically being used 
in political propaganda. 
There is one sense, however, in which these conflicts have clearly been 
'religious', but it concerns the world outside the former Yugoslavia. If we ask 
who won the propaganda war and where and when it was won, the picture 
is quite clear: the Croats (and the Slovenes) won the first round in 1991 in 
the Catholic world (together with its Protestant appendage), whereas the 
Serbs won it in the Orthodox world. During the second round, in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, these victories remained in place, whereas the 
Moslems succeeded, in the eyes of the Islamic world, in defeating its two 
protagonists.' 
This, however, tells us more about which strings international public 
relations agencies of the different parties are able to pluck than about what 
is going on inside the former Yugoslavia.21 have no intention, in this chapter, 
of attempting to answer these questions. My more modest aim is to clarify them. 
| | Identity 
Let me take identity as my point of departure. The term has two divergent 
meanings: on the one hand, it refers to what makes an individual unique3; 
and, on the other hand, to what makes him or her belong to various kinds 
of communities. I shall focus on the second meaning. 
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In the 'identity budget' of an individual, several different dimensions normally 
appear, and several levels may be significant within a single dimension. To 
the individual, these dimensions and the distinction between categories 
within them may appear as 'natural' or 'given'. To the social scientist, their 
character as social constructions is revealed by the considerable variation 
found between different cultures, both with respect to which dimensions are 
seen as important and how categorisation takes place within single 
dimensions. Let me illustrate this by identifying and analysing a number of 
central dimensions. 
Let me start with territory and neighbourhood. An individual is surrounded 
by a series of circles defined in physical or in cultural geography, such as the 
block or village, the municipality, county, province, state, region, continent 
and world. To which extent he or she considers such circles to be 'own 
territory' or 'own neighbourhood' depends strongly on time and space, as it 
does regarding the distribution of identification and of loyalty between these 
circles.4 
Kinship as experienced by kinsfolk also varies strongly: consider the nuclear 
family, the extended family, the clan, and, moving up the scale, mythical 
conceptions of the nation {based, as these conceptions are, on the 
'descendants' of some 'common' patriarch a longtime ago). Race as a social 
construction also appears in different forms. In one of them, it is seen as an 
even wider kinship circle than (this sense of) nation. Exactly which 'races' 
are presumed to exist differs across different societies. This is also true for 
another construction of'race', that based on skin colour and other physical 
characteristics. How many categories are presumed to exist, where the lines 
between them are drawn, and what lines are seen as most important, depends 
on which society we are considering.5 
We also find strong variations regarding the extent to which identification, 
organisation and solidarity are based on market position.6 The inner circle 
represents the community at a single work place; beyond that, we have guilds, 
unions, estates, castes and classes, moving (in one direction, at least) toward 
the 'global proletariat'. 
Religion and language also have central roles in defining reality and therefore 
tend to have great potential for shaping identities and creating communities.7 
Here, too, the distinctions that are made often depend profoundly on social 
factors. We may draw several circles, for instance, around the tongue that is 
actually spoken in a single family: sociolects, dialects, dialect groups, 
languages, and language families. Where the line is drawn between what is 
seen as 'different dialects of the same language' and what is seen as 'different 
languages' may often appear arbitrary or even nonsensical to a professional 
linguist - but the drawing of these lines will often have great symbolic 
ii 
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r t a n c e t o those drawing them. At a more macro level, states or political 
units often consider linguistic homogenisation as an important strategy 
aimed at 'nation-building', and, for ethnonationalists, it is important to have 
a langua£e that is their 'very own', not a dialect of 'somebody else's' - in the 
extreme, in fact, this view requires a policy of linguistic purism and proposes 
the shedding of all 'borrowed' words.8 
With regard to religions, moreover, no uniformity regarding similarities and 
differences in faith occur across societies. Classifications into 'Protestant', 
'Catholic.' or 'Orthodox', for example, are sometimes experienced as bitterly 
opposed and adversarial, and sometimes as having 'Christianity' in common. 
Islam sees itself as belonging to an even wider community, the 'peoples of 
the Book', which includes other monotheistic religions, whose believers are 
assigned a special position in contrast to other infidels. 
Let me repeat the basic message: none of these categorisations are 'natural' 
or 'given'. They are all social constructions, and often originally the products, 
more than the causes, of social conflict - which does not mean that they 
cannot have powerful causal effects once they are established.9 We should 
therefore look with scepticism at different kinds of primordialism, but with 
equal scepticism at seeing different categorisations merely as vehicles of 
political manipulation. Manipulation there may be; but it is not in the hands 
of those attempting it to decide whether it will be successful or not, nor what 
its results will be, nor to decide whether to reverse or undo its consequences, 
and perhaps not even to decide whether or not to engage in such 
manipulation. 
One important difference between the dimensions of the 'identity budget' 
concerns the possibility of a community creating a self-reproducing society, 
or being large enough to be able to constitute a state. For biological reasons, 
gender or age-specific communities are excluded.10 A community with a 
specific market position is also excluded as long as division of labour occurs. 
The classless society can only appear among hunters and gatherers, if even 
there. The fact that a political ideology may have this as an ideal is another 
matter. A state may actually manage to reduce some differences in privileges 
in their society - or even proclaim that a classless society has been created. 
A class may be able to seize power in a society. Nonetheless, a class cannot 
form a classless society, that is, a society with one class only. 
On the other hand, it is quite possible to imagine a society, or even a state, 
where everybody speaks the same language (as they define 'same language'), 
count themselves to belong to the same nation or race, or regard themselves 
as belonging to the same religion. Such homogeneous states tend to be 
strongly authoritarian, though there are exceptions. They often display a 
histoiy of ethnocide, of mass expulsion, or even of genocide, though, again, 
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this is not necessarily the case. And they are often highly parochial and lack 
creativity, though this, too, is no natural law. The quarter of a million 
Icelandic Protestants provide a counter-example on all three counts above. 
Once upon a time - or so we tend to believe - the typical 'identity budget' had 
few dimensions. Most weight was given to those circles immediately around 
the individual and family, and most positions within dimensions were 
inherited, or - at least - were what sociologists call ascribed (particularly by 
gender and age)." In increasing areas of the globe, this is now history. Various 
forms of mobility (geographical, social, ideological) have increased. Since the 
19th century, different political movements have devoted great amounts of 
energy designed to influence and change people's identity budgets. Let me 
illustrate these changes by identifying a number of ideal types.12 
Ideas about kinship may still be given great weight. The modern racist 
demands identification high up on this dimension. (His antithesis, what 
anthropologists call the amoral familist, goes to the opposite extreme, but 
typically does not formulate any missionising ideology - it's all in the family!) 
Religions sometimes demand that faith be accepted as the primary 
dimension, as in the Christian formulation about neither man nor woman, 
neither Jew nor Greek, or in the Islamic concept of Umma. More extreme 
versions of this are found in some sects. 
The extreme nationalist view comes in two versions, which we may call 'state 
nationalist' and 'ethnonationalist'. They both have a clear view on what 
dimension should be given priority: gender or class, for instance, should be 
seen as secondary or even irrelevant in relation to the national community 
or the political state. There is also coincidence in their preferences regarding 
where on the preferred dimension people ought to identify themselves: 
distinctions beneath the nation or state should be assigned less importance 
(so as not to 'divide the nation') and the same holds true for communities 
above them.13 The difference between these two types of nationalists has to 
do with the fact that though the state is relatively unambiguously defined, in 
particular, in territorial terms, 'the people' may be conceptualised in several 
different ways: in terms of descent, or language, or religion, or different 
combinations of these.14 To the extent that state nationalism (based, as it is, 
on territorial integrity in the first place) is really successful, it also manages 
to define the people in this way, and we get a 'double nationalism': state 
nationalism and ethnonationalism rolled into one. 
Extreme class thinking, as, for example, in vulgar Marxist versions, is equally 
one-dimensional: an emphasis on dimensions other than class is seen as a 
sign of'false consciousness'. Within this dimension, the desired identification 
tends to lie higher than that of the nationalist. The entire working class 
(however defined) or even the global proletariat are cases in point. 
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These one-dimensional ideologies rarely succeed completely. Human beings 
normally have multidimensional identity budgets. They tend to distribute 
their identification, moreover, between different levels on the same 
dimension. They see no contradiction, for instance, in being Catalan and 
European. Simultaneously, they are active in their church and their political 
party, their women's group and their trade union. To them, time pressures 
are regarded as the only reason for having to make choices between these 
activities. 
In some cases, however, - and most of them are historically horrifying - one 
of the monopolistic ideologies has been victorious and has created a real 
monster. There are three ideal types in this regard: class ideology, national 
ideology and state ideology. Combinations are also possible. Let us have a 
closer look at the relations between the three potential monsters. 
Slates are able to take on a variety of forms, and a variety of allied systems 
of legitimation. There are acephalous cultures with nothing resembling a 
state machinery in the traditional European understanding of the term. Other 
forms of political organisation have some features in common with the 
modern state, but do not constitute such a state. The modern 
territorially-bound state displays a set of monopolies: on the legitimate use 
of violence, on some aspects of defining reality, and on many kinds of 
decision-making. We also find variety, among democracies and among other 
slate forms, regarding the extent to which states display centralised powers. 
These range from extremely centralist states to highly decentralised 
confederations. 
Slate power may be legitimised by direct reference to God or to a ruler or a 
dynasty reigning gratia Dei. Alternatively, the current ruler may be 
considered to have charismatic features. In a third case, state power may 
define itself as being 'by the people' and serving the people, whether or not 
this people are actually given the opportunity to express their opinions 
through the franchise. In all three cases, the social meaning of such 
legitimation procedures may vary greatly. 
In the third case, the crucial issue is simply who the people are? There are 
two major traditions of thought on this issue, even though they have gradually 
bccome hybridised. In the thinking of the French Enlightenment, it is the 
state, and more specifically the citizens' state, that defines the nation (patrie). 
German Romanticism takes the converse view: it is the nation (Vo!fc) that 
enjoys a primordial existence by virtue of being a cultural community. If this 
nation does not already have a state, it is calling for one.15 
An allied question may be posed as follows: To whom does the state belong? 
Different constitutions give different answers to this question. Some remain 
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completely silent. Others, now increasingly rare, contain phrases like 'to the 
workers and peasants', or ' to the people', implying an answer couched iii 
class terms. Several constitutions, often adopted after 1989, contain 
formulas like 'Ruritania is the state of the Ruritanian people', or, in slightly 
more liberal versions, 'Ruritania is the state of the Ruritanian people and the 
Slobbovian minority'. In the first case, it is unclear whether the people are 
defined in state terms, rendering the clause purely circular, or in national 
terms, meaning in practice that one of the nations in the state claims a 
privileged or monopolistic position. Such a claim for a privileged position 
may of course also exist in the second case, but there the existence of the 
claim is at least an empirical question. 
In optimal cases, it is possible to have state, class, and nation 'tamed' so as 
to enable them to co-exist relatively peacefully. Parliamentary democracy, 
where really functioning, has proven useful as an arena where class conflict 
can be acted out through organisation, the franchise, and horse trading. In 
such cases, as well in several other states, the traditional protagonists of 
alternative methods of struggle have gradually tended to adopt the view that 
democratic methods are the only ones that carry some prospect of progress. 
Such democracies are also peaceful in another sense. Although they do not 
differ markedly from other states regarding their participation in wars (and 
there is no solid support for the view that they are predominantly defensive 
in these cases), it has been clearly established that democracies rarely, if 
ever, go to war against each other.16 
These arguments, however, do not imply that this form of democracy is the 
ultimate solution to modern state government. In the cradle of parliamentary 
democracy - Western Europe and North America - class conflict and class 
identity have been strong in the popular consciousness and have eventually 
become regulated by this form of democratic government. In many parts of 
the world, other cleavages govern people's primary perceptions and actions, 
no matter what sociologists may have to say about the fundamental causes 
of these perceptions and actions. In these societies, democratic institutions 
have, at best, survived 'on the surface'; and, at worst, have simply becouit-
channels for ethnonational clashes of interests. In the very worst cases, they 
have stimulated rather than mitigated such clashes. 
To illustrate the different roles such 'democratic institutions' may play, I now 
turn to post-war European history and to what sociologists call a natur.-il 
experiment. 
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Ethnonational movements in west and east Europe 
Tiie last but one resurgence of ethnonational movements in Europe took 
lace between the two World Wars. After 1945, they seemed to have 
disappeared, and obituaries started appearing in the 1960s. Marxists tended 
to iiiagn°se the cause of death as increasing class consciousness since 
ettv-boLirgeois nationalism had been revealed as false consciousness. 
Liberals, on the other hand, often concluded that European integration had 
succeeded in transcending traditional and parochial ethnonationalism. The 
corpse, however, soon began to move and hindsight wisdom indicates that 
we should have been looking for ephemeral sedatives rather than causes of 
death. 
1 have two proposals in this respect. First, collaboration with the likes of 
Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini had ruined the legitimacy of many 
nationalist movements, as, for example, those among Croats, Slovaks, 
Ukrainians, the Flemish, Bretons, Albanians, and Hungarians - not to speak 
of Germans and Italians. It took a long time for them or their spiritual 
descendants to find their feet again, to launch credible movements again. 
Si-coudly, after 1945, European states were initially highly nervous about 
this subject, displaying little tolerance for anything that might lead to ethnic 
separatism. While referenda were frequently used for drawing new 
boundaries after 1918, they were virtually absent after 1945. The drawing of 
boundaries was viewed either as a matter of restoring the status quo ante 
(as in the cases of Western and, largely, South-Eastern Europe), or as the 
decree of the victor (in the cases of the new boundaries of the Soviet Union 
and Poland), or as political bargaining (in the case of Trieste). Once these 
'sedatives' began to lose their powers, the 'natural experiment' started. The 
crucial question that I shall try to address on the basis of this 'experiment' 
is, 'How are the forms and effects of ethnonational movements affected by 
the character of the societies they appear in?' 
A re-awakening occurred first in Western Europe, where ethnonationalism 
started reappearing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There were three 
important experimental conditions. First, there was economic affluence and 
growth, even if the latter was reduced after the first 'oil crisis' in 1973. 
Secondly, with the exception of the death throes of the Iberian dictatorships, 
there were not only democratic constitutions but also, and more importantly, 
old :.nd rooted democratic cultures within which, critically, conflicts were 
handled by peaceful rather than violent political means. Thirdly, the 
integration process, especially in the Nordic countries and in what is today 
tin.1 European Union, rendered state boundaries less and less meaningful. 
Under these conditions, a series of ethnonational movements appeared. 
'I heir normal behaviour was to create organisations, make propaganda, 
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demonstrate, form parties, take part in elections and referenda, look for 
alliance partners, and use log rolling and horse trading, all in good 
democratic fashion, to find solutions that were acceptable to all parties. Tliis 
was not always done with great enthusiasm, and, in some cases, it appears 
that action on divisive issues was postponed, but this behaviour does appear 
normal under the conditions pertaining in Western Europe at this time, in 
fact, this is what has happened in Belgium (Flemish, Germans), Great Britain 
(Scots, Welsh), Spain (Catalans, Galicians, Basques), Italy (Friulians, 
Germans, Sardinians), Switzerland (the division of Jura), Denmark 
(Germans, Faroites, Innuit), Austria (Croats, Slovenes), Norway (Saini), 
Sweden (Sami, Finns) and France (several groups). A more detailed analysis 
would certainly produce more cases. In a few cases, violence was used as a 
means of struggle by minorities within minorities, such as with the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, with the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna in the Basque lands and with a small group in Corsica. There 
have also been isolated cases of violence in Switzerland (Jura) and Italy 
(South Tirolia). 
In Central and Eastern Europe, ethnonational movements only became 
clearly visible in the 1980s (though there were harbingers in Kosovo in 19G8 
and in Croatia in 1971). These movements emerged under very different 
conditions. First, economic levels of living were far lower than those in 
Western Europe, and were followed by full-blown economic crises comprising 
increasing unemployment and inflation, on the one hand, and falling Gross 
Domestic Product and general standards of living, on the other.17 These 
circumstances create a well-known breeding ground for political radicalism, 
whether of a Right, Left, Nationalist, or Populist variety, or of a combination 
of these. Secondly, vital democratic traditions were rare. In several states 
they had never existed, and in others it was only very old people that could 
recall them in action.18 Political ambitions and brand new constitutions were 
not sufficient substitutes. Thirdly, previously integrative organisations - such 
as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Econoniie. 
Assistance, their grave shortcomings notwithstanding - were dissolved and 
not replaced by organisations that functioned better. Accordingly, stitc 
boundaries, symbols of (re)gained sovereignty, increased in salience. The 
prognosis was therefore very much worse than in Western Europe. 
As a consequence, it is more than possible to imagine any of the three 
potential ideological monsters developing into full strength. The first 
condition - economic stagnation and crisis - does not tell us what kind of 
radicalism we should expect. The second condition - the absence of 
democratic traditions - suggests that the potential to regulate such radicalism 
was weak. It is interesting to note however that general historical experience 
does seem to indicate that fledgling democracies are better at handling class 
than nation or state ideological issues. The third condition points in the same 
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direct ion • boundaries tend to mean much more for states and nations than 
for classes. 
Another important issue needs to be raised. Radical mobilisation on a class 
basis needs a political language as a vehicle; and the traditional language for 
this was so eroded and had lost so much credibility after decades of (ab)use 
from Communist propaganda that this political language was of little use, at 
least over the short term.19 
The most threatening monsters were therefore the ideologies of nation and 
state, in the. latter case, of two types: that of the 'outward state' (pointing to 
irrcdentism, expansionism) and of the 'inward state' (characterised by the 
leaderships' greed for societal power). By way of illustration, there have been 
a continuing series of boundary disputes, even if we limit ourselves to that 
part of Europe that lies East of the Italy-Austria-Germany-Finland-Norway 
line.1'" The only boundaries between what are now sovereign states that have 
not been moved, once or repeatedly, in our century are the 
Norwegian/Russian, the Estonian/Latvian, the Latvian/Lithuanian, and the 
Romanian/Yugoslav borders. 
Accordingly, we might well have expected a reawakening of the 'outward state' 
as an active monster and it is remarkable that this, by and large, has not 
happened. Some states have indeed been talking about boundary revision, 
but apparently most often as a bargaining tactic rather than as a serious 
claim. Other states have supported the demands of their co-nationals in other 
states for autonomy, by means which range from political declarations to 
arms smuggling, but they have not sent people in their state's uniforms across 
these boundaries. All Russian (and other ex-Soviet) troops have returned 
home, exccpt for a handful in Latvia that are treaty-bound to do so soon. The 
armed forces of Yugoslavia have withdrawn from Slovenia after a faked war, 
and from Macedonia without even that. After recognition of Croatia and 
Bosnia-He.rcegovina by the great powers, they also pulled out, leaving the 
fighting to the local Serbs; and when there was international criticism of 
Croatia's military presence, it was legitimised by a formal alliance with the 
Sarajevo government. Russia has had its new military presence in some crisis 
areas approved by the respective governments and legitimised by the 
Commonwealth of Independent States or even the United Nations to a 
sufficient degree to avoid international criticism.2' 
Regarding 'outward state' ideologies and movements, therefore, the challenge 
is to explain, in Sherlock Holmes' terms, why the dog didn't bark. In some 
cases, explanations may be found at local level. Trying to realise claims for 
boundary revisions with Russia by armed force would have been suicidal for 
Estonia and Latvia.22 In other cases, a war implied very debatable prospects, 
as, for example, between the nuclear-weapon powers of Russia and Ukraine. 
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In several cases, however, local explanations do not suffice for we would have 
had fewer wars in the world, had this kind of uncertainty been a generally 
deterring factor. An important part of the explanation, accordingly, needs to 
be sought at the European level. 
We may begin with the prohibition in the Helsinki Agreement against seeking 
boundary revisions by use of threats of armed force. This prohibition has 
been strengthened by direct support from predominantly Western 
institutions, in particular, by the European Union and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. Rarely, however, if ever, has the chief motive to maintain 
a low profile on such issues flowed from fear of Western military sanctions. 
The motive for desisting from open disobedience is rather to be found in the 
desire (whether realistic or not) of many governments to 'get into the West' 
(EU, NATO, etc.) and the belief that playing by Western rules improves the 
chances for that. 
The remaining monster candidates are then the nation and the 'inward state', 
and clashes between these two forms of movement. Statistics of violent 
conflict indicate, in fact, that these two monsters account for far more 
violence than the others. Let us consider them in more detail. 
Nation and state 
There are many examples of different nations living peacefully together in 
one state. Sometimes one of them is so predominant that the others do not 
even try to assert themselves; and sometimes they have eventually been able 
to fine-tune political institutions to the point where all parties accept them, 
or even like them. Yet, several historical analyses show that multinational 
states run higher risks of civil war than others and that these risks seem to 
be particularly great where both Christians and Moslems form large groups, 
no matter which of them is the biggest one.23 Since the average state in 
Central/Eastern Europe is more nationally heterogeneous than in Western 
Europe, this gives an additional argument for its having a worse prognosis 
than West European states. 
The percentage figure for the biggest national group in a state is a very crude 
indicator indeed but it nonetheless seems to have considerable predictive 
power regarding serious domestic problems, at least in Central and Eastern 
Europe.24 The Statesman's Yearbook, supplemented with a few estimates, 
offers us the following rank ordering in groups of ten from worst to best 
prognosis, on the assumption that greater heterogeneity results in greater 
problems. The figures are often several years old, but demographic changes 
are very slow and the ordering will accordingly not have been affected much 
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such changes.25 The brackets give percentages of the second (and 
occas i ona l l y third) largest group in the given state. 
^ .Yugos l a v i a : 
Bosnia- Hercegovina: 
Kazakhstan: 
Kyrgyzstan: 
USSR: 
Latvia: 
Tajikistan: 
Moldova: 
Czechoslovakia: 
Estonia: 
Macedonia: 67 (Macedonians, 22 Albanians) 
F.K.Yugoslavia: 67 (Serbs/Montenegrins, 16 Albanians) 
Turkonienistan: 68 (Turkomens, 13 Russians) 
Uzbekistan: 69 (Uzbeks, 11 Russians) 
Georgia: 69 (Georgians, 9 Armenians) 
Ukraine: 74 (Ukrainians, 21 Russians) 
Croatia: 75 (Croats, 12 Serbs) 
Azerbai jan: 79 (Azeri, 8 Russians, 8 Armenians) 
Belarus: 79 (Byelorussians, 12 Russians) 
Lithuania: 80 (Lithuanians, 9 Russians, 8 Poles) 
Russia: 83 (Russians, 4 Ukrainians) 
Bulgaria: 80-85 (Bulgarians, 13 Turks) 
Slovakia: 80-85 (Slovaks, some 10 Hungarians) 
Romania: 85-90 (Romanians, 8-10 Hungarians) 
Armenia: 90 (Armenians, then Azeri) 
Slovenia: 91 (Slovenes, several small groups) 
Albania: above 90 (Albanians, then Greeks) 
Czech Rep.: above 90 (Czechs, then Slovaks) 
Poland: c. 95 (Poles, then Germans) 
Hungary: 97 (Hungarians) 
36 (Serbs, 20 Croats) 
40 (Moslems, 32 Serbs) 
41 (Russians, 36 Kazakhs) 
49 (Kirgyzians, 26 Russians) 
52 {Russians, 16 Ukrainians) 
54 (Latvians, 33 Russians) 
59 (Tajikhs, 23 Uzbeks) 
64 (Moldovians, 14 Ukrainians, 12 Russians) 
64 (Czechs, 32 Slovaks) 
65 (Estonians, 28 Russians) 
Out ol" the ten most heterogeneous states, including Estonia, three have been 
dissolved, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia by war. In Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
Moldova, two or three parts have declared themselves independent and 
remain beyond the control of central government authority after years of 
armed conflict. Tajikistan has experienced a major civil war since 1992. The 
remaining four: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Estonia and Latvia, are the most 
Russian states outside Russia itself, and each displays considerable or strong 
ethnic tensions. 
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None of the following ten states - Macedonia through Belarus - has b e e 
formally dissolved, but Georgia, Croatia and Azerbaijan, after major wars 
are de facto divided states. There have been clashes between ethnic groups 
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and there are strong internal tensions lii 
most of the others. Declarations of independence, in one form or another 
have been proclaimed by the Albanians in Macedonia26 and in Yugoslavia27' 
and by the Russians in the Crimea.23 The only state in which these kinds 0f 
problems appear absent is Belarus, which now seems to be headed for closer 
integration with Russia. 
The group of relatively homogeneous states, from Lithuania downwards 
appears better off in several respects. No formal dissolution has taken place.' 
Various declarations of independence in parts of the Russian Federation" 
have been recognised by nobody other than the minority concerned. The only 
clear bid for de facto dissolution is the main cause of the war in Chechnya, 
the only war located in this lower section of the list of states given above. The 
1989 power-shift in Romania had little background of this kind, and 
Armenia's support for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh has remained 
unofficial. 
Domestic tensions within these states have not been entirely absenl, as 
witnessed by past periods of forced Bulgarisation of Turks in Bulgaria, open 
discrimination against Hungarians in Romania and difficult Slovak-
Hungarian relations. As a matter of fact, we have to descend in the list to the 
second half of the third group to find states which experience few inter-group 
problems and this conclusion may not be accepted by some Greeks in Albania, 
some non-Slovenes in Slovenia or some Jews in Poland and Hungary. 
Peace among the monsters? 
Let us now turn to the category of states that are heterogeneous in some 
'ethnic' respect, such as regarding language, religion, customs, or historical 
traditions and myths. Across time and space, we find a great variety of 
dimensions which have served as the basis for human beings to think of 
themselves as belonging to 'different peoples' or to 'different nations'." Iri 
Belgium, for example, it is a matter of language, in Northern Ireland religion, 
in Canada and Cyprus, the main basis has gradually moved from religion to 
language, in Scotland it is primarily a matter of historical traditions, and in 
Somalia and Rwanda of perceptions and traditions of kinship among people 
who speak the same language and where religion is not a dividing line. 
The extent to which heterogeneity is perceived to be a problem by actors in 
a state also varies. Accordingly, it is possible by using historical example to 
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list opt ics or strategies that have been attempted by actors to 'solve' the 
potential or actual problem. I list seven of the most important below: 
(1) State-organised genocide. Several nations disappeared altogether or 
were reduced to tiny minorities during the 19th century by the 
United States and by European colonial powers in Africa.31 
(2) Ridding the state of as many of the minority populations as possible, 
so as to create 'ethnically clean' areas. Among the methods are 
state-organised deportation, usually with a high death rate32; terror, 
with various kinds of relationships between the central government 
and different militias or gangs33; and other kinds of mass expulsion 
in more legal forms, such as those based on formal citizenship34, or 
limited to strong encouragement to leave the state concerned.35 
(3) 'Neutralising' the minorities politically by using citizenship or voting 
legislation to make it difficult or impossible for them to get the same 
status as the 'state-carrying' group. This method is widely used 
against first or second generation immigrants, but also by colonial 
powers against autochtonous populations3® and by several 
post-colonial states against their aboriginal populations. 
(4) Retaining (partially or largely) different social orders for different 
groups, like the old Turkish millet system, where the state 
recognised separate systems of family (and wider areas of civil) law 
lor different monotheistic religious groups. 
(5) I laving two or more official languages and/or a high degree of local 
autonomy concerning the choice of official languages.37 
(6) Creating 'trans-ethnic' identities. Among the relatively successful cases, 
we find 'American', 'British' (except Irish Catholics), 'Finlander' and 
'Swiss'. There are also many failures. 
(7) Using sticks or carrots to assimilate linguistic, religious, and other 
minorities into the majority group. Modern examples include the 
systematic Frenchification of France since the early nineteenth 
century and, in more extreme forms, the attempts to make Russians 
or Germans out of the Poles, and Japanese out of the Koreans. 
Some of these methods have resulted in, and even created, far worse conflicts 
than (hose that they were supposed to solve. Today, a number violate 
international law to the extent that they carry risks of international sanctions 
which ra nge from military intervention to being kept in the waiting room of 
the Council of Europe. This is true for options (1), most versions of (2), and 
some variations of (3). 
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Whatever merits (4) may have, this option is difficult to combine with the 
formal requirements of equality before the law in modern states.38 Where we 
find versions of (4) in European history, these options tended to be medieval 
cases of conquest or migration relating, for example, to English/Celts, to 
Germans/Slavs, or to Christians, Moslems and Jews in the Iberian peninsula 
and southern Italy. They always proved to be unstable, leading after a few 
generations to the system of the strongest group prevailing.39 
Some of the other methods, especially some variants of (3) and (7), tend to 
engender resistance which may in turn lead to armed conflict, launched by 
either minority groups or by the central government. Often, what the 
predominant group sees as 'law and order' is seen as intentional 
discrimination by others and what the former sees as peaceful assimilation 
may look like planned ethnocide in the eyes of others. 
If judged by history, options (5) and (6) seem to have the best prospects for 
conflict management but they also have their problems. One main problem 
with (5) is hinted at by the formulation 'and/or' above: autonomy and 
multilingualism may be combined in different ways. We have the maximal 
version of bilingualism, where the official languages of the state are also the 
official ones at all political and administrative levels, with numerous 
consequent issues concerning language ability of government staff, financing 
of school systems, and so forth.'10 These issues may result in resistance within 
the majority group, where people may ask themselves why they have to learn 
the minority language in school at the expense of other and more useful 
languages. On the other hand, maximal autonomy is often accompanied by 
minimal multilingualism, where the central government is the only 
multilingual institution and each language remains exclusive to the territorial 
unit within which it is dominant.41 
One version of (6) is what we may call the 'citizen state', within which 
identification and solidarity with the state is greater than with the nation {to 
the extent that they collide), and also greater than with class or any other 
category with which the citizens may identify themselves. In any case, the 
existence of such a super-identity seems to be a necessary condition for such 
a citizen state. Among the cases lying relatively close to this ideal type of a 
modern multi-ethnic citizen state, we find the United States and some West 
European states, such as Finland and France {regardinglanguage); Germany 
and The Netherlands (regarding religion); and Switzerland (regardingboth). 
Several other states have officially proclaimed this type of state as a political 
ideal, or as an achievement but there are normally good grounds for 
scepticism on both counts. 
These examples also suggest that insofar as a state has progressed 
sufficiently in this direction, it will simultaneously stabilise as a state, 
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wli ifcver other grudges its citizens may harbour. This observation raises two 
fiirti er questions: How much is 'sufficient', and how does one get there? A 
major problem with method (6) is that it is rarely feasible to create such a 
super-identity by dictates from above. Until recently in Italy, for example, an 
Kalian politician's 1870 proclamation - 'Now we have created Italy; it only 
Kin-'his to create Italians!' - appeared to have succeeded but the emergence 
of Lega Lombarda, later Lega Nord, has questioned his assertion. British 
super-identity moreover has not been able to prevent a majority of Scots from 
voting for devolution in the referendum in the 1970s.'12 A Spanish state was 
created centuries ago, but a Spanish super-identity never really developed, 
even though General Francisco Franco was able to prevent too public an 
expression of other identities over a lengthy period. 
By contrasting successes with a number of failures, we may derive some 
tentative hypotheses aboutthe emergence of'sufficient' super-identities. Long 
duration as a state (or at least as a political entity) helps, but does not seem 
to be sufficient.43 An origin as a voluntary association (as, for example, in 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States) is useful, but does not 
seem to be necessary. As for religion, the Catholic/Protestant cleavage has in 
most cases eventually been possible to neutralise, often by not having any 
state religion. 
No immediate conclusions can be made concerning linguistic issues, Finland 
and France lying close to the opposite extremes.44 Still another dimension is 
hinted at by Ernest Gellner's classical quip that a nation is a group with a 
common enemy and a common misunderstanding of history. 
These observations may give some guidelines for further research on 'how 
much is sufficient', but they do not tell us how a state may achieve this 
sufficiency. To what extent does that depend on what the state is doing and 
to what extent on the dynamics of civil society? 
Though it is only in recent decades that 'nation-building' has become an 
analytical term, the phenomenon is far older. Several states, with France as 
the classical example, have systematically devoted themselves to creating a 
super-identity, although with widely varying degrees of success. All 
multinational empires have collapsed - if we count the Soviet Union among 
them, it obviously never succeeded in creating a real 'Soviet' identity 
transcending national ones. In fact, governmental attempts to create such a 
super-identity from above seem to have failed more often than to have 
succeeded, possibly because ambitious nation-builders have often missed 
the point that it is easier to create a single nation when it is not defined in 
opposition to national identities. After 1945, by way of illustration, Yugoslavia 
tried for a period to create a Yugoslav identity in competition with existing 
national identities, only to admit defeat in 1964.45 
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To what extent is it possible to replicate successful cases in today's world, in 
particular, in Europe? The United States obviously cannot be copied. It is 
today clearly impossible to create a state by exterminating the population of 
a large area and replace it with predominantly voluntary, or even 
enthusiastic, immigrants. The principle of voluntary association is not very 
helpful in those parts of Europe where the main problem is that large 
population groups do not want to belong to a recently-created state containing 
a different ethnic majority. 
To the extent that religion has a strong role in the definition of identity, the 
roads described in the histories of Germany and the Netherlands are not very 
encouraging either. In the former case, there was the Thirty Years' War which 
killed off about half the population; in the latter case, there was eighty years 
of liberation war against a common enemy. 
Finally, let us consider France and Finland. The difference between these 
cases hints at a classical dilemma for regimes in multinational states. Should 
one give more (primarily cultural) autonomy to the nations and run the risk 
of escalating claims for territorial autonomy, or state dissolution through 
secession? Or should one rather resolutely oppose all such demands, and 
risk that the demands frustrated by this very opposition grow stronger and 
eventually speed up the collapse of the state? 
Finland appears easier to copy than France, for the French (in the sense of 
mother tongue French-speakers) have grown from being a minority at the 
beginning of the last century to being five-sixths today, surrounded by half a 
dozen minorities in different corners of the country. Frenchification was 
largely carried out before the combination of lengthy formal education, 
modern communication technology, and the self-consciousness of civil 
society had rendered this project well nigh impossible. 
The contrast is Finland after its independence in 1917, where very generous 
language policies of the state have contributed to avoiding contradictions 
between a Swedish cultural identity and a 'Finlandish' (rather than Finnish) 
political identity. Method (5), accordingly, has been an important 
precondition for the application of method (6). 
Copying, however, is rarely simple. First, Finland has a leading position 
among multilingual European states, almost every citizen being able to use 
his or her mother tongue in school and in communication with authorities. 
Since this position is shared by both Switzerland and ex-Yugoslavia, it is 
obviously not enough. Secondly, it is going to be very difficult for several 
states to copy Finland in this respect. They are now engaged in building up 
their state identities, which usually means linking this identity strongly to 
the (majority) nation and contrasting themselves as strongly as possibly from 
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the states from which they have just seceded. In this situation, the Finnish 
model tends to be less attractive than the French and the governments 
concerned attempt Latvianisation, Slovakisation, Croatisation, 
Ivlacedonisation, and so on. Though there are members of the ethnic majority 
that criticise these tendencies as unwise or even unjust, they are usually too 
few to have mucli political influence now, and there is a real risk that they 
will not succeed in building such influence until it is too late. 
It appears then that the best hypothesis is that method (5), with the cautious 
striking of balances it must include, is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for the success of method (6) and the creation of an identity that 
permits the state to enjoy priority above nation, class, and so on. There is a 
second necessary condition: in a citizen-state, the citizens must have 
influence, and it was on this point that ex-Yugoslavia failed. When the 
elections in 1990 manifested at least the superficial attributes of a multi-party 
state, the political atmosphere was already poisoned by ethnonational 
mobilisation. 'Yugoslavism' of type (6) never had a chance: its traditional 
version was too interwoven with Communist doctrine and rhetoric to be able 
to survive as a legitimising ideology, and the liberal versions that had started 
to emerge were too fledgling to be able to compete with the Serb, Croat and 
several other versions of extreme nationalism. 
In order to avoid catastrophes, it may be necessary for the state to acquire 
priority with respect to identification and solidarity. It is not sufficient, 
however, since such a state may well develop from a potential to a real 
monster, where the suppression of class conflict is legitimised by corporatist 
or other authoritarian ideologies, and the suppression of ethnic 
contradictions by the same or other 'harmony ideologies', equating any form 
of ethnic mobilisation with treason and terrorism. History is replete with 
eases of a fledgling democracy collapsing under the influence of such 
tendencies, or at least degenerating into sheer symbolism within a strongly 
authoritarian state. 
To tame the state, one has to make it relatively unimportant. To put it more 
cautiously, a number of identity dimensions other than state identity are 
required to counter-balance state power, Furthermore, not only ought not 
the state to have a monopoly within its own dimension, but ought to be 
balanced by 'lower' identities in one direction and a measure of regionalism 
or even globalism in the other. 
With so many difficult equations facing governments finding themselves in 
situations that are also serious in other respects, there might paradoxically 
be grounds for a certain optimism regarding the future. This optimism is 
based on the view that what is remarkable is not so much that there have 
been so many wars and conflicts, but that in so many states there has been 
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sufficient creativity and wisdom among the parties involved to have enabled 
states to manage and regulate conflict in spite of grim prognoses based on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. This implies that we should not let 
research focus too much on states where things went seriously wrong46 but 
also on those states where things did not go as badly as expected. 
NOTES 
1. Complexity was then added when die Croat-Moslem war escalated in spring 1993 to the 
extent that it could no longer remain invisible, not to speak about the Moslem-Moslem 
war in the Bihac area since September 1993. 
2. See Peter Brock 'Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press', Foreign Policy no.93, Winter 
1993-94 and Jacques Meriino Les Verites Yougoslaues ne sont pas toutes bonnes a 
dire (Paris, 1993). 
3. Sometimes also called 'personality'. 
4. Territory and territoriality have been the subject of quite a bit of ideological literature. 
There are, however, also important scholarly analyses, such as Torsten Malmberg 
Human Territoriality (The Hague, 1980). 
5. For the social construction of'race', see the penetrating analysis in Michael Banton 
Racial Minorities (London, 1972). Its general logic is also applicable to other social 
constructs of this type, such as 'nation'. 
6. I am using this Weberian term to avoid getting into a discussion in the present chapter of 
the competing conceptualisations of 'class'. In short, class is obviously often an 
important basis for social organisation and mobilisation, but has to be thorougly 
conceptualised in order to be analytically helpful in this respect; even then, it is not the 
only significant categorisation of the 'market position' type. 
7. A central work on social constructions and their roles in identity formation is Peter Bergcr 
and Thomas Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (New York, 1967). 
8. Not that tills can succeed very far: throwing out what has been borrowed in the last 
thousand years would leave very little of most European languages. 
9. There is an important sociological tradition that sees the creation and stabilisation of 
identity as central functions of social conflict. The classic is Georg Simmel Der Strelt 
(1908) which appears in English together with another essay as Conflict and the Web of 
Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, 1955), critically followed up by Lewis Coser Thefunctions 
of social conflict (Glencoe, 1964). 
10. The monachic republic of Athos was entirely dependent on immigration. Age groups may 
indeed form an important basis for social organisation in some societies, but cannot 
constitute one. 
11. In general, an ascribed position is one which it is beyond the control of an individual to 
affect, whereas an achieved position is based on some effort, such as education, (often) 
profession, income, and so on. 
12. Here and later, I am using the Weberian term 'ideal type' to refer to a simplifying 
construction, not to express any normative opinion. 
13. Slavenka Drakulic expresses this very well in her book Balkan Ekspres 
(Copenhagen, 1993 - Balkan Express: Fragments from the other side of the war, in the 
English version): "This is what the war does to us - reduces us to one dimension: the 
nation. But the problem with this nationalism is that whereas I was previously defined 
by my education, my work, my thoughts, my personality - and, yes, also by my 
nationality -1 now feel deprived of all that. I am nothing, no longer a person. I am one 
out of 4.5 million Croats" (my translation from the Danish edition, p.48). 
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For details, see H&kan Wiberg 'Divided Nations and Divided States' in Jorg Callie and 
13ernliard Moltmann (eds) Weltsystem und Weltpolitikjenseits der Bipolaritat II 
(Kehburg-Loccum, 1992), pp.457-477 and H&kan Wiberg 'Societal Security and the 
Explosion of Yugoslavia' in OleWsever : Barry Buzan: Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre 
Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London, 1993), 
pp.;).'!-109. For a in ore general presentation of various social constructions of 'nation', 
sec Benedict Anderson Imagined communities (London, 1983). 
It is another matter that it tends to take intellectuals who stand to profit from its being 
made to formulate this and disseminate this call. On the role of mass media inside 
Ex-Yugoslavia, see Marjan Malesic (ed.) The Role of Mass Media in the 
Serbian-Croatian Conflict. Rapport No. 164 (Stockholm, 1993) and Mark Thompson 
Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnla-Hercegovina. Article 19 
(London, 1994). 
See several articles in the special issue of Journal of Peace Research, no.4, 1992. 
For a detailed study of Ex-Yugoslavia from this point of view, see Carl-Ulrik Schierup 
Migration, Socialism and the International Division of Labour: The Yugoslav Case 
(Aldershot, 1990). 
After the First World War, democratic regimes were indeed toppled in some West 
European countries (Italy 1922, Portugal 1928, Germany 1933, Spain 1936-39), but 
survived in all the others until the German occupation of some of them, after which they 
were restored in 1945. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the only parliamentary 
democracies that had survived as such were Finland (where it had been touch and go in 
the early 1930s) and Czechoslovakia, which was eventually torn apart by ethnic 
cleavages engineered by Hitler. 
The electoral swings in Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, 
Bulgaria - and elsewhere - indicate that the 'suppression' of class in favour of nation 
may not be very long-lived. 
By my count, at least 23 boundaries in this area have been changed once or more in the 
20th century. Macedonia appears to keep the record by entirely or partly changing 
rulers in 1912, 1913, 1915, 1918, 1941, 1945 and 1991. 
The ease of Chechnya belongs to another category, and international governmental 
criticism has been carefully limiting itself to the way of fighting the war, while giving no 
support to Chechenian independence claims. 
And it is anyhow difficult to imagine their governments interested in having more 
Russians than now in Estonia or Latvia, so the demands must have some other 
background. 
This is the conclusion, for the period 1820-1949, in Lewis Fry Richardson's Statistics of 
Deadly Quarrels (Chicago, 1960). There is also little ground for optimism today, given 
that the main cases combining a majority of one with a big, or locally predominant, 
minority of the other include the Philippines, Lebanon, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria, plus several 
African states, the worst cases being the Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda. 
In tin: list below, we count the old states as well as the first generation of successor states. 
Reccnt refugee floods from and between former Soviet or Yugoslav republics have 
changed some demographic compositions more drastically; but since we are looking at 
relations between an earlier composition and later severe conflicts, this is irrelevant to 
the question of predictive power. 
After a referendum in 1991, however, the bigger Albanian parties opted for trying to work 
within the political system. 
Where the Kosovo Albanians are boycotting the Yugoslav institutions, including 
parliament elections, and are building up their own institutions, but have opted for 
nonviolent resistance. 
This has lead to an alternation between confrontations and compromises, between the 
local Crimean and central Ukrainian governments. 
Some of these are ethnically related, others merely regional; some of them merely call for 
greater economic and other autonomy, whereas others have proclaimed full 
independence. 
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30. This remains equally true if we limit ourselves to the particularly strong definition of the 
term 'nation' that also presupposes some political project on separate status, autonomy 
or even secession. 
31. Among the main cases of attempted genocide in our century are the Ottoman Empire 
(Armenians), Hitler Germany (Jews and Gypsies, plus decimation of Poles and others) 
and Ante Pavelic's Croatia (Jews, Serbs, Gypsies); the entire list of mass killing based 
mainly or entirely on ethnicity is much longer. It gets longer still if we add the cases 
where there is no indication of state organisation of the killings, such as the million 
victims of the division of British India. 
32. Such as Joseph Stalin against Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars, Chechens, and so on, 
plus sizeable parts of the Baltic peoples; or several East European states expelling 
altogether about ten million Germans. 
33. For instance, against the Palestinians in 1948 or between different peoples in Former 
Yugoslavia. 
34. For instance, Indians in East Africa and several cases of mutual expulsion of expatriates 
in West Africa. 
35. Among the targets are Russians in Estonia and Latvia and immigrant workers in Western 
Europe. 
36. Apartheid survived longest among the formal institutions of this kind. 
37. Different combinations can be found in, for example, Belgium, Canada, Finland, India, 
Israel, Spain, Switzerland and Ex-Yugoslavia. 
38. India provided a good illustration of this in the 1980s when its Supreme Court had to 
make a decision as to whether Indian law was to override Sharia concerning alimony to 
divorced Moslem women, or vice versa. 
39. See Robert Bartlett The making of Europe. Conquest, colonization and cultural change 
950-1350 (Harmondswortli, 1994). 
40. In the case of religion, problems can be solved by having no state religion; but the state 
cannot be mute, nor can it handle addressing issues in any language that some citizens 
may count as mother tongue. 
41. The UN Commission for Human Rights recently prohibited Canada from allowing Quebec 
to prohibit and fine public announcements in any other language than French. 
42. Since the rules had been made in Westminster, that majority still lost, not being more 
than 40 per cent of those entitled to vote. 
43. A methodological problem is that there are very few states outside (mainly Western) 
Europe that can claim high age as a state. 
44. It might even be that a state will have to choose between these opposite extremes and is 
more likely to get problems by attempting to compromise between them; but it would be 
premature to offer this as a hypothesis. 
45. The number of self-proclaimed 'Yugoslavs' was never much beyond ten per cent in the 
censuses, falling to six per cent in 1981 and three in 1991. In Bosnia-Hercegovtna, 
furthermore, self-declared 'Bosnians' have never been more than a fraction of one per 
cent, the very great majority defining themselves as 'Serbs', 'Croats', 'Moslems' and 
'Yugoslavs'. The Moslem leadership in Sarajevo has now changed its name to 'Bosnjak', 
which was traditionally pejorative, but it remains unclear exactly whom, beyond the 
Moslems, the Sarajevo government claims to fall in that category. 
46. International attempts at intervention may lead to even worse outcomes, irrespective of 
the proclaimed aims of these attempts. The case of Ex-Yugoslavia is analysed from this 
point of view in H&kan Wiberg 'Yugoslavia and conflict resolution: problems and 
lessons' in Dusan Janjic (ed.) Religion and War (Belgrade, 1994), pp.104-124. 
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VIOLENT AND PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENTS OF 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
Some Theses on the Determinants 
Klaus Gottstein 
Since ancient times, the history of mankind has been full of violent ethnic 
conflicts. The Bible tells us of the murderous wars that occurred in the Near 
East between 3000 and 2000 years ago. The tales of written or oral histoiy and 
the legends and mythologies that survived from other parts of the world likewise 
describe wars and bloodshed between different groups and peoples. Of course, 
there have also been peaceful settlements and friendly cohabitation. These are 
mentioned less frequently, probably because they are less conspicuous and do 
not offer similar material to poets and historians for the description of human 
heroism and human passion, as tragic conflicts do. There is no doubt, however, 
thai both peace and war are possible within and between human societies. 
Neither one is inevitable, as numerous historical examples prove. Nevertheless, 
there is still controversy as to the conditions and actions which are likely to lead 
to either war or peace when a crisis situation arises, in spite of the fact that quite 
a bit is known in this respect.' 
Psychologists, historians and behavioural scientists have studied the ways 
individuals, groups and populations behave in situations of stress, 
excitement, exuberance, depression and despair and have developed theories 
Willi respect to the gradual or sudden emergence of enemy images, as a 
consequence, for instance, of traumatic experiences which may have 
occurred in the distant past to members of the group under investigation. 
"Psychoanalysts and students of human behaviour have shown that 
the insticts of aggression and destruction, just as well as the instincts 
of love and cooperation, are deeply seated in human nature. They 
are the result of a struggle for survival in a hostile environment 
through thousands of generations. In its course man learned how 
advantageous it was - in hunting, in agriculture, in war - to 
cooperate with other members of the tribe. A division of labour, a 
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coordination of efforts led to much better results. Now jobs could be 
done, tasks could be tackled which were completely out of reach of tfle 
individual or a smalll group. The larger a cooperating group was, the 
greater was its power, given equal levels of cultural development, but 
in order to keep peace within the group, taboos had to be set up and 
aggressive instincts suppressed. As Sigmund Freud tells us, ihis 
suppression leads to recurring eruptions of aggression towards those 
not belonging to the group, such as minorities and neighbouring groups. 
It is therefore not surprising that in the history of human development, 
from the beginning of our days, wars and violence are permanent 
phenomena. As groups grew larger and reached the size of nations and 
alliances of nations, and as technology became more and more 
advanced, wars became more and more devastating. Today mankind 
has acquired the technical capability to annihilate itself just by 
pressing a few buttons."2 
Since human beings depend on co-operation, they live in groups. They are 
co-operative in the sense that members of a group assist one another in joint 
undertakings. They are ready to defend themselves against compel ing 
groups. Attack is often considered to be the best defence. Sometimes 
aggressive behaviour is motivated by fear, sometimes it derives from a feeling 
of superiority, from the 'right of the stronger group'. This is the law of the 
jungle. When humans became sedentary, their units grew larger. In order to 
preserve peace internally and organise co-operation and defence, it became 
necessary to formulate and observe laws, to supervise their observance and 
to enforce sanctions against law-breakers. A leader, king or judge had the 
monopoly of passing judgement and, on behalf of the community, applying 
force. The individual was no longer allowed to take the law into his own 
hands. States developed, and, as long as they were stable, internal law and 
order ruled, more or less. But in dealing with each other the states have not 
overcome another law of the jungle. In modern times, primitive law has been 
curbed, though quite inadequately, by international law. The bloody wars (•! 
the 20th century are proof of this inadequacy. Nevertheless, the United 
Nations exists. With their 'Blue Helmets' and with the International Court of 
Justice some small first steps have been taken towards a political 
organisation which is meant to comprise all of humanity. When it will have 
been completed foreign policy will be replaced by world-wide domestic policy 
('Weltinnenpolitik' according to C.F.von Weizsacker). The use of force will 
then be the monopoly of the Security Council or some equivalent body which 
will see to it that all conflicts are settled peacefully, if necessary by the rulings 
of an International Court, and the execution of these rulings will be enforced 
in agreement with world law. 
We all know that we are still far removed from this state of affairs. But it is 
important to know that this is the long-range goal which should be 
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reached step by step. Meanwhile, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
nul l ie disappearance of the Cold War, old historical animosities which had 
almost been forgotten and considered resolved long ago, came to the surface 
l n of course, old friendships were also renewed: between the peoples of 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe, for instance, and between East 
Germans and West Germans. But this renewal of old friendships sometimes 
led to disappointments, because it did not always fulfil the material 
expectations associated with this renewal. 
With all the knowledge available on the psychological, historical, economic, 
and political origins of conflicts it is regrettable that there is little evidence 
that this knowledge is used by political decision-makers for the avoidance of 
armed conflicts. Indeed, we do not have to study ancient history in order to 
find examples of horrible wars and of massacres among the civilian 
populations, including old people, women and children, belonging to the 
parties fighting each other. These outrages happen in our present days, can 
be watched on TV, and are more cruel and bloody then ever due to the 
existence of modern weapons and technologies. But we need also to be fair 
in nur judgement. There are also examples of the peaceful settlement of 
difficult political problems in our days. We shall come to that later. 
Obviously, we cannot put up with the present state of affairs when ruthless 
leaders are allowed to pursue their political objectives by brute force, taking 
civilian populations as hostages and subjecting them in a most cruel and 
Inhumane way to months and years of continuous shelling and to deprivation 
of fond and medical supplies. Moreover, while doing this these leaders do 
not have to fear any sanctions. In a conflict of this kind there should have 
been intervention by superior police forces of the United Nations. 
Theoretically, the best solution for conflicts threatening to get out of control 
and turn violent would be, of course, to remove enemy images on which the 
original feud leading to the conflict was based. Can this be done? These enemy 
images might have their origin in a variety of genuine or merely perceived 
conflicts of interest, or in racial prejudices, in traditional antagonisms 
between neighbouring competing tribes or groups, in imagined irreconcilable 
religious differences, and so on. 
What is known about enemy images and the methods that could prevent their 
appearance and growth? Is it possible to 'cure' enemy images, and, if so, what 
are the prerequisites for doing this? What can be said regarding the available 
methods of crisis management and conflict resolution when violent eruptions 
between groups are to be avoided, when peaceful settlements are to be 
reached? Under which conditions do social and political changes of the type 
observable in former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union lead to 
aggression against minorities, to racism, ethnic cleansing, extreme 
nationalism, or civil war? What role does the weakening or disappearance of 
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central authority play in this respect? What is the origin of enemy images 
which underlie armed conflicts between populations which have lived 
together reasonably peacefully so long as a strong central authority existed 
in their territory? Which psychological tools are available to replace by 
co-operative behaviour such enemy images and associated racism 
chauvinism, and xenophobia? 
It would be worthwhile to take stock of existing answers to these questions, 
Though this cannot be done in a comprehensive way in this chapter, the 
writer will offer some suggestions based on practical experience gained 
during four decades of work in international relations, both within the 
academic community and during official assignments in scientific, 
technological and political co-operation between 'East and West' as well as 
between 'North and South', during the Cold War era. During this period, 
many conflicts of varying intensity took place, and an attentive observe]- had 
the opportunity to note the conditions under which they ran their course. 
Historical analysis supplied further examples. The author has learned much 
moreover through discussions with psychologists, and by reading 
publications in the field of conflict research. 
Vamik Volkan and his colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and 
Human Interaction (CSMHI) of the University of Virginia have argued 
convincingly that the emotional core of conflicts between groups can often be 
found in 'chosen traumas' and 'chosen glories' of opposing sides. Chosen 
traumas refer to the shared mental representations of humiliating events 
during which losses which could not be mourned effectively, occurred. 
Chosen glories recount the shared mental representations of events of 
success or triumph. Both are often mythologized and passed from generation 
to generation, although historical grievances are stronger markers of a 
group's identity than the mental representations of past glories. Losses 
associated with chosen traumas cannot be mourned and the humiliation and 
hurt cannot be resolved. Therefore such traumas are handed down in the 
'hope' that they can be mourned, resolved, or avenged in the future. This 
handing down, however, serves to perpetuate feelings of victimisation, 
entitlement, and the desire for revenge rather than successful mourning and 
resolution. Traumas experienced many centuries in the past are still active 
in the identities of some groups. It is as if time collapses and feelings about 
ancient events are condensed and intertwined with current events.3 
Volkan and his colleagues at the CSMHI have developed a kind of group 
intervention process in which leading representatives of the two opposing 
sides in a conflict meet with a neutral group of experts in psychoanalysis and 
in the history of the area in question. While the representatives of the two 
opposing sides attack each other verbally, voicing the accusations underlying 
the conflict, the neutral observers listen. Later on, they identify and 
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communicate to the two sides the traumas and glories which, on a conscious 
and obvious level, make them think the way they are thinking. A discussion 
follows. The two sides learn to view the situation not only through their own 
eyes, but also through neutral eyes, and through the eyes of the opposing 
side. They learn to understand the 'hidden transcripts' of the power situation 
between them.4 Tolerance is promoted, mourning is allowed. Symbolic acts 
in this regard are of great emotional importance. (Examples include Willy 
Brandt going down on his knees before the Warsaw ghetto memorial; 
Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl visiting the Verdun battlefield and its 
soldiers' cemetery together.) So is the building of joint institutions. 
Of course, before this can be done, a desire for co-operation is required. For 
instance, Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina had joint institutions 
before their country disintegrated. As long as a strong central authority 
existed, they lived together peacefully in one country. When the state 
disintegrated, they started fighting each other because there was no longer 
an enforceable legal way which enabled them to settle their differences 
peacefully . The disintegration of Czechoslovakia was peaceful because it was 
based on negotiations and on treaties recognised by both sides and all 
neighbours. At all times both sides had governments recognising each other. 
Similarly, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Baltic States 
separated essentially peacefully. The unification of Germany was also the 
result of agreements between legally elected governments of East and West 
Germany with the consent of their neighbours and of the great powers. There 
was no bloodshed even though the two Germanies had been loyal members 
of two adversarial blocs confronting each other during the Cold War. 
It seems that one can draw the following conclusions from these examples 
and Irom a study of history and of human psychology in general: groups of 
people, neighbouring villages, ethnic tribes, city states, nations or blocs of 
nations will develop different interests because people are different and have 
different ideas, philosophies and religious faiths, and are competing with 
each other economically, ideologically and politically. If there is a strong 
central authority monopolising the use of force, and a functioning legal and 
administrative system, these conflicts of interests will be settled peacefully 
by arbitration and litigation. If a strong central authority, a functioning legal 
system and an effective police are missing, fist fighting, murder, Mafia rule, 
civil war and war will start. The type of violence depends on the size and 
quality of armaments available to competing groups. Violence will only stop 
if and when one of the following events occurs: 
complete victory for one side 
complete exhaustion on both sides 
appearance of a great common danger to both sides, forcing them to make 
peace and unite forces to meet the new challenge. 
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In the absence of an overpowering central force, conflicts will lead to 
continuous fighting unless or until one of these three conditions applies i„ 
the world of today a strong central authority is missing, and many wars are 
flaring up in various parts of our globe. To stop them, we have to look for the 
third solution because it is certainly preferable to the others. History offe rs 
many examples of the effectiveness of the third solution. A few of them may 
be cited: 
In the Middle Ages, the inhabitants of a castle ended their feuds and 
concluded a truce when the castle was beleaguered by an enemy force 
and the life and freedom of all was at stake. 
Though Bavaria and Prussia fought each other in the German War of 
1866, they became allies against France in 1870, united in the German 
Reich and never took up arms against each other again. 
»••*• For centuries France and Germany waged war against each other. They 
became friends when both felt threatened by the Soviet Union. Botl 1 j oined 
the European Union, and now have joint army units. 
Western Europe, for centuries the site of numerous wars, united during 
the second half of the 20th century because it perceived a threat to all 
emanating from the Soviet Union. 
<»•• Eastern Europe was united under the leadership of the Soviet Union and 
under the auspices of communism against the threat perceived, genuinely 
or allegedly, from western capitalism. 
•<-* President Ronald Reagan, at the height of the Cold War, mentioned (hat, 
if the Martians would attack the Earth from outer space, the United States 
and the Soviet Union would certainly bury their quarrels and would 
jointly defend human life and values against the invaders. 
By implication, we need to find some sort of replacement for the fictitious 
Martians if we want peace among the inhabitants of this planet. Let us first 
consider a short list of great dangers threatening all of humanity: 
The population explosion, hunger, deforestation, the extinction of species, 
illiteracy in the presence of high technology, drugs and diseases; 
« * Mental disturbances and instabilities created by fundamentalism and 
national chauvinism; 
»>*• Social consequences of mass unemployment and of the increasing gap 
between poverty and wealth, both within individual nations and between 
different nations; 
The vulnerability of our modern scientific-technological society to 
ignorance and unethical behaviour; 
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General pollution of the ozone layer, the atmosphere, of lakes, rivers and 
diT.uis, and of the soil; the dying of forests and the spreading of deserts; 
Risks connected with the storage and dismantling of nuclear and 
chemical weapons, with the illicit production of biological weapons, with 
nuclear proliferation, with the malfunction of nuclear power stations and 
with wreckages of supertankers carrying oil. 
Mastering these problems will require the co-operation of the leadership of 
all peoples. It is an enormous task which needs the goodwill, the intelligence, 
and the hard work of people all over the world. It will require the construction 
of efficient mechanisms for the discussion of the available options for 
mediation and decision-making, and for the enforcement of decisions by an 
i i i j i i national court of justice. 
Politicians are usually too busy for long-term planning and the weighing up 
of options, They have to deal with the requirements of the day, trying to stay 
in power by winning the next elections or by eliminating competitors in other 
ways. Moreover, complicated assessments may be involved which require the 
knowledge of scientific details and of complex interrelations. This is a matter 
for the international scientific and scholarly community, its established 
institutions in particular. They have access to numerous sources of reliable 
knowledge, and their members do not depend on re-election and therefore 
can afford more easily to think in terms of long-range solutions, and to 
publish unpopular results. Therefore, the institutions of science and 
scholarship should be ready to serve humanity by setting up expert 
committees for the preparation of options and the checking of proposed 
solutions for their feasibility, compatibility and their various consequences. 
Ea< 11 option offered should be accompanied by a full analysis of the possible 
consequences, including those to be expected in neighbouring fields. All risks 
and benefits should be given, if possible, with the probability of their 
occurrence. The discussion of goals should include ethical aspects, and how 
to prevent misunderstandings and misperceptions. 
The prevention of armed conflicts could be based on a combination of 
Volkan's three-group method with a definition of urgent joint goals. 
Meanwhile, long-range efforts should be devoted to the creation of 
international institutions of arbitration and peace enforcement which would 
In- ui i iversally accepted and respected, except by a few trespassers who would 
have to be induced to accept them. 
The following theses may summarise the conclusions of this chapter: 
Independent groups of people develop independent ideas which, in time, 
lead to conflicts of interest. 
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If there is no superior authority to which quarrelling parties can appea| 
and whose judgement is accepted and enforceable, people will fCej 
entitled to use force. They will fight unless there is mutual deterrence of 
the kind that implies that continued fighting leads to n lutua] 
self-annihilation. This is as true for individuals as for ethnic groups or 
nations. It is the fundamental cause of war. 
Former enemies can become friends and allies when they perceive a 
common enemy threatening both of them. 
>"•» The fading of enemy images can be greatly assisted by studying the chosen 
traumas and glories of opposing parties and by making each side 
understand them. Both sides must learn to see the situation through the 
eyes of the other side. 
People of different races and different languages can live together 
peacefully in one state if they do not feel oppressed and if they respect 
the institutions of their nation or state. Brazil and Switzerland are 
examples. 
Peoples who have lived together peacefully under common rule — as in 
the cases of the peoples of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires 
- can become enemies when central rule crumbles. 
<»• If there is to be a dissolution of joint institutions peace can be preserved 
if a new, stable power structure is set in place before the old one is 
abolished, and if transition takes place under pre-arranged agreements. 
Czechoslovakia's dissolution is an example. 
In order to prevent further wars the establishment of strong mediation, 
peace keeping, and peace enforcement authorities should have high 
priority. Whether these can be developed by the United Nations 
independently, or with the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
the European Union or new organisations, is an open question which 
requires further study. 
In the past, joint tasks like hunting a mammoth, defending a castle or 
building and defending an empire, have motivated people of different 
origins to join forces and forget their differences. Today, there are global 
problems threatening the health and life of all humankind. People should 
be made aware of the fact that these problems can only be solved by 
world-wide co-operation and that all local and national causes for w.ir 
are minor issues which should be set aside in the interest of joint action 
for the protection of life on our planet. 
"»*• Peace and stability in a multi-ethnic society - and all our societies will 
become multi-ethnic in the 21st century due to world-wide migration -
can only be maintained if education relating to tolerance and ethical 
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behaviour starts at an early age and continues throughout life, through 
(lie school system, the churches, the media, the law system, the trade 
unions, and so on. Without general consensus on a number of basic rules 
'ind principles of behaviour, a peaceful and stable society is not possible, 
people must be constantly reminded of these rules and principles, 
prominent among them rank the following: honesty; readiness to help 
others in distress; law enforcement solely by the central authority thereby 
excluding the private use of force; recognition that even a noble purpose 
does not justify unethical means. 
Hans Ki'mg i called attention to the fact that there can be no world order 
without world ethics. In the international conferences of religious leaders 
organised by him the representatives of the great world religions found that 
there is a consensus among them on a core of ethics which may be expressed 
by the Christian commandment 'Love your neighbour as yourself. People 
must come to understand that the highest goal of human life cannot be mere 
consumption and entertainment (panem et circenses). In our fragile world 
the avoidance, if at all possible, of human and natural catastrophes, and -
after tliev have happened - unselfish assistance to all those who have been 
affected by them remain be the highest goal. 
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ARE NATIONS 
NATURAL ECONOMIC 
UNITS? 
Carl Kaysen 
We are accustomed to think of economies in national terms: the Italian 
crniKiiny. Hie American economy, and so on. Gross National Product (GNP 
or, in slightly modified form, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (of a nation) is 
the most widely used all-purpose measure of economic activity, and, of 
course, it is defined in national terms and measured on the basis of statistics 
collected, maintained, and published by nations. The 'nations' to which GNP 
refers are political units, that is, states. The term 'nation' also has another 
referent, a cultural unit. We sometimes emphasise this point by referring to 
the 'nation-state', and think particularly in these terms of the 'old' nations of 
Europe and North America. The state or polity is the subject of a discourse 
in political science and political history; the nation, a discourse in political 
sociologv'/anthropology; the economy, a discourse in economics. What are 
ilir possible/necessary connections between these discourses? 
Another way of stating the question to be explored in this chapter is to ask 
wli.it kind of social organisation is necessary to support or make possible a 
modern cconomy, and what is the relation of that organisation to the social 
ortfmi.sntion termed a nation. As we shall see the relation is an indirect one: 
the i-cnuoiuy relates more directly to the polity; the polity, in turn to the 
milieu 
A subsistence or near subsistence economy requires little in the way of a 
politic.il framework to make its continued functioning possible. In a hunting 
and gathering economy, the density of human population in relation to the 
n\Miui (i\s of flora and fauna is typically low enough to occasion little conflict 
over resources, and correspondingly, little social machinery for resolving 
and/or containing them. The same is true of societies based on subsistence 
•igriniHure. More advanced economies are based on more division of labour, 
specialisation, and exchange. The more advanced the economy - in terms of 
prodiir-tive capacity, best captured in a single summary measure of 
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productivity per head - the more elaborate the division of labour, the $ 
the extent of specialisation, and the larger the role of exchange. 
To function with reasonable efficiency, a 'national' economy must allow the 
relatively free movement of goods, labour, capital, and information within an 
area large enough in terms of population to sustain a reasonably efficient 
scale of economic activity. Since the Industrial Revolution, the development 
of new technologies and new methods of organisation has on the wliole 
increased the minimum efficient scale of most productive activities. Thus the 
minimum size of what might be termed an 'economic nation' has tended to 
increase. From an abstract economic point of view the 'freedom' of u lese 
movements should be conceived in terms of results rather than in terms of 
the intentions and desires of the human agents involved. For example, the 
'free movement of labour' means that if the demand for the output of industry 
A located in region a is declining, and that for the output of industry B jn 
region b is increasing, labour in fact leaves A/a and moves to B/b, whether 
that result is reached by voluntary movements of individuals responding to 
declining job opportunities/wages in A/a and the opposite in B/b or by a 
well-informed central labour allocation mechanism with command authority 
that sends labour from A/a to B/b. The question of whether a command 
system can be designed and realised that in fact achieves the appropriate 
results, or whether any command system will be inferior to a system that 
relies on the voluntary responses of the human agents to the 
incentives/signals created by the shifts in demand - that is, the market as 
organiser of economic activity - is a separate question. But at the present 
time, the overwhelming consensus of social scientists in general and 
economists in particular is that market systems are superior to command 
systems as modes of organising and guiding economic activity. Accordingly 
most of the rest of the discussion is framed in terms of a market economy, 
although we will note possible alternatives briefly at the close of the lecture. 
The essence of a market economy is its reliance on markets and prices as 
the co-ordinators of economic decisions made by individual actors -
households and business firms - acting in their own interests to organise 
production and exchange. For a market system to function effectively, the 
economic nation in which it operates must possess an appropriate legal 
system. The central feature of such a system is a definition of property rights 
and the means of transferring them that permits the creation of incentives 
for productive activity. Further there has to be enough 'law and order' so that 
the incentives are real: property rights have to have substance. The 
ownership of, say, a building, gives owners the power to charge tenants rent 
for its use and excludes others from it. Finally, the explicit or implicit 
contracts that underlie all economic exchange have to be enforceable: 
machinery must exist to interpret them in cases of conflict and assess and 
enforce penalties for non-compliance with the interpretation. Providing the 
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inerv lor interpreting and enforcing contracts, and providing the 'law 
1113 order' on which the working of the machinery depends is, of course, the 
311 foil of the political nation, that is, the state. For a modern economy to 
iinii the polity has to be sufficiently stable so that economic activity can 
forward on a continuing basis with a time horizon long enough to permit 
s t m enls with a long-term pay off: long-lived capital goods such as 
1 plines or electric power plants, or research and development of new 
products or production processes. 
The political nation must pay the costs for providing law and order, a working 
legal system, and much else soon to be discussed. This requires that the 
olitical nation - the state - must be able to collect taxes in the necessary 
amounts. Tin: usual political science text book's definition of the state focuses 
on its monopoly of legitimate coercive force in the area over which it is 
sovereign: the state's power to assure the collection of the taxes it levies, or 
obedience to the decrees of its courts. Both the legitimacy of the state's 
monopoly of coercion and its efficacy must rest on the consent of its 
population, in the sense that if all taxes had to be collected and all court 
orders enforced at gun point, neither polity nor economy would function. 
Rather, in order to function the polity must constitute a community of 
consent, a moral community with a shared ethos. At the most general level, 
the shared ethos is produced by the process of socialisation undergone by 
the members of the population as they grow up in the political nation. One 
binding tlu-me in this process is nationalism, the sense in each individual of 
iiirmbi-rship in the political nation as an essential ingredient in his/her own 
sense of identity. Before exploring further just what this socialisation process 
involves in a modern polity, and its relation to the economic nation, let us 
step back a moment to look at other essential functions of the state. 
The first and perhaps primary function of the state in terms of the resources 
it demands and its historical function in the development of the state is the 
provision of external security - defence against potential aggression by other 
states. In the period from the 14th through the 19th centuries, as states were 
evolving from kingdoms and principalities and developing organisational 
structures and institutions which were distinct from the personal households 
and courts of rulers, organising and paying for war was the most important 
force driving the process. But the close relation between war and national 
identification was yet to come. It was first displayed in the levee en masse 
and the ideological mobilisation of the French population in the wars of the 
French Revolution. Before that soldiers were either mercenaries, or 
impressed peasants who had little or no identification with the nobles and 
kings on whose behalf they fought. Many officers, including those of highest 
rank, were also mercenaries, or professionals, available to the rulers who 
could afford Lo pay them and pay the armies they led. 
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For the modern state, the provision of education is an equally essential arm 
even more expensive task. In the modern urban industrial societies of ^ 
developed world, the state provides primary education for essentially tjle 
whole relevant population, secondary education for from half to four-fifths 
and the same form of higher education for a tenth to a third. In the United 
States, where a higher share of government expenditures go to both defence 
and education than in almost all other industrialised nations, expenditures 
on education were 20 per cent higher than on defence in 1993, a 
representative recent year. 
Education is the central link that ties the state to the nation in modern 
industrial societies, as well as providing an input indispensable to a modern 
economy, an educated work force. Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism 
provided an extensive and persuasive analysis of this link; brutally 
compressed in what follows. Pre-modern societies were highly segmented: 
status and class differences marked every aspect of life. The peasants who 
formed the overwhelming majority of their populations were typically 
immobile, tied to the locality and region in which they were born. In most of 
Europe, their regional dialects were often mutually incomprehensible, and 
sufficiently different from the written language of high culture to make 
interclass communication difficult. Only the small elites of nobility, clergy, 
higher state functionaries - usually one or the other of the former - and the 
small urban elites of merchants, professionals, and some craftsmen 
commanded the written language and enjoyed wide mobility, including 
significant international mobility. Identity for the vast majority was tit d in 
locality and its kinship networks. 
Industrialisation and urbanisation changed all that. Cities grew by drawing 
former peasants from the countryside - the immobile became mobile. The 
development of railroads further increased their possibilities of mobility. The 
new city dwellers lost their ties to the kinship networks of their former 
villages. During the same period, around the middle of the 19th century, the 
public provision of schooling started to increase. The uniform written 
language of high culture began to replace the variety of local dialects, .ir.il 
literacy grew rapidly. More and more, a national identification embodied in 
the common language and common schooling began to replace the local 
identities of the earlier agricultural society. In the impersonal, mobile, urban 
society, it became a central ingredient in the sense of self of the ordinary 
person. 
Here is Gellner's own summary of the end result of the transformation.1 
Let us recapitulate the general and central features of industrial society. 
Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general 
sophistication are among its functional prerequisites. Its members are. 
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and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, 
and must possess that generic training which enables them to follow 
the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the 
course of their work they must constantly communicate with a large 
number of otfier men, with whom they frequently have no previous 
association, and with whom communication must consequently be 
explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able to 
communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, 
to-whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these communications 
must be in the same shared and standardized linguistic medium and 
script. The educational system which guarantees this social 
achievement becomes large and is indispensable, but at the same time 
it no longer possesses monopoly of access to the written word: its 
clientele is co-extensive with the society at large, and the replaceability 
of individuals within the system by others applies to the educational 
machine at least as much as to any other segment of society, and 
perhaps more so. Some very great teachers and researchers may 
perhaps be unique and irreplaceable, but the average professor and 
schoolmaster can be replaced from outside the teaching profession 
with the greatest of ease and often with little, if any, loss. 
What are the implications of all this for the society and for its members? The 
employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and 
(or tin1 majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the 
culi urr within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within 
wliirli ihey can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man's education is by 
far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him. 
Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may 
sny. hut to a culture. And he is, generally speaking, gelded. The Mamluk 
condition has become universal. No important links bind him to a kin group; 
nor do they stand between him and a wide, anonymous community of culture. 
The obverse of the fact that a school-transmitted culture, not a 
folk-transmitted one, alone confers his usability and dignity and self-respect 
on industrial man, is the fact that nothing else can do it for him to any 
comparable extent. It would be idle to pretend that ancestry, wealth or 
connections are unimportant in modern society, and that they are not on 
occasion even sources of pride to their beneficiaries; all the same, advantages 
secured in these ways are often explained away and are viewed at best 
ambivalently. It is interesting to ask whether the pervasive work ethic has 
helped to produce this state of affairs, or whether, on the contrary, it is a 
reflection of it. Drones and rentiers persist, of course, but they are not very 
conspicuous, and this in itself is highly significant. It is an important fact that 
Mwh privilege and idleness as survive are now discreet, tending to prefer 
obsrurity to display, and needing to be uncovered by eager researchers bent 
on unmasking the inequality which lurks underneath the surface. 
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It was not so in the past, when idle privilege was proud and brazen, as ji 
persists in being in some surviving agrarian societies, or in societies which 
continue to uphold the ethos of pre-industrial life. Curiously enough, nle 
notion of conspicuous waste was coined by a work-oriented member 0f a 
work-addicted society, Thorsten Veblen, scandalized by what he saw as ule 
survivals from a pre-industrial, predatory age. The egalitarian, work- and 
career- oriented surface of industrial society is as significant as its 
inegalitarian hidden depths. Life, after all, is lived largely on the surface, even 
if important decisions are on occasion made deep down. 
The teacher class is now in a sense more important - it is indispensable -
and in another sense much less so, having lost its monopoly of access to the 
cultural wisdom enshrined in scripture. In a society in which everyone is 
gelded by identification with his professional post and his training, and 
hardly anyone derives much or any security and support from whatever kin 
links he may have, the teaching clerics no longer possess any privileged 
access to administrative posts. When everyone has become a Mamluk, no 
special mamluk class predominates in the bureaucracy. At long last the 
bureaucracy can recruit from the population at large, without needing to fear 
the arrival of dozens of cousins as unwanted attachments of each single new 
entrant. 
Exo-socialization, education proper, is now the virtually universal norm. Men 
acquire the skills and sensibilities which make them acceptable to their 
fellows, which fit them to assume places in society, and which make them 
'what they are', by being handed over by their kin groups (normally nowadays, 
of course, their nuclear family) to an educational machine which alone is 
capable of providing the wide range of training required for the generic 
cultural base. This educational infrastructure is large, indispensable and 
expensive. Its maintenance seems to be quite beyond the financial powers of 
even the biggest and richest organizations within society, such as the big 
industrial corporations. These often provide their personnel with housing, 
sports and leisure clubs, and so forth; they do not, except marginally and in 
special circumstances, provide schooling. (They may subsidize school bills, 
but that is another matter.) The organization man works and plays with his 
organization, but his children still go to state or independent schools. 
So, on the one hand, this educational infrastructure is too large and costly 
for any organization other than the biggest one of all, the state. But at the 
same time, though only the state can sustain so large a burden, only the state 
is also strong enough to control so important and crucial a function. Culture 
is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social 
order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture 
is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the 
minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society 
ii 
Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict iii 
C'Hi breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it must be one in 
which they c a n breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same 
culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) 
culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little 
culture or tradition. 
But some organism must ensure that this literate and unified culture is 
indeed being effectively produced, that the educational product is not shoddy 
and sub-standard. Only the state can do this, and, even in countries in which 
Important parts of the educational machine are in private hands or those of 
religious organizations, the state does take over quality control in this most 
important of industries, the manufacture of viable and usable human beings. 
That shadow-state dating back to the time when European states were not 
merely fragmented but socially weak - the centralized Church - did put up 
a fight for the control of education, but it was in the end ineffectual, unless 
the Cln irch fought on behalf of an inclusive high culture and thereby indirectly 
on behalf of a new nationalist state. 
Time was when education was a cottage industry, when men could be made 
by a village or clan. That time has now gone, and gone forever. (In education, 
small can now be beautiful only if it is covertly parasitic on the big.) 
Exo-socialization, the production and reproduction of men outside the local 
intimate unit, is now the norm, and must be so. The imperative of 
exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now be 
linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, 
loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is 
about, and why we live in an age of nationalism.2 
Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen 1870-1914 offered a classic 
account of the transformation of France from a still agricultural and 
segmented society to a modern industrial nation.3 There universal military 
service added a further element in creating a single national identity. In each 
particular country, the process took a course shaped by the country's history. 
In general, it moved through Europe from Northwest to Southeast, following 
the course of industrialisation. In the United States, the process had the 
somewhat different character given to it by the creation of a new country and 
a new nation through immigration. Also, geographic and social mobility were 
high from the country's earliest days. But despite these differences, the 
fundamental forces involved were the same. 
I'ublicly-provided formal education teaches more than literacy in a common 
language. It helps create and transmit the myths and symbols through which 
individuals participated in the sense of nationhood: the text-book history 
with its heroes, the national anthem and the national flag. The author can 
still remember the pledge of 'allegiance to the flag and the nation for which 
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it stands' which began one school day each week in the assembly of all the 
students in his junior high school. 
Literacy in the common language of high culture is as necessary to inakinp 
the economic nation as to forming the moral community that underlies the 
polity. Individuals without it have no possibility of full participation ^ 
economic life. At all but the lowest level of casual labour, the ability to learn 
by reading is indispensable to securing a job. Moreover, formal processes of 
recruitment, involving tests and credentials, have increasingly displaced the 
informal ties of kinship and neighbourhood in the process of channelling into 
jobs new entrants into the labour force. ; 
Further, the levels of formal education required for higher level jobs in the ' 
economy has moved up steadily in the last several decades especially but not 
only in the 'old' industrial countries. With the shift from manufacturing t o service • 
industries in many of which processing information rather than materials pJays i 
an increasing part, the demand for more formal training grows stronger. The I 
mobility of information as well as the mobility of labour in the economic nation 
depends on the near universal literacy which the state provides. 1 
One vital aspect of the provision of education in the modern economy is the ' 
supply of technically-trained people in engineering and science, and the 
complementary support of scientific research that is required for the highest 
levels of technical and scientific training. Here again, the state is called onto 
supply an ingredient necessary for the effective functioning of a modern 
economy. However, it must be recognised that education at these levels is 
less tied to the particular nation state than at the primary and secondary 
levels. There is a wide international trade in higher education, especially in 
the sciences, engineering, and business administration. Students leave their ', 
own countries for education elsewhere, to return, remain, or migrate to third , 
countries. 
Let us summarise the bare bones of the argument so far. A modern economy 
needs a certain framework of institutions provided by the polity in order to 
function: law and order, and the enforcement of contracts, a certain decree 
of political stability, the widespread provision of education. The polity in turn 
must rest on the consent of a moral community that ties together its members 
and specifically enables the polity to pay for its activities and enforce its laws. 
In the modern polity, nationalism, in the sense of a strong identification as 
a member of a national community forms an important element in the 
creation and maintenance of this community by making identification with 
the nation an important part of the self identity of the representative mi inhtr 
of the urban, mobile, mass society. Nationalism in turn is carried by the 
education in literacy in the national language of high culture and the 
associated inculcation of the myths, images, and symbols of the nation. 
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us return now to consider in more detail the fundamental requisites of a 
rlern economy and their relation to states and nations. First, it is worth 
o h a s i s i n g that all these conditions are matters of more and less, not black 
6 a white absolutes, absent or present. Consider, for example, the question 
f cont rac t enforcement. If the courts can be counted on to read a contract 
that covers transactions over a long period in terms closely similar to those 
that the two sets of lawyers who drafted it do, and to enforce, let us say, 
pnalty provisions it contains for specified failures of performance, it will be 
easy to make the kind of transactions it embodies. To the extent that this 
reliance is less justified, the parties may ask for higher prices and more 
safeguards, with the result that fewer transactions may be made. If there is 
simply no mechanism for enforcement, long-term contracts may simply 
disappear as viable modes of doing business, and only spot transactions 
survive, which clearly has a wide variety of negative efficiency implications. 
Similarly, the public provision of education is a question of degree: what 
kind, how much, to whom. If the polity provides less and less broadly, 
business firms will adapt to some degree by making up in firm-supported 
trainmi; But in a mobile labour market, (with no Statute of Apprentices), 
firms will limit their investments in providing education and training, since 
some d! the benefits of it can be captured by other firms when individuals 
change jobs. 
Puhli'- support of scientific research offers an even stronger example. 
Business firms tend to invest in applied research closely connected with the 
creation of new or improved products and new or improved production 
processes. Except in unusual circumstances, they are unlikely to invest much 
in basic science, the applications of which are usually both distant in time 
and difficult to foresee. So diminution of public support for basic research 
will lie made up only in small part, if at all, by an increase in business support. 
This question is further complicated, however, by the fact that the pool of 
scientific knowledge is an international pool, which can be drawn on by 
anyone in any economy competent to use it, independently of his contribution 
to the pool. The question of the competence of any country to draw on the 
pool is, of course, not independent of the level of technical and scientific 
training in that country, which in turn is connected with the level and kind 
of research it supports. 
One element of an effective legal/political system very important for the 
limn inning of a modern economy is the maintenance of a reasonably stable 
nioneiary and credit mechanism. This involves two somewhat disparate 
elements. The first is a set of institutional and legal controls on banks and 
°ther (redit mechanisms that makes failures rare, and contains their 
consequences when they occur. The second is some constraint on the 
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capacity of the sovereign/polity to 'debauch the currency' in the old-fashion 
phrase for government's resolving their political problems through iiillati 
Experience shows that market systems have a high capacity for tolerati ' 
bursts of inflation. This capacity is not, however, an unlimited one: hype^  
inflation clearly has strong negative consequences for economy and society 
An interesting and puzzling question is that of the minimum scale, in terIlls 
of both population and area, at which a modern economy can function. The 
city-state can apparently be an efficient economic unit; witness Singap0re 
and Hong Kong with populations of 3 and 5.5 million, respectively. The 
prosperous Italian city-states of an earlier era all had substantial areas of 
dependent country which they dominated; perhaps they would not have been 
viable without it. The small nations of modern Europe - Austria, Denmark 
Sweden, Switzerland, ranging in population from 4.3 million (Norway) to 8 8 
million (Sweden), are all highly prosperous. Their per capita GDP's were of 
the order of 75 per cent (Sweden) to 98 per cent (Switzerland) of that of the 
United States and except at the top covered about the same range as those 
of France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. Hong Kong and Singapore fell 
in the same range of per capita GDP. Luxembourg, a mini city-state Willi fewer 
than a half-million people, was as prosperous as Switzerland and thus 
markedly more so than the large industrial nations of Western Europe. 
Are Luxembourg, Singapore, Hong Kong, independent polities? Luxembourg 
is tightly enmeshed in the Benelux arrangements with Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Hong Kong is in transition from being a crown colony of Great 
Britain, with a substantial degree of autonomy under a British appointed 
governor, chosen from the political and higher civil servant class in Great 
Britain to an as yet unknown status in relation to China. Singapore is a fully 
independent state. All of them are far short of viable scale in terms of security 
in the anarchistic world of international politics as understood by 'realist' 
theorists of international relations. In this view, they are dependenl on some 
larger state or group of larger states for their continued existence; Hong Kong 
on Great Britain, soon on China; Luxembourg on Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and more broadly, NATO; and Singapore on whom? 
In such a world, the other small prosperous countries are also too small to 
provide for their own security, and are dependent on some combination of 
larger patrons, alliances, and the balance of power. In the ideal world of a 
genuine system of the rule of law in international relations, and the collective 
provision of security, such as the United Nations (UN) Charter and the various 
UN Declarations on Human Rights provide in theory, the problem would not 
exist. In the real world, as opposed to the world of the 'realists,' the mixture 
of imperfectly-observed norms of international law such as those set out in 
the UN Charter, and power balances, provides, if always imperfectly, for the 
security of many small states that are not included in alliance systems 
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tfitv considerations played a major role in the evolution of modern 
ScCl The consolidation of small principalities into ever larger 
naiio" ^ ^ characterised the political evolution of Europe from the 13th 
,jh Uic 10tli centuries, starting first in the British Isles, France, and 
in and moving east and south was strongly driven by the competitive 
r Is of powerful princes to enlarge their kingdoms and make themselves 
C their houses more powerful and wealthier by absorbing smaller 
a I . ,n a m i c . s through marriage and conquest and preventing their 
P ,„!,yours from doing the same. Military and political power grew with size: 
n %r kingdoms able to extract larger absolute surpluses from their subject 
l l s n i K l urban merchants and craftsman could provide larger armies, 
overbear and/or buy off their aristocracies more effectively and thus present 
niore powerful and unified force to their rivals. By the end of the process 
in the 19th century more narrowly economic criteria of efficient scale played 
a larger role. The Zollverein preceded rather than followed the imperial 
unification of the German states and principalities. 
To what extent, then, are small polities viable economic nations? In the first 
instance, the answer to this question depends, of course, on the international 
context in which they function. Hong Kong and Singapore are dependent on 
an environment of relatively free international trade; in its absence neither 
could survive. Luxembourg is in a similar situation, with its prosperity 
deriving almost entirely from its international banking business. Unlike the 
other two, ils much smaller population could probably provide for i tsel f - at 
a much lower level - with its pre-1939 mixture of farming and some 
export-oriented heavy industry. 
The more barriers to international trade, the larger an economic nation has 
to be in order to be able to capture the major part of the economics scale 
available to modern methods of organization, production, distribution, and 
marketing. Between the end of the 19th century and the onset of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, when barriers to international trade in terms of 
tr,ins|Kii l costs, difficulties of speedy and reliable transmission of 
information, risks, and tariffs and other government-imposed obstacles were 
relatively high, the large size of the unconstrained internal market of the 
United States was a significant factor in stimulating rapid US economic 
growth. The lowering of both administrative and cost barriers to international 
trade has made the size of the unconstrained internal market less important, 
hut by no means abolished its significance. Market size remains important 
in respect to the provision of new technologies and also their basis in new 
wu-niilu knowledge. At the bottom of the ladder from new science to new 
technologies to new products and processes, both a large population size and 
;i lariy i-iucation sector are required to find the perhaps 1-2 per cent of the 
pipuM'i'iii with the capability of and inclination for doing serious work in 
science, recruiting and training them, and producing enough scientists in 
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enough fields to sustain a serious scientific establishment. A population size 
of 5 million might be adequate for this purpose provided the education^ 
system and the tradition of scientific research were in place, and the 
international context was one of free communication and high mobility 0f 
scientists and engineers. The examples of Denmark, Sweden ant} 
Switzerland, each with 5-7 million population and each with a stronp 
scientific and technical establishment, bear out this speculative calculation 
The underlying sense of moral community that sustains the political nation 
at a macro-level, and thus, indirectly, the economic nation, also has a more 
direct economic reflection at the micro-level. There must be enough 
interpersonal trust to create the expectation that promises will be kept, that 
representations made in the course of business are reasonably accurate, and 
so on, to facilitate a continuous flow of transactions without the necessity for 
either elaborate investigation or elaborate sureties for each proposed 
transaction. This is particularly relevant to transactions at the retail level 
between households and those who provide them with goods and services, 
The typical transaction is small in money terms, not necessarily regularly 
repeated between the same buyer-supplier pair, and often impersonal and 
anonymous. In these circumstances, the sense of communal identification 
that the nation provides can help reassure the participants: the buyer that 
the goods or service he is acquiring is what it appears to be; the seller that 
the credit card will not prove stolen or fraudulent, or that the cheque will not 
bounce. It is the common experience that travellers abroad are more 
suspicious and readier to feel cheated than they are at home. 
Two historical examples that exemplify the importance of trust are worth 
mentioning. In 18th and early 19th century Great Britain, Quakers were 
particularly successful as merchants and shopkeepers because they did not 
believe in haggling, then common at all levels of trade, and they had a wide 
reputation for honesty. Thus their single price, fair price policy was trusted. 
The other example dates back to the world of medieval Islam, where Jews 
played a major role as long-distance traders. Their success depended on their 
dispersion through the Islamic world from Morocco in the West to India in 
the East. One Jewish merchant trusted another in matters of credit, and 
promised delivery, because of their ethno/religious tie. This was often 
expressed in the fact that a pair of merchants from even the most distant 
parts could often find a common kin connection. 
Finally, and again at the macro-level, the sense of identity that makes a ii.nn>" 
a moral community is an indispensable support for another vital economic 
function of the polity, income redistribution. This is especially important in 
democratic societies; no modern democratic nation relies on the undirected 
results of the market to distribute the output of the economy. None would 
find it politically tolerable. A wide variety of public policies and activities have 
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nie redistribution as their function and serve to make the available real 
" Hues of the wealthy less than their market earnings, and those of the 
1 orest segment of the population substantially more. These results are 
Achieved by a complex and usually not entirely consistent set of policies of 
taxation and provision of subsidies in cash or kind. Their detail varies greatly 
from country to country, but in the typical Western democracy the largest 
art of the national budget is concerned with social welfare provisions: old 
a re pensions, provisions or subsidisation of health care, disability pensions, 
child allowances, food subsidies, and housing subsidies. 
A politically important distinction is made between social insurance and 
ii'v fine security programmes (in US terminology). The first include primarily 
old age pensions and health care and are available to the whole population. 
They are not explicitly aimed at redistributing income from the wealthier to 
the poorer members of the population. But they do in fact have redistribution 
effects. The second are means-tested programmes directly aimed at helping 
the poor. The first set of programmes is always large relative to the second. 
In li»90, these programmes together ranged in size from about 11 per cent 
of GDP in Japan and the United States to 13 or 14 per cent in Canada and 
Great Britain, around 19 or 20 per cent in Italy, Germany and Sweden, and 
isimi'Iv 24 per cent in France. 
In addition to these social welfare programs governments maintain a large 
v.irii ty of subsidies that go to producers, rather than households. Payments 
to farmers and other agricultural producers are most widespread and most 
important. The whole spectrum of these activities, together with the structure 
of the tax system, determines how much net income redistribution there is, 
a magnitude quite difficult to estimate. We can, for the United States measure 
two aspects of these redistributive activities. The first is the degree to which 
they move those who on a market-income basis are poor out of poverty. In 
1992, just under a quarter of the population had market-incomes below the 
officially defined poverty line. Adding government transfer payments under 
sociiil insurance programmes lowered this percentage to 16 per cent; adding 
ii'in-rash transfers and subtracting taxes lowered it to 12 per cent. In other 
words, government transfers reduced the proportion of the population in 
poverty by half. 
The o:hcr aspect compares the overall distribution of income before and after 
all taxes and transfers. Table 1 compares the pre-tax-and-transfer 
distribution of income with the post-tax-and-transfer distribution of the 
United States in 1990. It shows the shares of total income received by the 
(piiiiiiles of the population ranked by pre-tax-and-transfer income, and also 
by the top 10, 5, and 1 per cent of the income recipients. The table shows 
that there was a net transfer mainly from the top quintile, that went to the 
bottom two. More than half of 'loss' of the top quintile came from the top 5 
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Table 1 
N - tile Share of pre-
tax-and-transfer 
income 
Share of post-
tax-and transfer 
income 
1 st quintile 1.8 
8.3 
14.1 
22.0 
54.3 
38.4 
27.7 
14.1 
5.5 
9.9 
14.5 
21.2 
49.5 
34.7 
24.9 
12.5 
1-3.7 
+ 1.8 
+0.4 
-0.8 
--4.8 
-3.7 
-2 .8 
-1 .6 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
top 10 per cent 
5 per cent 
1 per cent 
per cent of the income distribution but amounted to some 10 per cent of their 
incomes in aggregate. The gain to the bottom quintile multiplied their share 
of income by three. 
What we have so far described in relation to a modern economic nali<m is 
the ideal type of modern industrial nation-state, the essence of which is the 
coextensiveness of the polity - the territorial state - and the cultural nation, 
with the universal membership of the whole population in both as citizens 
of the polity and sharers in the national identity. We have not claimed that 
the idea of a 'nation' did not exist in pre-industrial society, but rather ihat it 
did not then have the same inclusiveness and the same identification with 
the political state. Indeed the idea of an in-group distinct from other 
out-groups, and in-group membership as a major constituent of 
self-identification goes back to the dawn of human life. The groups were very 
small, typically from a few hundred to a few thousand members, and their 
definition strongly kin-based.4 
As we move from pre-history - reconstructed from the archaeological record 
and the observation and traditions of surviving pre-literate societies - to 
history, communities of common culture whose members identify 
themselves as such appear from earliest times, and persist through history. 
Anthony D. Smith has surveyed the processes by which what he terms dimlc 
evolve into states. He finds the process creating nations in England, France, 
Spain, Holland, and perhaps Japan well before the industrial revolution. 
But they are states of the aristocracy and urban elites, not states of the 
masses. In Henry V, William Shakespeare puts two contrasting speeches in 
the King's mouth that exemplify the limits of the contemporary community. 
The first Henry makes in prose to three common soldiers when he is walking 
about the English camp incognito at dawn before the battle of Agincourt; the 
second the gorgeous poetry he speaks to his noble fellow warriors, im ludinji 
his two brothers and an uncle. To the soldiers, he underlines their duty to 
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King; 10 nobles, their membership in a 'band of brothers.' This of 
se is 'he sensibility of Renaissance England at the end of the 16th 
°° t irv. though the action takes place in still medieval England and France 
nearly two centuries earlier. 
pi-iv i'1 any modern states conform to the ideal type, a national state 
coterminous with a cultural nation. Perhaps Japan comes closest. The small 
Nordic states are also nearly culturally homogeneous, though Norway and 
Sweden have their tiny Lapp minorities. Germany today is homogeneous 
culturally, but the polity is not quite coterminous with the German cultural 
nation, though the consequences of the Second World War greatly shrunk 
the gap. France and Great Britain, the modern states with the longest 
histories of unified polities and separation of the state as an institutional 
structure from the personal household of the monarch, both have a relatively 
high degree of cultural homogeneity. Corsicans and Bretons, the most 
culturally distinct groups in France, together constitute less than 3 per cent 
of the French population. The communities of Scotland and Wales, 
numbering 10 and 5 percent, of the total population of Great Britain are 
relatively much larger. 
More typically, national states have a substantial degree of cultural 
heterogeneity, usually marked by linguistic and/or religious diversity. 
Canada, with its quarter Francophone population, mostly in Quebec, 
Switzerland, with three major and one remnant minor language groups or 
Belgium, divided about 40-60 between French-speaking Walloons and 
Flemish-speaking Flammands, are nothing to the linguistic and cultural 
v.irieiy of Russia, India and China. India and China, of course, are only in 
some part i nodern urban-industrialised societies; in terms of population, the 
majority in each still live in agricultural villages, with a connection (more in 
China than in India) to a national and international market. 
What is the probable future evolution of the connection between nation-state 
and economy? The nation as a purely economic unit is diminishing in relative 
importance in many ways. The growing international mobility of financial 
Instruments, information, investment, and some kinds of elite labour has 
reduced the degree of control an individual nation can exercise over its own 
economy. So in a different way has the development of international economic 
ori;,uiizatioris, both formal, such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now succeeded by World Trade 
Organisation) or informal, such as the Group of Seven. Within the European 
Union, regions inside member nations are given special treatment at the 
Union level. 
r>!1 "if side of politics the potential disintegrative force of cultural diversity 
within the nation state is growing. Political life is increasingly shaped by the 
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use made of the information media by political leaders and would-be leaders 
in both democratic and non-democratic polities. The exploitation of ethnic 
and cultural differences within a nation, especially when they overlap or 
appear to overlap with significant differences in economic status and 
opportunity, has proved to be an effective route to political power. The result 
may well be political fission: peaceful as in the division of Czechoslovakia 
into two nations, or violently explosive, as in the disintegration of the 11inner 
Yugoslavia. 
But economic counterforces remain. Scale economics are still important and 
though the importance of national boundaries as mobility barriers lias 
diminished, it has not vanished. It is significant that the drive of the Parti 
Quebecois to separate Quebec from the rest of Canada has not so far 
commanded the support of a voting majority in Quebec. Fear of ihe 
consequences of the loss of the connection with the prosperous provinces to 
the West surely is an important part of the reason. 
Earlier, we speculated on the minimum size for a viable national ecunnniy. 
Is there an optimum size of a nation from an economic point of view? This 
involves the question of when all available economies of scale are exhausted 
and whether there are diseconomies of scale as well. On the side of 
production, there seem to be no reasons for diseconomies of scale, since 
efficient size units can simply be replicated to reach the appropriate size of 
output. In terms of distribution, the issue of market density becomes 
significant, and the relation between population and area might create 
diseconomies; Canada might exemplify this situation. The most likely activity 
in which diseconomies of large scale might arise is governance. Even under 
the assumption of a national educational system which imparts the same or 
equivalent literate culture to all citizens, the larger a country, the more likely 
that regional differences will exist that complicate the tasks of political 
management. And to the extent that regional differences are intertwined with 
significant differences in culture, the problems would be multiplied. 
Homogenous Japan of nearly 130 million might be easier to govern than 
bifurcated Belgium, less than one-tenth its size. 
One narrowly economic function in which large size in geographic terms may 
produce diseconomies is labour mobility. If long-distance moves are less 
easily undertaken, labour markets will function less effectively. Here 
the problem may be compounded by marked regional differences in culture. 
Two areas in which scale economics on a national level remain important 
are the provision of highly trained scientific and technical personnel and the 
related support of science, and the provision of national defence and security. 
To the degree that the world in fact moves to a more effective sysiem of 
international law and collective security, the importance of both these 
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elements may diminish. A more peaceful world will both allow and promote 
an even greater international mobility of elite labour. More directly, it will 
dlrninish the importance of the national provision of defence and security, 
and thus the significance of the advantages of scale in that domain. Such a 
world would create the potentiality for a somewhat closer alignment of 
nolitical and national-cultural demarcations in a peaceful and therefore an 
economic way. On the opposite path, towards which the world now seems to 
be moving, the probability of explosive nationalisms appears alarmingly high. 
A world in which the salience of nationalism was on the increase might well 
be one in which the hitherto rapid growth of the internationalisation and 
globalization of the economy would be slowed, or even reversed. One 
c o n s e q u e n c e of stronger nationalism might well be an increasing desire by 
political leaders to reassert more control over their national economies. This 
implies constraints on market forces and greater separation of national 
economies from the international economy. The same impulses that lead to 
a move toward autarky have in the past produced a move in the direction of 
economic planning more generally, and less willingness to let the market rule 
supreme over the national economy as well as internationally. These 
possibilities, so contrary to the experience of the last several decades as to 
stvin remote, are nevertheless implicated in the current choices of how the 
world of nations responds to the forces of nationalism, as they are used and 
played out in the political spheres of internal politics within many states, and 
internationally. 
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MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 
IN INTRASTATE AND 
ETHNIC CONFLICT 
George W. Rathjens 
Introduction 
For most of the world the major threat to peace during the forty years 
following the Second World War lay In the possibility of major war involving 
the two superpowers and their allies, and, at least from the perspective of 
this period, the quite likely use of nuclear weapons. These were the prime 
considerations in the development of the military establishments of the 
world's major powers, those of India and Pakistan excepted. To a large 
degree, these same considerations dominated their approaches to 
international relations. Thus, in their world-wide competition for influence, 
the United States and the Soviet Union intervened extensively in the affairs 
of other nations, sometimes supporting favoured warring factions in civil 
wars and regional conflicts; at other times discouraging conflict deemed 
inimical to their interests. 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire all is 
changcd: the military postures and alliance structures of the Cold War period 
seem anachronistic and command little popular support; there is great 
resistance in the polities of the major powers to military involvement abroad, 
France being perhaps a partial exception; and the forces of nationalism and 
ethnic conflict, in many instances long suppressed, are now increasingly 
manifest:. As has been demonstrated in the last several years - perhaps most 
notably in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda - the response of the major 
powers, and of the United Nations, to intrastate conflict has left much to be 
desired. 
Two problems dominate all others. In many instances of conflict, few, if any, 
outside states see immediate threats to their national interests that appear 
to be sufficient to justify military - or often, even just political/economic -
intervention if the costs seem likely to be large. This is particularly evident 
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in instances of intrastate conflict where human rights are at issue. There have 
been exceptions, for example the US intervention in Haiti, when the prospect 
of an influx of refugees led to sufficient concern in the south-eastern United 
States that the Bill Clinton Administration was moved to act. We can probably 
expect more such interventions in other instances where refugee problems 
threaten the interests of strong neighbouring states. But, even then, there is 
likely to be reluctance to try to deal with the causative bases for refugee 
problems. Secondly, there is the widespread predisposition against 
interference by outsiders in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a matter 
of particular sensitivity to smaller, weaker states, notable those recently 
emerged from colonialism. In commenting on these problems and more 
generally about intervention the writer will focus here particularly on 
operations conducted under UN mandates, not because the UN Is necessarily 
the only instrument for peace operations but because so much of our recent 
experience has been with it and because, notwithstanding great erosion in 
its credibility, it would still seem, in general, to be the option of first choice. 
While one might have thought that the aforementioned problems could be 
substantially mitigated by having the burdens of intervention shared under 
its auspices, the structure and character of the UN, and the great disparities 
in the strength - and histories - of its member states, have been major 
impediments to its effectiveness. The sovereignty problem has been a 
particularly difficult one for the UN, and this is reflected in its Charter. 
Paragraph 7 of Article 2 states that 'Nothing in the present Charter sliall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'; but it then 
goes on to state that 'this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII', Articles 39 and 42 of which 
provide a basis for the Security Council's authorising forceful action in the 
event of just such 'threats to the peace'. To justify forceful intervention when 
gross violations of human rights have been at issue the Security Council has 
claimed, on some occasions with a very liberal interpretation, that they pose 
a threat to international peace, hardly a very satisfactory way of dealing with 
the sovereignty-human rights conundrum. 
Another impediment to the UN's taking responsibility for decision-making 
about forceful intervention arises because of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council having veto rights with respect to its actions. This made 
it almost unthinkable that the UN could have been instrumental in dealing 
with important security problems all through the Cold War. The likelihood 
of at least one of the permanent five members exercising a veto seemed just 
too high. Although this changed with the end of the Cold War, exemplified in 
the passage of resolutions mandating forceful action against Iraq following 
its invasion of Kuwait, there have been indications in Russian reluctance to 
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along with forceful opposition to aggressive behaviour by the Bosnian 
Serbs that the veto problem is likely to continue to be troublesome. 
With infringements on sovereignty not at issue in peace-keeping, as distinct 
from peace-making/enforcement (see below), it is not surprising that the UN's 
invo lvement in military intervention all through the Cold War period was 
largely limited to the former. There were only two significant exceptions, the 
Korean War and the war in the Congo, where securing mandates for more 
forceful operations was possible for rather special reasons: in the first case, 
because the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council deliberations at 
the time and because Taiwan then held the China seat; and in the second 
case, because, in a misjudgement about how conflict would develop and 
about how Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold would respond, the Soviet 
Union joined the United States in July 1960 in support of the original 'weak' 
mandate, (the other three permanent members abstaining), and then, after 
opposing the continuation of the operation, again joining the United States 
in November, 1961, with Great Britain and France abstaining, in support of 
a 'strong' mandate, one calling for expulsion of Belgian military personnel 
and advisors and for crushing, by force if necessary, efforts of the province 
of Katanga to secede. But in the last half dozen years internal conflict has 
become more frequent and manifest, especially in states around the 
periphery of Russia and in Africa, where national boundaries, established 
during the era of colonialism, have borne little relation to tribal or ethnic 
divisions. And, even though the impetus for the major powers to intervene 
militarily in other states on the grounds of narrow self-interest is much 
reduced, the conflicts have commanded more attention on a world-scale 
because of reportage on television - the CNN effect - and because of feelings, 
wide-spread in at least developed* countries, and supported by the Genocide 
and Human Rights Conventions, that the world community should act in 
support of self-determination and other human rights, feelings that could be 
more easily repressed during the years when so many unsavoury actions -
and inactions - of governments could be in some measure justified, or at 
least rationalised, by claims of need to compete effectively in the Cold War 
and/or to reduce the likelihood of its turning hot. 
I | Partitioning the Problem 
Regrettably for expository purposes there is no generally accepted 
terminology for distinguishing between different scales and intensities of 
military interventionary activity. The UN has a Department of Peace-keeping 
Operations to deal with the problems from its perspective, the British Army 
a field manual on 'Wider Peace-keeping,' and the US Army an analogous 
manual for 'Peace Operations'.1 Yet, they all deal with the same range of 
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activities. At one extreme, the issue is intervention with at least u le 
acquiescence if not the active support of the parties to a controversy an< I with 
there being a clear understanding that intervening forces must behave in a 
disinterested way, using weapons, if at all - in some missions they have been 
unarmed - only for self-defence. At the other, there is the possibilily of 
interventionary forces being charged with imposing and enforcing a peace on 
one or more resistant parties to a conflict. Although the Gulf war did not 
involve intrastate or ethnic conflict, the foci of this paper, Desert Storm 
illustrates in an extreme form the latter kind of use of military force. Given 
that it involved a half-million men, combined-arms attack against the whole 
of Iraq's military establishment there is some irony in the fact that i Ls link 
with the UN would presumably have been through the UN peace-keeping 
directorate had that office existed at the time! 
Here, the terms 'peace-keeping' and 'peace-making/enforcement' will be used 
respectively in referring to the two aforementioned kinds of operations. 
Clearly, the criteria for intervention and the requirements for il differ 
markedly in the two cases, and this is widely recognised, notwithstanding 
the ambiguity about terms. The division is reflected in the UN Charter, 
peace-keeping having its basis in one chapter, VI, and peace-making and 
enforcement in another, VII. In practice though, the dichotomy is not as sharp 
as the foregoing discussion suggests, and this is reflected in the use of the 
terms 'chapter six and a half and even 'chapter six and three-quarters' to 
apply to some operations. But still, it seems useful to begin at least by 
considering the extreme cases. 
Before doing so, it is perhaps worth noting that the approaches to peace 
operations of West European governments, especially that of Great Britain, 
reflect much greater emphasis on the dichotomy between peace-keeping, 
narrowly defined, and peace-making/enforcement than is the case for the 
United States. The differences are apparent in official writings, training of 
forces, and in operations. 
Peace-keeping 
Peace-keeping commonly involves two antagonists who, having agreed to an 
armistice, see advantage in a third party, that is a peace-keeper, accepting 
responsibility for monitoring and supervising compliance with it while the 
antagonists try to resolve outstanding differences, with or without help of the 
third party or other outsiders. Depending on their mandate, peace-keeping 
forces may also be charged with such tasks as disarmament and the 
cantonment offerees, the supervision of elections, and assuring the safety of 
displaced persons and non-interference with the delivery of humanitarian 
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relic'' in their various missions peace-keepers can play a stabilising, 
confluence-building role, deterring outbreaks of violence and perhaps 
facilitating negotiations. 
For peace-keeping missions the need will be for relatively small numbers of 
men. Experience in the Congo, Somalia, and Cambodia suggests an upper 
limit of perhaps 25 000, but there have been other examples where the 
numbers have been as few as a hundred, or even less. The troops will be 
lightly firmed and supported by modest communications, observational, and 
in-theatre transport capabilities; they will be expected to sustain few, if any, 
casualties; and, as noted earlier, they will be expected to use their arms 
rarely, if at all, and to maintain postures of impartiality vis-a-vis contesting 
parlies. 
It is easy to specify essential conditions for peace-keeping in addition to those 
just mentioned. Mandates must be reasonably clear to all involved and ideally 
the contesting parties should play a facilitating role in the peace-keepers' 
carrying out of their mandates. At least there should not be interference with 
their doing so. It must be possible to raise the required peace-keeping forces, 
and to cover the costs of deploying and sustaining them. Raising those 
required for UN operations has generally not been particularly difficult, in 
part because for some poorer nations making forces available for such 
npei ations has brought with it significant financial return. Unfortunately, 
some of those forces have been inadequately trained and ill-disciplined, and 
many have been poorly equipped. Ideally, a peace-keeping operation will be 
judged of sufficient value to antagonists that they are willing to pay for it. This 
has happened, for example in the case of the deployment in 1962-63 of the 
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, the costs of which were 
shared equally by the Netherlands and Indonesia, but this was a rare 
example, and in many cases there have been problems, some very serious, 
in covering costs. Relatedly, there have been concerns that some operations 
have dragged on for extended periods, with the adversaries bearing little, if 
any, of the considerable costs - and displaying little will to reach a settlement 
of their differences. As an extreme example, the UN Cyprus operation still 
continues after more than thirty years, with the total cost now over $700 
million. It has also resulted in the loss, as of 1990, of 149 lives.2 
Finally, whatever the initial understandings with respect to the mandate for 
a peace-keeping operation, differences may arise during implementation. If 
they cannot be resolved in the field, peace-keeping forces must be prepared 
to withdraw - unless agreement can be reached on appropriate changes in 
•li'-ir mandate - and they must be able to do so safely and expeditiously, a 
consideration of great importance, as developments in Yugoslavia are now 
making painfully evident. 
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While a number of UN peace-keeping operations have pretty well conformed 
to the pattern just described, in others there have been major problems, in 
addition to financing, problems that must be expected to recur. For example 
time may run out on the peace-keepers because one - at least - of the 
antagonists decides that resumption or expansion of active conflict is in jts 
interest. Events in Croatia are illustrative. After the initiation of hostilities in 
1991, and while attempts were being made to broker a cease-fire and to 
negotiate an agreement for the introduction of peace-keepers, the Serbs 
moved so quickly to seize most of the Krajina that by the time the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peace-keepers were actually 
introduced they were confronted with monitoring and supervising a cease-fire 
that, though acceptable to both the Serbs and the Croats in the short term, 
could not be expected to be acceptable to the latter as a basis for a lasting 
peace. As Croat military capabilities improved and as it became increasingly 
clear that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was not going to give the 
Croatian Serbs unqualified support, a counter-offensive to regain lost 
territory became increasingly attractive to Croatia. Hence, its ultimatum, 
subsequently withdrawn, that it would no longer accept the presence of 
UNPROFOR after March of 1995; the offensive against the Croatian Serbs in 
Slavonia, UNPROFOR notwithstanding; and the recapture of the Krajina. 
Yugoslavia also provides examples of a second kind of major problem with 
peace-keeping: the possibility that a party to agreements to aeeept 
peace-keepers may be unable, or unwilling, to persuade or coerce forces or 
factions, nominally under its control or with which it is associated, 1o comply 
with the agreements relating to peace-keeping. This has been most 
demonstrably evident in Bosnia, where it has become apparent thai, the local 
Serbs have been little influenced and certainly not controlled by Belgrade. 
The problem is more likely to surface in instances of ethnic or tribal conflict 
than in cases of clear interstate war; and, for better or worse, the lornier 
would seem to be the wave of the future. Somalia and, in the early 1960s, 
the Congo were extreme examples. They illustrated how hard it is to carry 
out peace-keeping of the idealised kind discussed above in the absence of 
political authorities who can make agreements relating to the responsibilities 
and immunities of peace-keepers and who have capacity and interest in 
seeing such agreements complied with. Although one can envisage negotiating 
separate peace-keeping agreements with a number of factions, eacli cap.ihk 
of interfering with the mandated activities of peace-keepers, it is likely, j 
considering the interests and limited authority of the various faction leaders, 
to be a frustrating business in situations such as obtained in the Congo and 
Somalia. Moreover, if even just one faction decides to interfere significantly 
with the implementation of the peace-keepers' mandate, the choice will have 
to be made between termination of the mission or expanding the mandate to 
include peace-enforcement. 
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fore turning to the latter option it may be worth taking note of one other 
kind of peace operation, preventive deployment. This is exemplified in the 
esenl stationing, under UN auspices, of American and Scandinavian forces 
jn Macedonia. This differs from traditional peace-keeping really only in that 
It involves deployment before potential conflict rather than after a truce or 
arinislice and requires the consent of only one rather than of two or more 
arties. The costs and difficulties ought logically to be lower and the payoff 
|n deterrence of hostilities perhaps even higher than in idealised 
p^ro keeping. 
Peace-Making/Enforcement 
Criteria, force requirements, and rules of engagement for peace-making and 
enforcement will in general be totally different from those for peace-keeping, 
points made particularly in British doctrine and in American practice. In 
contrast to peace-keeping, peace-making/enforcement involves clearly taking 
sides, and this may imply substantial, sustained opposition, not only from 
organised forces but from civilian elements as well. Interventionary force 
requirements will be at least an order of magnitude larger than for 
peace-keeping operations - Yugoslav partisans tied down more than twenty 
German, Bulgarian and Hungarian divisions, totalling over 250,000 men, 
during the Second World War - and casualty rates for 'peace-making' forces 
may lie relatively high.3 Given the great aversion in the polities of most of the 
major powers to their military forces' taking such casualties, particularly in 
operations judged to be of no great immediate interest to them, there is likely 
to be very great pressure, particularly in the case of the United States, to try 
to achieve interventionary objectives by using air power alone. 
If, however, this appears not to be possible, as will generally be the case, the 
choice may be between doing nothing or using considerable force. In the case 
of at least American military planners there is likely to be a strong 
predilection to do so in an overwhelming way in combined operations. 
Witness Panama, Haiti, and, particularly, Desert Storm. But these particular 
operations were hardly unqualified successes. Although Iraqi forces were 
quickly defeated and driven out of Kuwait, other important American 
objectives of Desert Storm were not realised. Saddam Hussein is still in 
power and, without the establishment of a democratic government, we can 
hardly be assured that we will not see the renaissance of an Iraqi nuclear 
weapons programme; and while General Manuel Antonio Noriega was 
captured in Panama, Operation Just Cause has not seemed to have made 
much difference to that country's serving as an important conduit for drugs, 
nor in any transition to democracy. To achieve these objectives much more 
would have been required. As for Haiti, it remains to be seen whether the 
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US/UN intervention will, in the long term, make much more of a contribution 
to 'nation building' than intervention by the United States which lasted from 
1915 to 1934. 
We are led to the questions of objectives in peace-making/enforcement 
operations, particularly in intrastate/ethnic conflict situations. There have 
been two major examples of such interventions involving UN forces, one in 
the Congo and the other in Somalia, both of which began as peaee-keeping 
(chapter VI) actions, but which then developed, with expanded mandates in 
what has become known as 'mission creep,' to involve peace-making 
enforcement. The first, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), ultimately 
involved the UN's taking sides, as noted earlier, against Katanga, which was 
attempting, with help from abroad, to secede from the Congo. In the second 
the UN authorised chapter VII operations to establish a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and to effect disarmament of 
troublesome clan elements. In both countries the interventionary forces were 
arguably responsible for saving hundreds of thousands of lives and, in the1 
case of ONUC, successful in expelling the Belgian and other foreign officers 
supporting Katanga and in preventing it from seceding.4 It was, in fact the 
only war the UN ever 'won,' (putting aside Desert Storm, which was really an 
American show, with the UN role being only to provide window-dressing.) 
But both the Congo and Somalia can now be reasonably characterised as 
'failed states.' It is, however, hardly fair to charge this sorry state of affairs 
to ONUC and the three UN operations in Somalia, UNOSOMI (the first United 
Nation Operation in Somalia), UNITAF (that of the Unified Task Force -
basically a US Marine Corps operation) and UNOSOM II: their mandates did 
not provide for their making substantial long-term nation-builcling efforts. 
But it is not unfair to ask whether the Congo, now Zaire, would bf in .my 
worse shape today than it is if nothing had been done to prevent Katanga's 
secession, nor whether in both cases it was morally reasonable for the UN to 
become as involved as it did in peace-enforcement without having an intent 
and plans for taking some responsibility for longer-term developments in 
those countries. And, in the same vein, it may be reasonable to ask whether 
the UN, and particularly the United States, is not morally culpable for having 
left Saddam Hussein in power and the people of Iraq to their own devices, 
considering the damage inflicted on them, and from which they continue to 
suffer. 
Although the UN intervention in Cambodia, first with the United Nations 
Advanced Mission in Cambodia and then with the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) did not have a ch;iplei VII 
mandate and, although no 'chapter six and a half operations were involved, 
the mission was very broad, having more of a commitment to 'nation-building' 
than perhaps any other UN operation. It has been partially successful, 
perhaps more so than should have been expected, in organising and 
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ervising a reasonably free election and in facilitating the repatriation of 
^veral hundred thousand displaced persons. However, with the Khmer 
Se i£?e not co-operating, it has not fulfilled its mandate as regards 
cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces within the 
countiy. nor in assuring basic human rights and an effective rule of law and 
order It is. moreover, clear at this writing that a great deal more will have to 
be done it Cambodia is ever to develop a democratic government having the 
kind of legitimacy that is deemed acceptable in the West. (Whether or not the 
realisation of such a system of governance should be a reasonable objective 
of outside intervention in Cambodia's affairs is another question. Many would 
argue that to suggest that it should be is a reflection of Western hubris.) 
g~] Objectives of Peace Operations 
In considering what interventionary objectives make sense we will find that 
fnilhei i inphasis on the dichotomy between peace-keeping on the one hand 
and peaee-making/enforcement on the other may not be totally appropriate. 
Drawing a sharp line is useful in thinking about force requirements, training 
and the conduct of military operations; perhaps less so in discussion of 
iiiiirifi.'Ui s and objectives.There would seem to be little objection to the UN's 
- or individual states or regional groupings of states - taking on 
responsibilities for the simple monitoring of elections and/or of compliance 
by antagonists with cease-fire arrangements, assuming the aforementioned 
conditions are met. It is tasks that go beyond these that may invite mission 
creep, sometimes leading to peace-making/enforcement measures with 
concomitant costs which may be unacceptable. Attempting to generalise 
about whether these other kinds of missions should be undertaken by the 
UN - or other potential intervening entities - turns out to be a frustrating 
business A brief discussion of some kinds of justifications for intervention 
will illustrate the point. 
Probably 75 to 95 per cent of states, and of the world population, would agree 
thsit genocide is so reprehensible as to, in principle, justify active opposition 
by the world community, even at the cost of infringement on state sovereignty. 
It '•> unlikely, however, that many, if any, other objectives of forceful 
intervention would command as high a level of approbation. But the 
expulsKiii of people from their homes - ethnic cleansing, including inducing 
'Iiein to leave by denying them basic rights, particularly a realistic means of 
livelihood - would probably in principle, at least, rank almost as high on a 
•scale ot morally indefensible behaviour. Consideration, however, of specific 
cases suggests that there would be much disagreement about this. Consider 
toe expulsion of Germans from Silesia following the Second World War, 
discnriiinatory practices against Arabs in some parts of what was Palestine 
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and against Jews in other parts of the Middle East, and efforts in the Bali 
States, now that those states are again independent, to induce Russians ? 
leave, bearing in mind that the problems there had their genesis in ^ 
displacement of the Baits from their homes by Russians in the early 194qs 
Relatedly, interference with the provision of humanitarian relief to distressed 
populations will be seen as morally objectionable to many, but it may be seen 
by others as just another instrument, perhaps even a relatively benign one 
to be used in instances of conflict to effect ethnic cleansing or to den' 
opposition the means to sustain itself and continue fighting. 
Here are some other examples where there may be great variation m 
about intervention. Attitudes about actions to try to prevent or stop civil w;(r 
will depend strongly, as exemplified in the Congo and Yugoslavia, on feelings 
about the merits of the positions of the parties in conflict and about the 
prospects for the peaceful resolution or accommodation of their dill'erences 
And, while there is a widespread tendency to pay obeisance to democracy 
and self-determination as desiderata of governance, support can be expected 
to erode with clarification of just what is meant by 'democracy' and about to 
whom self-determination is to apply: to nations, to tribes, to 
ethnically-related groups, to those professing a common religion, or to those 
living in a clearly-defined geographic area? Attitudes about self-determination 
will also be affected by the possibility of domino effects. This was the basis 
for widespread concern in international circles about Slovenia's otherwise 
unobjectionable declaration of independence in 1991. There was I he fear that 
it would make similar action more likely in Croatia and Bosnia-I lerzegovina, 
where, in contrast to the situation in Slovenia, the presence of large Serb 
minorities would make civil war all but inevitable. 
Most especially difficult is judgement about the acceptability of intervention, 
forceful or otherwise, based on 'nation-building' rationales. UNTAC's role in 
Cambodia is an example. How does one judge what is 'good' for a p.irn« ular 
nation or group of people? What kinds of trade-offs are desirable; which 
undesirable: equity versus efficiency in an economy, reflection nf minority 
interests in political representation in government, emphasis on individual 
rights versus consensual behaviour, the separation of church and state? 
Dealing with such questions is likely to be particularly troublesome if there 
is a considerable gulf between the cultural values of those making the 
judgements and those likely to be affected by them. This suggests thai those 
contemplating peace operations, for example the UN Security Council, 
should be particularly careful about supporting mandates that have as their 
objective - or where there is even much likelihood of an unintended 
consequence - of affecting significantly the long-term development of social, 
political and economic institutions. Given that in the real world, decisions 
about UN - and other - interventions are likely to be especially reflective of 
the values of the advanced, industrial countries, there is some merit, Boutros 
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tros-Ghali notwithstanding, in the UN being a bit more humble about 
king decisions relating to intervention in Africa, or Cambodia, that may 
{^ve such cffccts than about those relating to, say, Yugoslavia. 
even in the event of a broad consensus on the desirability, perhaps even 
moral obligation, of forceful intervention in particular instances of affronts 
3 the conscience of the world, or, for that matter, to the clearly-identifiable 
interests of some states, other conditions for undertaking intervention have 
to be met. There must be, as Catholic just-war criteria would have it, not only 
rfiit intent but a reasonable prospect of success. Most informed people 
throughout the world have deplored Russian behaviour in Chechnya, and 
that of China in Tibet, but few would take seriously any suggestion that the 
UN should intervene militarily to deal with these problems. The certainties 
of vetoes aside, the costs of success would be unacceptable, if success could 
be reali^i d at all. 
In other cases, the most prominent at this time being that in Bosnia, 
peaee-in.iking and enforcement may prove effective and, though costly, 
affordable for the world community - perhaps no more costly than Desert 
Storm, at least in terms of force requirements and dollar costs. Many 
countries - certainly most Muslim states and most of the advanced industrial 
countries - would see benefit in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to desist from 
ethnic cleansing efforts against the Muslims. But it seems that the Americans, 
the British and the French will have to bear the main burden. If so, we would 
ii.ive an example of the classic commons/free rider problem: the cause of 
world-order would be well served if the Bosnian Serbs could be dealt with 
effective];,; and, with that, most states would benefit, but the preferred 
solution lor cach is that others pay the price while they get a free ride. 
There have been and will be other instances of conflict where the costs of 
peace-making/enforcement will be less and where, therefore, it may be easier 
to get the necessary agreement on an effective UN - or other collective -
response, but the record is discouraging, the experience in Rwanda 
parlic ul,u |y so. There, the pursuit of genocide was even more blatant than 
in Bosnia, and one might, therefore, have expected even broader world-wide 
revulsion, but even in this case it proved impossible to mobilise an effective 
collective response through the UN or otherwise on a timely basis. France 
intervened with the UN's blessing and with the other major powers cautiously 
applauding but unwilling to do much. 
Can anything be done to improve the likelihood of effective response where 
forceful intervention for humanitarian reasons seems called for? One 
possibility comes to mind: the establishment of a UN volunteer force. Much 
discussion of the concept is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is perhaps 
w°rth noting that such a force could conceptually, at least, deal to an extent 
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with three of the most evident and troublesome problems that have 
UN interventionary efforts. 
First, there is the extreme reluctance of most governments to put troops 
harm's way: to accept the political risks of significant casualties being tak'*1 
in instances where the intervention might be effective but where ininiedhi 
important national interests do not seem to be at stake. While a volunteer 
UN force suffering casualties would be no less tragic, the pol i ty 
consequences for national governments would likely be far less severe than 
if the casualties fell on seconded national forces. 
Secondly, difficulties in the effective use of national forces have arisen 
because unit commanders have often felt obligated to check with home 
governments before carrying out orders given them by field commanders-
and all too often, they have been instructed not to obey such orders. Or, forces 
may be withdrawn by governments dissatisfied with the way a mandate is 
being interpreted and implemented, as happened in the Congo at a critical 
point in 1961 when African countries withdrew about a third of the UN troops 
then in the country. These problems in command and control \v<i;i!ii not 
arise with a UN-legion type force (except possibly to the extent that the UN 
might be dependent on national forces for air and other support.) 
Thirdly and most importantly, in some instances, the effectiveness may be 
higher, and the costs lower, if deployment of interventionary forccs ' milii in-
effected more quickly than has been possible under past and existing 
arrangements. Rwanda is the most recent major example. With a U.N force, 
this would probably often be possible. 
At present, there is little disposition on the part of the UN member-states to 
establish a UN force and to pay for it. But even if it were available 1here would 
remain the questions of when to employ it and to what purposes. 
Two summary statements can be made as regarding the matters raised in 
this chapter. First, decision should, in general, be straightforward if the 
objective is simply monitoring and supervising compliance with cease-fire 
agreements, provided certain well-defined conditions can be met, including, 
notably, provision of adequate financing and having confidence that 
responsible political leaders can and will exercise firm control over 
belligerent forces. Supervising and monitoring elections, and perhaps some 
other well-defined tasks, may also fall in this category. Secondly, when 
objectives are more far-reaching, for example to the protection of safe-havens, 
or where there is likelihood that potentially troublesome elements may not 
be responsive to control by the political authorities that are parties to the 
agreements on which the deployment of peace-keepers has been based, there 
is the potential for mission-creep, leading to peace-making/enforcen lent. In 
60 Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict iii 
cii'ies, or when it is even more immediately apparent that 
S l l C making/enforcement will be required, deciding on intervention will, in 
Peaeraj j,e very much more difficult. This is because adversary response, 
tj l c rcfore costs, may be quite unpredictable; and benefits perhaps even 
811 so, particularly if 'nation-building' objectives are involved. While 
""^fpjjjjcs will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, one 
C 'eralisation may be in order. Before getting involved in such operations, 
mU«st be a clear understanding about what responsibilities should be 
c c e p t e d by the intervenors for developments that may extend beyond the 
comple(ic,n immediate military operations and about the likely costs of 
meeting these responsibilities. For UN or other multilateral interventionary 
activitie«, getting consensus on these points is likely to be absolutely critical, 
difficult as it m a y be . 
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SECURITY, IDENTITY 
AND THE PEACE 
PROCESS IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
Bill McSweeney 
Introduction 
The visitor to Belfast in the twenty-four hours following the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) ceasefire on 31 August 1994 would have been puzzled. The 
republican movement had finally abandoned the bullet for the ballot-box, but 
the reaction on the street pointed to a dissonant interpretation. In the Falls 
Road centre of republicanism, there was jubilation, flag-waving, all the 
symbols of victory. In the unionist quarter on the Shankill Road there was 
dejection, anger, the sense of betrayal. The cessation of IRA violence, which 
Ulster unionists had demanded for decades, was now greeted by the street 
theorists as a betrayal of unionism, a triumph for republicanism. The British 
Government was now committed to negotiating the future of Northern Ireland 
with all parties, including Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA), but Ulster 
unionists had a cast-iron guarantee that their two-to-one majority could veto 
any constitutional change in the province. What did these street theorists 
know that was not on the record for the observer? 
This chapter is an attempt to interpret the peace process by situating it in 
Hk nontext of the changing identities and interests of the principal actors, 
rather than in the traditional security-policy framework of much of the 
literature. The peace process is seen as a security policy designed to alter 
the allegiances and identities which underlie the military and paramilitary 
acts of violence which express the Northern Ireland conflict. 
D The Facts of the Peace Process 
What is termed 'the peace process' in Northern Ireland is usually dated from 
Nit- ceasefire declaration of 31 August 1994. But the first recognition of the 
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need for new structures to replace those which governed the province since 
1921, and the active search to achieve an agreed basis for their construction 
began in 1973 with a major British initiative (the Sunningdale Agreement) to 
replace the Stormont Parliament with a power-sharing executive in 1973 
The collapse of this experiment in the aftermath of unionist resistance, and 
the escalation of violence and sectarian murder which followed, led to the 
setting up in the Republic of Ireland of the New Ireland Forum in 1983.' -phis 
was an attempt to rethink nationalist attitudes in the light of unionist 
concerns, and to develop a more pluralist agenda for all-party negotiation on 
the basis of alternative resolutions of the problem, rather than the unitary 
state hallowed by the irredentist republican tradition. 
It was given political urgency by the need to deflect Northern nationalists 
away from the growing attraction of Sinn Fein, in the wake of the 
uncompromising policies of the Thatcher government, and to back John 
Hume's constitutionalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP).2 International pressure on the British Government, particularly 
from the United States, softened British attitudes in favour of a negotiated 
settlement with the active involvement of the Republic, and helped to bring 
about the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. This treaty established tl le southern 
Irish government as a consultative partner in the search for a new political 
structure in Northern Ireland and, in return, embodied the acceptance in the 
Republic of the principle of consensus in Northern Ireland as the basis for 
constitutional change. The refusal of the unionist parties to participate in the 
negotiations prior to, and following, the Agreement limited its effectiveness. 
But the fact that such resistance could no longer force the abandonment by 
Westminster of this stage of the peace process allows us to mark the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement as its formal beginning. 
The second stage began with the so-called 'Downing Street Declaration" 
signed by Prime Ministers John Major and Albert Reynolds on 15 December 
1993. In return for 'a permanent end' to violence, the Major government 
offered Sinn Fein direct involvement in negotiations on future structures 
within the context of a commitment to the democratic process. The informal 
preparation for this dramatic announcement took the form of secret 
negotiations between the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn Fein during the eight 
months prior to the Declaration. The full text of their private agreement has 
never been published, but its gestation gave rise to considerable speculation 
in the media about the extent of IRA willingness to compromise on its historic 
demand for national unity. 
The brief statement contained in the Hume- Gerry Adams Document, 
formally presented to Irish Prime Minister or Taoiseach Albert Reynolds in 
September 1993, implies a new commitment on the part of the IRA to respect 
the different traditions in Ireland and to accept the democratic process as 
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the only means of achieving agreement on constitutional change. This was 
Widely taken to signal the fundamental change necessary to enable the Major 
d o v e r i u v i e n t to initiate the second stage of the peace process. Significantly, 
jnd foi' the first time, both sovereign governments and the IRA had now 
a c c e p t e d the idea of self-determination for the people of Ireland, North and 
South- No less important for understanding the peace process is the 
acknowledgment in the Declaration that Britain entertains 'no selfish 
strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'. 
Immediately following the Downing Street Declaration, Reynolds announced 
the convening of a successor to the New Ireland Forum under the title of 
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. This official examination of the political 
and religious culture demanded by the peace process differs from its 1983 
predecessor in inviting submissions from Sinn Fein and the unionist 
paramilitaries. The principle of self-determination was strengthened by the 
acceptance in Dublin that this is incompatible with the retention in the Irish 
Constitution of Articles 2 and 3, which define the jurisdiction of the southern 
state over the whole island of Ireland. The removal of these Articles, together 
with British agreement that the Dublin government should have a formal role 
in the creation of political structures affecting nationalists in Northern 
Ireland, are contained in the agenda for all-party negotiations on the peace 
process - the Framework Document - published in February 1995. This 
Document also provides for a new legislative Assembly giving Dublin 
ministers a role in government, the creation of new cross-border institutions 
and the guarantee of a referendum to decide future constitutional change in 
Northern Ireland. It has been repeatedly emphasised to unionists that these 
Ideas arc proposals for all-party discussions, not a declaration of intent by 
Westminster; that no change is possible without the consent of the majority 
in Northern Ireland; and that the British Government is, and will remain, a 
neutral facilitator of the process. But unionists remain profoundly skeptical 
of such assurances. Having demonstrated for a century their abhorrence of 
Home Rule and their unshakeable commitment to the maintenance of the 
unuin v.Vain the United Kingdom, they are now invited to enter negotiations 
on institutional changes with Sinn Fein, the contemporary champions of 
Home Rule, and expected to trust that their two-to-one majority will not be 
eroded by the designs of the process of change on the part of Westminster. 
The ceasefire and its attendant events immediately raised the puzzle: why 
should the IRA, in an act of apparent surrender, now abandon the instrument 
0 violence by which, for 25 years and more, they have single-mindedly 
P'Tsiied .heir goal of British withdrawal? And having done so, why should 
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they and their republican supporters have interpreted it as a triumph while 
unionists have regarded it with deep suspicion? 
The facts recounted above are susceptible of a range of interpretations: 
British security policy, traditionally focused on the goal of military victory, 
has finally succeeded in weakening the IRA - materially in its capacity for 
violence, politically in terms of its legitimacy with the nationalist population, 
and organisationally in terms of its internal coherence. In effect, this 
explanation points to an IRA surrender. It is the final vindication of the 
verge-of-collapse theory, rehearsed at regular intervals since 1969 by British 
security spokespersons, only to be repeatedly rebutted by an IRA very much 
alive and active. An alternative version of this theory points to the United 
States rather than the United Kingdom as the source of the collapse. Without 
continued US support, directly and through political pressure on London, 
the IRA cannot sustain its military activity. Given the evidence of increasing 
American concern to find a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland since 
the mid-1980s, it is inferred that US pressure was exercised in favour of a 
solution coinciding with the demands of the British government for a military 
victory. 
Both these explanations are weakened by lack of supporting evidence and by 
their failure to make sense of the known facts - most obviously, the dissonant 
reaction of republican and unionist supporters to the alleged capitulation of 
the IRA. The present writer believes that a more persuasive case can be made 
to support the view that the ceasefire was announced in the context of the 
continuing strength and capacity of the IRA, of increasing US pressure on the 
British government for a radical shift of policy, and of a weakening of British 
resolve arising from a new awareness of British interests in the province. The 
British may well have entertained the hope of weakening the efficiency and 
solidarity of the IRA by appealing to a general desire for peace over its head. 
But it would depend crucially on British success in achieving the 
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons prior to negotiations, which was 
never realistic and which has been brusquely dismissed by the IRA as a 
'ludicrous demand for a surrender' and 'an absolute barrier to progress'.3 
That the IRA would at this stage risk a ceasefire and place its historic mission 
in the hands of the people, two-thirds of whom are traditional supporters of 
the Union, makes little sense, unless we assume that the organisation was 
in a state of imminent collapse. But there is no evidence of a weakened IRA 
negotiating an end to violence under the duress of organisational collapse or 
threat of unionist paramilitary action. In the period preceding the ceasefire, 
its capacity to continue its armed struggle indefinitely both at home an' I in 
mainland Britain was manifest in the continued high level of British security 
in the province and on the British mainland. 
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f l ic military confrontation in Northern Ireland since 1969 has been 
essentially a battle between two forces: the British army and the IRA. Loyalist 
paramilitaries, notwithstanding the rhetoric of 'no surrender' and the threats 
0f a bloodbath if their interests are ignored, are parasitic on the continued 
presence of the British, both politically and militarily, and on the continued 
violence of the IRA which legitimises their sectarianism domestically. 
However unjustified, international support is overwhelmingly weighed 
against them and in favour of the republicanism of the IRA. The evidence of 
increased sectarian violence on their part in recent years posed a new security 
problem to Catholics within the province; it does not measure against the 
security threat directly posed to British interests by the IRA. 
As to American pressure on the IRA to move to a political resolution of the 
conflict, this has undoubtedly been a significant factor since the early 1980s. 
Since the beginning of the Bill Clinton Administration in 1992, US influence 
has been exercised under the tutelage of the nationalist Irish Government as 
part of a twin strategy of pressure on the IRA to compromise on its dogma 
of Irish unity in return for pressure on the British to compromise, in turn, 
on its dogma of refusal to negotiate the future of Northern Ireland with armed 
paramilitaries. This is now, in effect, the American solution, and one which 
is perceived in Washington as offering a major fillip to the re-election of 
Clinton.4 Far from weakening the IRA, increased American involvement has 
helped to educate it to the political opportunities available to achieve a place 
in the negotiations in the context of a phased British withdrawal. Implicit 
American support for the IRA refusal to decommission its military capacity 
as a pre-condition for such negotiations to commence is witness to this.5 
Seen from the Westminster viewpoint, it is clear that British interests cannot 
be neutral as to the outcome of the negotiation process. The declaration that 
there is 'no selfish strategic or economic interest' involved cannot disguise 
the fact that there may be considerable 'selfish' interest in detaching Northern 
Ireland from the British identity map - of which Northern Ireland was always 
an ambivalent offshore element - and in playing the role of active persuader 
to ensure such an outcome in the interest of long-term political stability. 
Several factors have contributed to persuading the government of John Major 
that now is the time for a decisive break. They can be listed summarily under 
six heads: the declining strategic importance of Northern Ireland since the 
end of the Second World War; the escalating costs of the Westminster 
subvention required to support the Northern Ireland economy and security 
apparatus; the increasing export of IRA violence to the British mainland since 
the early 1980s, in particular the shift of target from civilian to political and 
financial; growing support of British public opinion for withdrawal from the 
province and detachment from the British mainland; the evidence of a new 
political culture in the Republic of Ireland, more amenable to negotiation on 
the terms of a peace process; and the pressure of successive US governments 
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and, particularly, the new aggressiveness of the Clinton Administration 
aimed at settling the Irish question in favour of what is perceived to be 
Irish-American nationalist opinion. 
While each of these influences may be seen as playing an independent part 
in educating British political opinion as to the 'real' interests involved in 
Northern Ireland, the fourth factor relating to British public opinion - and 
to a lesser extent the fifth - plays a pivotal role in defining the realisn i of the 
others. One has simply to ask how such real material and political pressures 
as those listed would be interpreted if the region at issue was not Northern 
Ireland but Somerset. The 'selfish' interest of the British government in 
Somerset is not merely strategic and economic, but pertains to a funda mental 
level of meaning and identity which gives strategic and economic interests 
their purchase on politics. 
Since 1922, and more explicitly since the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, 
the people of Northern Ireland have lived a conditional existence as part of 
the people identified with the British crown - conditional, one could say, on 
the tolerance of public opinion in the British heartland. Opinion polls in the 
past few years make depressing reading for any unionists still inclined to 
believe the rhetoric of the Union. While 72 per cent of the people of Northern 
Ireland preferred to remain part of the United Kingdom in 1992, only 30 per 
cent of the British people saw the identity of Northern Ireland in the. same 
light. In a different poll two years later, 70 per cent of the British people 
opted for some form of detachment of Northern Ireland from the United 
Kingdom, either through independence or unity with the Republic of Ireland, 
while British support for the Union remained at 30 per cent.6 These polls 
reflect the political reality of an offshore region, geographically and 
constitutionally set apart from the core nation since its inception, with its 
identification with the crown thus exposed to the test of its performance oil 
economic, political and strategic indicators in a manner which would be 
unthinkable for Somerset or Cornwall. 
If this interpretation of changing interests on the part of the principal actors 
is correct, then there is clearly more to the 'peace process' than the facts 
available on the public record. The British Government, the IRA, and the US 
Administration have redefined their interests in relation to the fulure of 
Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland, too, shows a readiness to break 
with its monoculturalist past and to seize the political and economic 
advantages offered by the convergence of interest on the part of the other 
main actors. Only one significant group continues to assert its interests in 
terms of symbolic meaning and historic identity: the unionist majority in 
Northern Ireland, who interpret the peace process as a British-led conspiracy 
to undermine their formal veto over constitutional change. Like their 
republican opponents, they infer a hidden agenda behind the observable facts 
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and a new interest underlying the apparent 'neutrality' of a disinterested 
Westminster.7 
If the peace process was interest-driven, as argued, it was nonetheless always 
clear to its architects that the interests of unionists were not so malleable, 
s e p a r a b l e from their identity. Northern Ireland unionists placed a premium 
on symbolic meaning over instrumentalist ends in their public affirmation 
of identity, and saw the constitutional status quo as its guarantor. It is 
plausible, then, to infer that a deal of some kind preceded the IRA ceasefire. 
To conclude otherwise - that the process offered in return for the ceasefire 
w as no more than a place at the negotiation table, with a demilitarised IRA 
resting its historic mission on democratic discussion with unionists and with 
London playing the evenhanded role of disinterested facilitator - this is to fly 
in the lace of the evidence and of political intuition. It is to take the rhetoric 
of the Declaration and Framework documents too literally, as Gerard Delanty 
appears to do when he concludes: 'The people of Northern Ireland must 
decide their own future for themselves. Britain will not force secession on a 
reluctant majority.... Anything else would be unthinkable in a democracy.'8 
What, then, is the nature of the peace process, the deal which persuaded the 
IRA (and other actors) that their interests were best served by engaging in it? 
Before discussing this, it is necessary to address some aspects of the concept 
of security, in particular its relation to collective identity and interests. 
Security, Identity and Interests 
Security is not a property of the instruments used to attain it, such as 
weapons, dogs, insurance policies.9 Nor is it a property of the group requiring 
it. It is essentially a quality of a relationship between groups which takes its 
character from the identity of Self and Other by which they are distinguished 
as groups. A security policy understood in this elemental sense is a policy 
designed to reconstruct, not just the institutions and behaviour of conflicting 
groups, but the group identities from which the conflictual behaviour flows 
and which, in turn, are sharpened by these conflictual practices. A security 
policy, in other words, is a peace process. Its link to the concept of identity 
follows from its relational quality, from its character as an orientation to the 
Other.10 
A moral choice, not a factual discovery, is central to the achievement of a 
collective identity. The question 'Who am I?' clearly does not rest simply on 
empirical evidence, though the factual, historical data collected in our 
passport, our diary and our past experiences are very relevant. Neither can 
it be decided exclusively in terms of subjective perception. We routinely 
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'correct' identity claims, not only of others, but of ourselves. It rests also on 
the contrast and balance between a normative view of human nature and the 
facts of personal biography. It entails an element of decision as well as 
self-observation. 
Similarly, the collective question: 'Who are we?' cannot be answered simply 
by reference to opinion polls, ancient myths, folk music or other measures 
of collective history. It too entails a decision based on a theory which selects 
and relates some of the countless biographical facts of our collective past and 
present to a view of who we want to be. 'We are who we choose to be', 
overstates our freedom in the matter, but it makes the point forcefully that 
collective identity is a choice made by people, not a property of society which 
transcends their agency." This is clearly opposed to the view that a 
community or society 'has' an identity by definition, which people do not 
choose, but discover, recognise, belong to. 
Collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered. What is 'out 
there' is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and 
countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating and 
affirming a response to the demand - at times urgent, mostly absent - for a 
collective image. Even in times of crisis, this is never more than a provisional 
and fluid image of ourselves as we want to be, limited by the facts of history. 
Identity may be a cause or an effect of insecurity. We cannot affirm or deny 
a priori that certain security problems are a consequence of the perceived 
vulnerability of a community's cohesiveness. Whether it is or not can only 
be revealed by deconstructing the process of identity-formation at the 
sub-societal level. The security problem in the Russian Federation, inner 
Yugoslavia, or Northern Ireland, is not there just because people have 
separate identities; it is just as likely the case that they have separate 
identities because of the security problem. Identity is not to be taken as an 
independent variable, tout court; it is more often the outcome of a labelling 
process which reflects a conflict of interests at the political level. This is not 
to deny that a generalised and vague sense of belonging can exist detached, 
so to speak, from any underlying conflicts of interests, and that it is therefore 
rightly considered a component in the definition of society. But it only 
becomes relevant to security at a much higher level of clarity and 
exclusiveness which cannot be assumed to be self-generated by its adherents, 
or to emerge mysteriously from the social fact of society. 
The point at issue in the foregoing discussion is to emphasise that group 
identity is chosen, not given.12 This does not deny that many people are born 
into a 'given' identity - Russian Jewish, Afrikaner, Ulster Protestant - which 
constrains their freedom to choose differently. To refer to such an identity 
as 'ascribed' is only to draw attention to the historic weight or obduracy of a 
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social construction; it is not to deny that human choice rather than nature 
constitutes the source of the group identity whether it is passed by ascription 
to the individual members or achieved by conscious effort by political leaders 
or intellectuals. The further point to stress is that this choice is a moral one, 
arising from the competing interests which give rise to the demand for group 
identity in the first place. The relevance to the peace process in Northern 
Ireland should be clear. 
Interpreting the Peace Process 
With this understanding of the social construction of identity and its relation 
to security, we can return to the question of the peace process in Northern 
Ireland, and draw some inferences from the factual evidence earlier outlined. 
Three problems of collective identity are entailed in the historic conflict 
between the British and the Irish which erupted in sustained violence over 
the past twenty-five years - what it means to be British, to be Irish, and to be 
unionist. In each case, the roots of identity can be traced to the pursuit of 
Interests and to the dominance of some over others which might have defined 
the group identity differently.13 In each case also, the identities which 
emerged from these struggles acquired over time a primordial character 
which entered interactively into the definition of interests, inhibiting any 
attempt to expose their human fabrication and to separate the instrumental 
interests at stake at any time from the symbolic meaning which they 
sustained. 
In the British and Irish case, there is evidence in the events of the peace 
process of the emergence of new interests and of the corresponding attempts 
to articulate a new or revised identity. The constraints of history, which 
weigh heavier on the Irish and heaviest on the unionists, were never permitted 
to exercise their burden on the British in their relations with Ireland. From 
the time of formal partition in 1922 until the beginning of the recent period 
of violence in 1969, Northern Ireland was a place apart, unlike any region of 
the mainland in the manner in which Westminster conducted its affairs of 
state and in which the British people understood their collective identity. 
However much the people of the province affirmed their cultural identity as 
British, their fellow-Britons on the mainland denied it by their ambivalence. 
In the Sunningdale Agreement imposed by Westminster in 1973 on an 
outraged unionist population, we see the first major initiative to resolve this 
ambivalence from the British point of view, and to begin the process of 
reconstructing a British identity which would, in time, exclude the people of 
Northern Ireland. Strategic, economic, and political considerations of longer 
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gestation had come together with a critical security problem to expose the 
fragile basis of Northern Ireland's Britishness. 
Had domestic British problems not intervened to bring down the Edward 
Heath Government and the Sunningdale Agreement with it, this initiative was 
critically flawed in another respect. It contained no provision for 
transforming the self-image of unionists as a pre-condition for transforming 
their behaviour and their relations with nationalists. It was as guileless an 
instrument of security as the military force which preceded it, but its lessons 
endured for unionists in their suspicion of Westminster and for the British 
Government itself in their approach to any new initiative in the future. 
Major's Downing Street Declaration makes clear what the British people 
always knew and what the unionists denied: whatever else they are, they are 
different from the British, and the British Government intends to deal with 
them in future as a people apart. 
The 1983 New Ireland Forum provides the example of an explicit experiment 
in identity reconstruction on the part of the Republic of Ireland. Just as the 
British Government's redefining of Britishness reflected a growing trend in 
public opinion, so this attempt by the Irish Government to formulate a 'new 
Ireland' in the context of relations with the North tapped into existing currents 
in society at large: the process of secularisation and decline of the political 
authority of Catholicism which has been in rapid progress since the 1960s; 
a concomitant acceptance of the need for pluralism; widespread revulsion at 
the violence of the IRA as well as a readiness to compromise in the interests 
of peace. The ceasefire itself and the dynamics of the peace process have 
given added significance to the second stage of Irish self-examination, still in 
progress since the beginning of 1995, in the Forum for Peacc and 
Reconciliation. 
At the constitutional level, there still remains the removal of those Articles 
sacred to the republican tradition which define the territory of the Irish as 
the whole island. This will cost republicans dear when it is implemented; 
but it is instructive of republican interpretations of the peace process that 
the dispute about implementation is so far largely one of timing and tactics, 
rather than dogma. 
I f it is easy for the British to redefine their relations with Northern Ireland in 
the context of independently-changing interests, and for southern Ireland to 
identify new interests which coincide with existing cultural trends, the 
problem for unionists is incomparably greater. The major difficulty is that 
unionists still perceive their interests in line with an historical/theological 
identity which is fundamentally incompatible with the British and Irish 
concerns reflected in the peace process. This is not to claim that support 
for the Union today carries all the metaphysical baggage of post - R e f o r m a t i o n 
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theology, nor is it to deny the cultural pluralism which unites Anglican and 
Presbyterian, Methodist and even some Catholics in a common cause of 
unionism. Still less does it mean that unionist interests cannot be redirected 
in line with the economic and political opportunities envisaged in the peace 
process. It is to claim, however, that the obduracy of a history defined by a 
Calvinist understanding of Catholicism and refracted by a form of Irish 
Catholicism south of the border which, until recently, provided Calvinists 
with a faithful image of the Other, has made opposition to any involvement 
in their government by Dublin an overriding interest in its own right. Irish 
Catholicism represents the antithesis of the core beliefs of the powerful 
Calvinist voice in unionist politics.'4 When 'Ulster Says No!' it is not just in 
defiance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, much of which made economic sense 
for the unionist business class. It is in opposition to the prospect of 
government by Rome and to the proven treachery of a Westminster 
government which might contrive it. 
The Framework Document, then, can be seen as the agenda for constructing 
a new identity for the people of Northern Ireland which will persuade the 
unionists to consider other interests at stake, and to reconsider their historic 
choice of an identity defined in opposition to any form of integration with 
Catholic Ireland. 
With the active political, economic and ideological support of London, 
Dublin, Washington and the European Union, the challenge of this process 
is to break the link between the unionist/Protestant self-image and the 
political structure to which it has been historically bound. Not only is the 
European Union a major funder and active promoter of the peace process, 
but certain mechanisms of functionalism, borrowed from the European 
experiment, are being applied to it. Foremost among these is the building of 
a political spillover effect into the economic support measures designed to 
persuade the conflicting communities of the benefits of cooperation and, in 
the process, to provide the legitimacy for the new political structures through 
the emergence of a communal identity.15 
Finally, it should be noted that the apparent victory of the republicans in 
Northern Ireland may carry a sting in the tail. The calculated construction 
of identity which is the peace process will not be restricted to changing the 
character of the unionist world-view. It was a condition facilitating the British 
role in the peace process that the Republic of Ireland also should divest itself 
of the cultural obstacles to pluralism and tolerance and should refashion its 
identity to accommodate closer integration with unionists. 
The IRA will discover that the Ireland from which they staked their irredentist 
claims - Gaelic, Catholic, monolithic - is also targeted by the identity-makers 
of the peace process. What it meant to be Irish when these claims were first 
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channeled into violence will not be sustainable - and is already evaporation 
- in the new political culture evolving in the Republic of Ireland.10 
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CONFLICT, ETHNICITY 
AND DEMOCRATISATION 
IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Simon Bekker 
'Ethnicity is one of those forces that is community-building 
in moderation, community-destroying in excess.'1 
| Introduction 
\fkr the emergence in the 1990s of a new international global order, after 
lie disappearance of the old order of Western and Eastern blocs, of capitalist 
md communist ideologies, of Third World countries as pawns caught up in 
he Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing strong currents of 
lemocratisation. South Africa is directly involved in this trend after a long 
period during which it was perceived to have been isolated, estranged from 
ts African associates. Today, following identification with this process of 
iemocratisation, South Africa is also experiencing rapid institutional 
restructuring of state, parastatal, and private sector institutions. New social 
movements are emerging, and new identities are being forged, 
internationally, South Africa is seeking ways of realising its comparative 
advantages in a new and threatening global economy. It is widely perceived 
to have rejoined the African continent and to be facing challenges similar to 
its African neighbours. 
Contemporary South Africa is a modern plural society in which its different 
groups have experienced division along lines, inter alia, of language (for over 
200 years during which various languages changed, merged, were codified, 
and took root), of territory (before the twentieth century in separate 
pre-industrial and settler societies, and after, under different state-imposed 
orders), of race and changing culture, and of changing relationships to the 
South African state and to the economy of the country.2 
At least for the whole period since White settlement in South Africa began in 
1652, this society has been a particularly conflictful and violent one. There 
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have been periods of less conflict, periods of widespread and intense coiiHict 
and periods of war. In broad-brush strokes, it is helpful to distinguish three 
periods during this historical trajectory. Before the beginning of the twentieth 
century, macro-conflict took place between colonising European powers and 
their settlers, on the one hand, and a number of pre-industrial, primarily 
pastoral, African societies and their states, on the other.3 
The second period involved conflict rooted in a rapidly industrialising 
society, conflict revolving around attempts at the political incorporation into 
South African society of the excluded majority of the population, namely 
those classified by the government of the time as Black, Coloured, and Indian 
South Africans. The story of conflict during the last decade of this second 
period - the 1980s - is probably the best-known for it was during this decade 
that apartheid, became an international issue, that the white- and 
Afrikaner-dominated South African state, its security forces, and its policy 
of total strategy were pitted against the black exile movements, their iiiicrn;il 
allies, and - at least in diplomatic terms - against governments of most 
countries in the rest of the world, all subscribing to the universal values of 
equity and non-racialism. 
During the early 1990s, these two major protagonists, represented by the 
South African government and the Congress Alliance, led by the African 
National Congress (ANC), continued their struggle through negotiations and 
civil disobedience rather than by violent conflict. This resulted, in April 1994, 
in the establishment of South Africa's first democratically clected 
government. It named itself the Government of National Unity (GNU). What 
is less well known is that a qualitatively different kind of violent conflict 
emerged in the late 1980s and escalated during this period of negotiations. 
As will be shown below, violent conflict during this third period (which 
continues to the present day) exhibits ethnic features, that is the definition 
by important actors themselves of conflict issues in ethnic terms. 
Simultaneously, this violent conflict exhibits other salient features (which 
may variously be called political or communal or traditionalist/niMlerni. 
Accordingly, it appears sensible to analyse such conflict in terms of multiple 
causality, rather than to attempt to categorise it as singly or primarily ethnic. 
During this same period, moreover, ethnic leaders within South African 
society are beginning to make claims, some newly-emergent and some of long 
standing, on behalf of their communities, thereby expressing new or 
increased communal self-awareness. Developments along these lines in the 
new Western Cape province of South Africa form an example. The existence 
of such ethnic claims is not new to South African history.4 What is at issue 
here is the emergence of such claims and conflict during the first half of the 
1990s. South Africa, together with most African states to the north, is 
experiencing strong currents of democratisation during the present decade. 
As a consequence, in search of a unifying mission, the government of national 
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unity is introducing a claim for a new form of nationhood, albeit nationhood 
based on territory rather than on cultural coherence. This claim is directed 
at nation-building; at a government project intended to accomplish 'a 
collective act of historical imagination'.5 
Concurrent claims for new or increased communal self-awareness appear to 
be encouraged by these currents of democratisation. The dialectics created 
by these potentially divergent trends are the main focus of this chapter. In 
societies where perceptions of racial difference are pervasive, these dialectics 
are complicated even further. As a result of its particular history, 
contemporary South African society is a prime example. This added element 
of cultural pluralism probably increases the conflict potential in the society. 
The rest of this chapter comprises six sections. The first section introduces 
the notions of ethnicity, race and nationalism as they are employed in 
comparative literature. The second section traces in broad-brush strokes the 
main features of violent conflict in South African history during the first and 
second periods identified above. 
The third section addresses the process of negotiations during the early 
1990s which culminated in the establishment of the new South African GNU; 
It is entitled 'The South African Miracle'. The fourth section addresses the 
new form of violent conflict and communal mobilisation which appeared 
during the same period: it bears the title 'Shadows Across the Miracle'. The 
fifth section outlines the development of a brown ('Coloured') identity in the 
new Western Cape province. 
The sixth section brings the chapter to a close, identifying and analysing 
present strategies being used in South African society to regulate the 
dialectics created by the potentially divergent trends highlighted in third, 
fourth and fifth sections. 
[ | Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism 
It has become standard practice, among many scholars and analysts of 
modern plural societies, to interpret social and political movements in terms 
of ethnicity, race and nationalism. As a working definition, ethnicity may be 
viewed as linked, albeit not strictly, to claimed ties of birth, blood and 
marriage. For an individual, this identity is usually difficult to change - and 
accordingly includes some element of ascription - and relates to both 
individual and to group origins. In short, ethnicity is based on a myth of 
collective ancestry. 
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In plural societies, it is seen by an increasing number of scholars to be a 
primary factor underlying sustained conflict. Consider the following recent 
reflection by three respected scholars of political conflict. In a paper written 
for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation on 
ethnicity, development and democracy, three scholars declare as follows: 
Of all the factors that influence the social and political systems of Third 
World countries, none perhaps is more important than ethnicity. The very 
future of some countries as united sovereign states is in doubt due to 
ethnic conflicts. In many others, political order is difficult to establish 
and social and economic developments are bedevilled by ethnic 
differences. In many parts of the globe, ethnic minorities suffer appalling 
discrimination and live in fear. Ethnic conflicts frequently spill over 
across state boundaries and threaten international peace. The correct 
and creative handling of the tensions and conflicts which arise from 
ethnic differences has become a supreme test of statesmanship in most 
countries of the world, particularly in the Third World.6 
A comprehensive survey of approaches to ethnicity and ethnic conflict will 
not be attempted here. But it is useful to draw a number of distinctions. Some 
scholars tend toward a primordial perspective, arguing that the aseriptive 
nature of ethnic identity is deep and is rooted in groups' claims to common 
ancestry and to the shared memories and symbols of this ancestry. Others 
point to the constructed aspects of this identity and the continuing 
re-invention - for reasons that ought to be sought elsewhere, through 
materialist and political analysis - of shared history and solidarity. One 
scholar has written: 
By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and 'fault lines' of 
religion, customs, language, and institutions, we run the risk of treating 
ethnicity as something primordial and fixed. By concentrating solely on 
the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of fixed ethnic or 
ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb and 
flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependent 'tools' 
or 'boundary markers' of other social and economic forces.7 
Two points about this debate can be made. It does not seem useful to opt 
exclusively for one of the two approaches, to take sides, as it were. Both 
persisting historical elements, contemporary situational and constructed 
factors, as well as their interaction with one another need to be considered. 
The second point flows from the first: without a historical analysis 
underpinning explanations given for ethnic conflicts, explanations will tend 
to be superficial and often faulty. As has been argued elsewhere: 
As a source of conflict, ethnicity takes its coloration from the specific 
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circumstances of time and society. It is difficult to pin it down as an 
independent variable in the ordering of social, political and economic 
life... Ethnicity is (also) highly manipulable: indeed its very existence 
can be conj ured out of vague bonds and symbols of association. There 
is a dynamic quality to ethnic relations which suggests that more 
attention should be paid to history than is customary in the study of 
ethnic relations.8 
A second distinction is also necessary. The notion of ethnicity is intimately 
linked to the ideas of nationalism and of race. Nationalism is an ideology 
which claims that groups (identified as 'nations') have the right to form 
territorial states. It is immediately apparent that ethnic movements which 
arc based on claims of common ancestry will often develop nationalist claims. 
What difference, if any, exists between these two phenomena? Equally, if race 
is defined as a social or cultural construct established through perceived 
group differences based on physical or morphological characteristics, is a 
movement based on common racial characteristics different from an ethnic 
movement based on claims of common ancestry? 
With regard to ethnicity and nationalism, it is relevant to note that ethnic 
movements often do not make nationalistic claims.9 The political programme 
to set up separate territorial states may be irrelevant or impractical; the 
purpose may be the reallocation of state resources; and the competition may 
be with other ethnic fragments in a plural society. While sharing features with 
nationalist movements, ethnic movements do not necessarily include claims 
to sovereignty, to full territorial independence for the national community. 
Simultaneously, it is also relevant to note that ethnic claims and ethnic 
programmes will often incorporate strong emergent nationalistic tendencies, 
tendencies which seek sovereignty for the ethnic community. Such 
tendencies may lead to changes in these ethnic claims and ethnic 
programmes - changes which, at the limit, involve claims for control and 
domination of the state; or for secession, partition, or irredentism. 
Accordingly, though intimately associated, ethnicity and nationalism need to 
be distinguished from one another, and subsequently, in each separate case 
being addressed, related to one another, where appropriate. 
The case of race and ethnicity is different. Racial consciousness is a form of 
ethnic pluralism which is rooted in domination and in stratification and 
originates in organised systems of labour exploitation. Contemporary South 
African society is a prime example. Scholars who claim that racial conflict 
differs from other forms of ethnic conflicts are dealing with ranked ethnic 
groups in societies which have developed systems of racial categorisation 
largely coinciding with systems of group stratification. It is as a consequence 
the history and circumstances of these societies, not of the racial 
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constructs and beliefs themselves, that racial conflict appears to be different 
from other forms of ethnic conflicts. 
This argument implies an inclusive notion of ethnicity which comprises 
perceived group differences identified not only by language, by religion, or by 
some other (non-physical) characteristics common to the group, but also by 
colour. Colour ('race') tends to become an important indicator or marker of 
group difference in societies where class differences and colour differences 
have come to overlap. The fact that perceived race may arouse intense 
emotions and is often viewed as indelible and immutable, has led some 
scholars to distinguish between ethnic and racial groups in principle, but 
counter-examples10 as well as the advantage of comparative analysis justify 
the more inclusive notion of ethnicity. 
This short overview raises as many questions as it was intended to address. 
As a source of conflict, ethnicity does not appear to be amenable to 
comparative analysis, and its emergence remains elusive. It also iippi-.irs 
often to be intertwined with nationalist currents. The most useful conclusion 
to draw at this stage, accordingly, is to heed the call for specific historical 
analysis of the case under scrutiny. This is the aim of the next sections of 
this chapter. 
The added element of racial consciousness in South Africa further 
complicates the search for understanding. The overlap between racial and 
class differences - the main historical reason for the rise of a racial 
consciousness - points to the need for an explanation which goes beyond 
'ethnicity' on its own, that is for an explanation which also includes 
socio-economic and political analyses. The most useful conclusion here 
appears to be the need for an analysis of the multiple - rather than single -
causes of contemporary conflict in South Africa. 
Finally, what indicators of ethnic tensions and ethnic conflict exist? When 
ought political claims and conflicts to be classified as 'ethnic'? The most 
useful response appears to be when important actors themselves define these 
claims and conflicts in ethnic terms. 
Macro-conflict in South Africa 
• Introduction 
The purpose of this broad historical overview is two-fold. First, as was made 
clear in the preceding section, an adequate understanding of conflict 
exhibiting ethnic features requires historical analysis. Secondly, such 
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historical analysis is necessary background for a better understanding of 
both the South African 'miracle' and the shadows falling across it. The 
'miracle' refers to the relatively peaceful establishment in 1994 of a new 
democratic government in the country, against the backdrop of domestic as 
well as internatidnal expectations that the country would be plunged into an 
'inevitable' black-white racial conflict. The shadows refer to continuing 
communal conflict in certain regions of the country, primarily in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
The analysis will focus on two periods of South African history. Before the 
beguming of the twentieth century, macro-conflict took place between colonising 
European powers and their settlers, on the one hand, and a number of 
pre-industrial, primarily pastoral, African societies and their states, on the 
other. The second period involved conflict rooted in a rapidly industrialising 
society, conflict revolving around attempts at the political incorporation into 
South African society of the excluded majority of the population. 
• European colonisation and the destruction of pre-industrial 
African states 
'The Cattle-Killing (of 1856) was born partly out of Xhosa frustration 
at colonial domination and partly out of the hope awakened by the 
news that the Russians had beaten the English... (The prophetess) 
Nongqawuse said that she had met with a "new people" from over 
the sea, who were the ancestors of the living Xhosa. They told her 
that the dead were preparing to rise again, and wonderful new cattle 
too, but first the people must kill their cattle and destroy their corn 
During the late eighteen and nineteenth centuries, a number of pre-industrial 
Alrifiin states were being established in the country. The Pedi, Swazi, 
Southern Tswana, Zulu and Xhosa states are examples.12 Dutch (and 
subsequently British) migrants settled in the Cape, in the south of the 
coumry, thereby alienating land from indigenous Khoi societies. A 
slave-based agricultural system was established in the eighteenth century. 
Simultaneously, settlers began to moved north- and eastwards in search of 
more land for stock-farming, of game to hunt, and of other resources and 
commodities for their subsistence and for trade with Europe. From the 
to'iyuniug of the nineteenth century, the British Government incorporated 
the southern part of the country into its Empire and, as was happening 
elsewhere in that empire, the flag followed colonists and trade. 
After the discovery of commercial diamond and gold opportunities in the 
north oi the country, towards the end of the nineteenth century, British power 
Hirorpi,rated the rest of present-day South Africa into its Empire. This 
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incorporation required a major imperial war against the Boer renuhi-
which had been established during the second half of the cvnturv 
descendants of the original Dutch (and German) settlers who had treklr 
into the interior of the country. This violent imperial incident wh-> 
contributed substantially to the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism in th' 
twentieth century, coincided with the destruction of the pre-indusirial Afrjp e 
states in the region. Can 
The economies of these African states revolved around cattle-fanning ancj 
cultivation, especially of maize. In a study of the destruction of the ZUiu 
kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century, the author describes 
aspects of such an economy as follows: 
The majority of the Zulu were still held firmly in the different production 
communities of the kingdom, moving from one type to another as they 
grew older and their status altered. The boys worked in their fathers' 
homesteads before establishing homesteads of their own, while, the girls 
worked in their fathers' homesteads before establishing their own 
production units within their husbands' homesteads. Of course external 
forces had affected the Zulu increasingly as settler communities became 
established on the borders of the kingdom. Nevertheless throughout the 
reigns of the kings, Zulu labour expended within the commoners' 
homesteads continued to support the bulk of the population, and the 
surplus which was drawn from them by the king ... created the basis for 
his material power and authority.13 
Conflict during this period took on two major forms. In the first place, conflict 
took place on the 'frontier', zones where intermittent colonisation look place 
and where little state authority was present. Under conditions of such 
ambiguity and uncertainty, conflict between colonisers and indigenous 
people was endemic. Opposing claims to land, disputes over trade and labour 
arrangements were complicated by divergent cultural and hnn'iislir 
practices.14 As the colonists moved north and the frontiers closed, settlers 
occupied some of the land left behind, and the colonial governments 
instituted indirect rule in what was left of the African states. In the second 
place, direct conflict took place between imperial forces and armies of African 
states. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, major British 
campaigns were waged in the Eastern Cape against Xhosa armies, in 
KwaZulu-Natal against Zulu armies, and in the north against the Pedi 
kingdom. As in the case of frontier conflict, after the destruction of these 
African states, settlers occupied some of the land left behind, and the colonial 
government instituted indirect rule in what was left of these African societies. 
This incorporation of pre-industrial societies was undertaken in the n nne of 
British civilising colonialism, a mission aimed at colonising the minds of 
indigenous South Africans, and in the name of settler colonialism, a mission 
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•mied t° dispossess these people of their land and to enable British (and 
r fkaner) settlers to put down roots in the country.15 The presence of the 
=vaners, the Boers, against whom imperial war had to be waged to achieve 
se two missions, complicated the British project. For Afrikaners, whilst 
erally favouring the settler colonial policy, questioned incorporation 
i^thir- the British civilising colonial mission. 
Black reaction to conquest was more complicated. There were various 
fliilicr.ai'ian movements in the late nineteenth century. In the early twentieth 
centurY' separatist Christian churches were established and flourished. 
/African languages which were gradually codified, remained the main medium 
of communication in rural and most urban communities. In those areas of 
the country where indirect rule had been instituted, pastoral and agrarian 
life continued, albeit under the requirement of payment of regular cash taxes. 
Accordingly, an increasing number of blacks joined the industrial and urban 
labour force and thereby contributed in a critical manner to South Africa's 
process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation during the twentieth 
century. 
• Macro-conflict in Urban and Industrial Society 
A society which moved from rural Aj'rica to urbanized and 
industrialized South Jtfrica within three quarters of a century, if not 
, , 16 
less. 
During the twentieth century, as part of the British Empire, South Africa 
rapidly developed a modern economic system. Mineral resources of 
increasing international importance had been discovered early in this period 
and major mining projects followed immediately. Together with agricultural 
commodities, their export launched this development. From the 1920s, the 
white South African Government promoted domestic manufacturing, a 
sector which has grown steadily in importance, especially after the Second 
World War. This process of industrial development was accompanied by a 
related process of urbanisation. By 1990, one half of all South Africans were 
urban dwellers, most living in one of the four metropolitan areas of the 
country. 
Black South Africans joined and were drawn into this developing economy 
in ever increasing numbers. Initially on white-owned commercial farms - land 
colonised by settlers during the previous century - and in mines, and 
subsequently in manufacturing, their increasing involvement in the labour 
"ii:rki:t reflected the process sketched above. Their presence in South African 
cities and towns expanded in parallel. 
Three primary political developments took place during this period. First, 
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the South African Government which had from its inception in 1909 been 
elected by an overwhelmingly white electorate, formally instituted itself in the 
early 1950s as a white Government, elected by white South Africans alone 
This statutory racist element became one of the two ideological cornerstones 
of apartheid. Secondly, since a majority of this electorate was Afrikaner, this 
Government demanded independence from the British Empire and Crown 
deciding in 1961 to break all ties and establish a Republic, thereby realising 
the mission of Afrikaner nationalism whose supporters dominated the 
government from that point on. 
Thirdly, in what was the second ideological apartheid cornerstone, there was 
the establishment of a series of separate 'homelands' for different black South 
African communities. Located mainly in areas where the remnants of 
nineteenth-century African societies persisted, governed and financed by the 
central state officials, these apartheid homelands were designed to justify the 
exclusion of black South Africans from participation in the central political 
system and from permanent residence in South African cities by creating, 
for them, separate government-defined ethnic states within the country, 
Black reaction to these processes of increasing economic incorporation and 
sharpening political and residential exclusion changed from acquiescence 
and negotiation to political and economic action, and, finally, from the 
mid-nineteen-seventies to nineteen-ninety, to resistance and violent 
confrontation with the South African state, both domestically as well from 
exile. The black anti-apartheid movement used two primary justifications for 
its opposition, resistance and armed struggle against the ap.irihiiil 
government. The first, the democratic project, espoused most clearly and 
consistently by the ANC, was that of establishing a non-racial democracy in 
the country. In order to achieve this, against a recalcitrant and powerful state, 
the means chosen was that of armed struggle, in partnership with the working 
class, the oppressed urban communities within the country, wills toreign 
support from the Soviet bloc and its allied Communist ideology. 
The second, the Africanist project, espoused most clearly and consistently 
by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness (BC) 
Movement, sought political emancipation and individual worth through the 
common identity of being African. It was through solidarity and mobilisation 
as Africans that national freedom would be achieved. The BC movement 
extended the definition of 'African' to 'black', thereby including Coloureds 
and Indians in the dispossessed group, and emphasised the positive 
conscientising identity of being-black. Throughout the period 
anti-apartheid struggle leading up to 1994, an uneasy alliance between these 
movements was maintained, the one broadcasting a non-racial iiuiusicmary 
political ideal, the other a political ideal in which black renaissance was held 
to be a precondition for full democratic inclusion. 
94 
Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict iii 
Though the time leading up to this period of resistance and violent 
confrontation was not without strife, it is striking how much more political 
viole"ce took place during the last decade of this period of South African 
history- To illustrate, during the five year period from 1984 to 1988, it was 
reported that over 4000 people were killed in incidents of civil unrest, the 
majority of them black urban residents; approximately 45 000 people were 
detained without trial; insurgent actions of various kinds by the ANC 
increased from 44 in 1984 to 209 in 1988; and there was a virtual breakdown 
of, and rebellion against the system of black education, as well as of township 
and local government structures.17 
Macro-conflict during this period was guided by a single theme, a principle 
which was sweeping the globe during the same period. It was the imperative 
of democratic inclusion of all societal groups into a single nation-state. 
Simultaneously, in South Africa, struggle over this principle was refined by 
two allied, equally universal, sub-themes; the quests for non-racialism and 
for an inclusive nationalism in a modern plural society. 
^ T l lC ^ tt^ ^^ fu'ECS ^^K^dol^ 
At the close of the 1980s, South Africa appeared poised on the edge of an 
abyss. Embroiled in a seemingly unwinnable war in Namibia against Angolan 
and Cuban troops, stretched to its limit in the black townships of its cities 
and towns, the state security establishment had only succeeded in 
maintaining order through increasingly brutal means. Civil unrest had 
turned the country into a series of beleaguered communities and was causing 
serious damage to the country's open economy. Internationally, apartheid 
had become a major international problem and few governments were 
prepared to engage positively with the South African Government. 
Black resistance was likewise in turmoil. The ANC-in-exile was married to a 
Marxist strategy of armed struggle against a militarily-unbeatable opponent. 
Urban insurrection in the country was taking on increasingly divergent and 
brutal faces. Continued struggle between the two evenly-matched 
protagonists increasingly took on the form of a battle of attrition, pointing 
toward a downward spiral where all in the country would be the losers. 
Two events were critical to the breaking of the log-jam. The first was the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the rapid dissolution of its superpower status, 
dismantling and dissipating its supportive institutions, resources and 
ideological underpinnings. The second was a purely domestic matter.'The 
National Party (NP) - the governing party in the country over the past forty 
years - changed leadership and elected a new leader and State President who 
had few ties with the state security establishment. These two events acted 
Upon one another. With promises of support from Western governments, the 
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NP decided in 1990 to launch a process of negotiations with its prim 
protagonists, the banned black resistance movements and their leaders 
The period of negotiations which led to the establishment in 1994 of the first 
South African government elected on popular franchise was characterised 
by a series of violent events reflecting the two sub-themes identified in the 
previous section: the quests for non-racialism and for an inclusive 
nationalism in a modern plural society. Attacks on white persons, 0n 
predominantly white institutions (such as churches and places 0f 
entertainment) were examples of the Africanist consciousness manifesting 
itself in a period lacking institutionalised forms of popular expression 
Equally, incidents of white separatist Afrikaner insurrection were nu inerous 
culminating in acts of sabotage immediately before the general elections. 
The main negotiating parties sought compromise, not only among themselves 
but also with these movements. The compromise was located within the 
idiom of the major macro-conflict theme of twentieth century South Africa: 
that of achieving non-racial democratic inclusion at a national level. Thus, 
major efforts were made to involve parties within both the PAC and BC 
movements within the negotiating process, and the primary negotiators 
agreed to continued negotiations with Afrikaner separatists, after the general 
elections, on possible partition of the country. 
These concessions, particularly by the NP regarding the Africanist project, 
and by the ANC regarding the Afrikaner separatist project, appear to have 
been successful for neither radical Africanist nor Afrikaner separatist 
movements have become salient since. Nor has any overt racially-bnsed 
movement developed. By agreeing to, and establishing, over an initial 
five-year period, a government of national unity under an interim 
constitution, the ANC and the NP appear to have facilitated a transition largely 
devoid of divisive racial or nationalist fissures. In these regards, optimistic 
international expectations for democratisation in the post-cold war era seem 
to be on track in South Africa. 
• Shadows across the 'Miracle' 
'Why has a seemingly inevitable black-white racial conflict been 
replaced wtth much more wide-spread inter-black violence?'18 
During the twentieth century, South Africa appears to have passed through 
a reasonably clearly defined period of change: 
«-» rapid industrialisation and urbanisation; 
>»* increasing economic inclusion of black South Africans in these processes; 
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M increasing political and residential exclusion of black South Africans 
from these processes; 
j , increasing resistance and struggle by the excluded majority against the 
Afrikaner nationalist government and its apartheid policy; and 
^ tin: establishment of a democratically-elected national government, the 
main mission of which is to institute equity, reconciliation and prosperity 
in the society, 
Macro-conflict, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s, has generally 
been interpreted within the context of this type of change: 
struggles over racial and political discrimination; 
struggles over access to economic wealth and security; and 
struggles over capitalist and Communist, Afrikaner nationalist and 
African nationalist, ideologies. 
From the late 1980s, however, a new form of conflict has emerged in South 
Africa. The overwhelming majority of participants and of victims in this 
conflict have been urban blacks. Over the past eight years, some 15 000 
deaths resulting from this conflict have been recorded. The objectives of the 
combatants appear to cover a bewildering range of local issues: struggles 
over local community control, over land, over access to local scarce 
resources, over allegiance to traditional or to modern leaders and 
institutions. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, where the conflict is mainly found, its cycle peaked during 
1990, the year duringwhich the political process of national negotiations was 
launched, and peaked again in early 1994 immediately prior to the general 
elections.'9 After these elections, the conflict appears to be persisting. From 
1990, moreover, Zulu immigrant communities in Johannesburg and its 
environs have become involved in a series of related conflicts during which 
confrontation took place along lines defined in explicit ethnic (Zulu/non Zulu) 
terms. 
One major interpretation of this conflict points to competition for grass-roots 
Zulu support between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The 
latter party - based in KwaZulu-Natal - has developed an ideology and policy 
which amalgamates a liberatory with an ethnically explicit programme of 
action: democratic values are promoted within the context of respect for 
traditional Zulu leadership and values. More recently, following the 
provincial electoral victory by the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, the new provincial 
government has been promoting the idea of renaming the province the 
kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal. 
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Building on an older Zulu cultural movement, the IFP was launched in the 
1970s by Chief Buthelezi, the then Chief Minister of the homeland 0f 
KwaZulu. It refined and broadcast its liberatory and cultural programme 
from within this homeland ambit and soon found itself at loggerheads with 
the liberation strategies of the ANC-in-exile. By the mid-1980s, this 
relationship had deteriorated into one of enmity and bitterness. During the 
negotiation period of the 1990s, the IFP withdrew from.national negotiations 
and was accordingly party neither to the drafting of the interim constitution 
nor to agreements on the form the government of national unity would take 
The province of KwaZulu-Natal is dominated economically by the city of 
Durban within which close to one half of its eight million residents live. Over 
the past two decades large numbers of rural Zulu-speaking families have 
migrated into the city and most live in shanty towns in its periphery, 
Simultaneously, the city has developed a large industrial sector in which a 
substantial black working class has taken root. Outside of Durban, the 
province comprises large areas of the former homeland of KwaZulu in which 
Zulu rural families live in poverty, dependent upon family members working 
in cities and mines elsewhere. 
A number of scholars of Zulu history have pointed to the persistence • i| Zulu 
cultural symbols and identities which have accompanied this process of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. J. Guy, for instance, concluded his work 
on the destruction of the Zulu kingdom with the following words: 'The Zulu 
nationalist movement today, whose leaders are in many cases the dirwt 
descendants of the men who fought the civil war, and who draw consciously 
on the Zulu past, is a force which will still affect the course of southern Al rie.ui 
history'.20 A second example is as follows: 
Chiefs, indunas, sangomas, and shack-lords present (the conflict in 
KwaZulu-Natal) as a legitimate defence of a traditional order. Their large 
clientele has little option other than to fall in line.... 
The call for cultural revival is heeded because the most deprived amoni; 
the Zulu people search for responses to their humiliation. An escape into 
a mythical [past] of pride and success in battle provides the dignity that 
most of the hostel dwellers and unemployed migrants have lackei 1. 1p. this 
predicament, tribal loyalty carries with it a badge of honour. Only those 
with a more secure identity of a different kind consider the tribal cillective 
to be a badge of shame.21 
Scholars have also pointed to the military metaphors which have often 
accompanied these symbols. An example is as follows: 
The significance of Zulu ethnic associations and cultural nationalism in 
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diffusing class-based organisations and fracturing national movements 
is no new phenomenon,... 
In 1937, the Zulu Cultural Society was founded by Albert Luthuli, later 
lo become President of the ANC and a winner of the Nobel Prize.... 
[This society's] own glorification of a Zulu cultural identity was as much 
shaped by elements of popular consciousness coming from below as it 
was a shaping force in the making of that consciousness... The problem 
for Africans in Zululand and Natal, however, was the ways in which a 
pre-colonial past provided military metaphors for mobilization.22 
Inadequate though these remarks may well be to explain the rise of this new 
form of conflict and violence in contemporary South Africa, they do suggest 
that these shared and reconstructed memories are powerful indicators of the 
potential for new forms of ethnic identity and solidarity in a society 
experiencing strong currents of democratisation, and in a society presently 
seeking stability by means of nation-building. 
• The emergence of a Brown identity in the Western Cape 
'We are the dispersed Khoi 
scattered reflections 
in the arteries of Africa 
W'e are the tributaries 
of many rivers merged 
yet still flowing 
towards a new destiny.'23 
The population of the new Western Cape province is in excess of four million. 
Most members of this resident population speak Afrikaans as their home 
language. Most are brown South Africans, and the overwhelming majority 
are urban residents with close to nine out of ten inhabitants living either in 
Cape Town or in a provincial town. The panoramic setting, natural harbour, 
and strategic historical position of this city have led to rapid urbanisation, 
with its current population of over three million having doubled in the last 
fifteen years. It is both the economic hub and the centre of the province.24 
This unusual urban-rural demography of the province as a whole has been 
brought about by two sets of related factors. First, rural land was and remains 
held under individual tenure, overwhelmingly in white hands. There has 
never been a black homeland in the Western Cape and urban-rural migration 
for brown and white South Africans has been unimpeded by government 
restrictions throughout this century. 
99 Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict iii 
Secondly, migration of black South Africans, directed as it was country-wide 
by influx control measures, was strictly regulated from the 1950s in the 
province by the Coloured Labour Preference policy, a policy designed by the 
erstwhile National Party government to maintain a rigid ceiling on the .small 
proportion of black residents in the Western Cape. This policy was scrapped 
in the mid-1980s. During the past decade, accordingly, as information 
regarding the Western Cape's good economic performance and levels of living 
became generally available, significant migration streams of Xhosa-speakers 
hailing from the Eastern Cape province were directed toward the province. 
This large population shift appears to have peaked in the early 1990s. These 
new Western Cape families - mainly poor households with a rural past - have 
settled primarily in the Cape Town metropolitan area where their numbers 
are approaching three-quarters of a million. Accordingly, Cape Town's recent 
demographic growth reveals more rapid increases among its poorer, black 
and brown communities than among its better-off communities. 
These demographic shifts identify a new cultural challenge for the province. 
There are more black than white Western Cape residents today. In meetings 
where most people present have become accustomed to an easy 
Afrikaans/English form of communication, the use of the Xhosa language is 
increasingly being requested since Cape Town and the Western Cape are 
considered by many Xhosa-speakers as part of their hinterland. Most 
members of majoritarian brown communities voted in the April 1994 general 
election for the National Party rather than for the African National Congress, 
and accordingly appear to be developing for themselves a narrower bmvn 
(albeit ambiguous) identity rather than a more comprehensive national one. 
In these brown communities, there are indications that anxiety and suspicion 
are growing regarding affirmative action strategies and urban residential 
developments addressing the needs of poor black communities.25 There has 
been little contact over the years between brown and black communities, 
located as they were in separate group areas. In black communities, there 
are also indications that the consequences of Coloured Labour Preference 
remain squarely in residents' minds and that some form of redress is 
expected. White Afrikaans residents who have also had little con tad wilh 
black South Africans, seem retiring and silent about this cultural challenge, 
unable to develop a new provincial vision or identity compatible with their 
Afrikaner culture. 
In the 1994 election, the new National Party succeeded in gaining majority 
control in the provincial government and appears today to be most receptive 
to its brown and white constituencies. Provincial ANC structures - in contrast 
to their national counterparts - seem to lack party political capacity and their 
provincial leaders have enjoyed neither a successful nor a particularly 
wholesome track record. 
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The question of a Coloured identity is accordingly salient. Coloured cultural 
movements are being launched, conferences are being held26 and national 
and provincial politicians prbably intend mobilising around the issue. This 
process adds a significant new factor to South Africa's nation-building 
project. 
j ^ ] Conclusion 
'We are both humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that 
you, the people of South Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first 
President of a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South 
Africa, to lead our country out of the valley of darkness. We 
understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom.<11 
Without a democratic culture to direct and regulate it through institutional 
processes, macro-conflict in South Africa has tended to be violent, 
suppressed during certain periods by various means, and playing itself out 
by force during others. Today, drawn as it is into international currents of 
democratisation, this society's potential for violent conflict remains. 
Potential lines of conflict follow the cleavages identified above: ethnic 
differences, especially where these are perceived to coincide with felt group 
deprivation; racial differences, especially now that expectations for the rapid 
removal of racial discrimination and subordination are high; and 
secessionist claims in a world in which the principle of self-determination 
lias become legitimate. In this new world order, increasingly, representatives 
of these various groups in South African society, in search of cultural rights, 
and of equity in access to resources, will no doubt consider mobilisation 
strategies based upon these felt differences. 
How is the GNU addressing this challenge? Racism (and sexism) are 
constitutionally forbidden. Appointments to its national cabinet display a 
serious attempt at installing a 'rainbow' leadership. Affirmative action 
recruitment policies are operative in both the public and private sectors. The 
charisma and powerful symbolism of the President are consistently used to 
broadcast non-racial democratic values. 
In relation to racist and Afrikaner nationalist cleavages, these techniques 
have succeeded in the short term. In relation to Zulu ethnic mobilisation, 
they have been singularly less successful. Faced with a recalcitrant junior 
partner in the GNU, the IFP, a party which has withdrawn both from 
post-electoral constitutional negotiations and from local government election 
Planning, the ANC and the President have threatened military and state fiscal 
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intervention in KwaZulu-Natal to avert further violence. To them, the ethnic 
challenge appears particularly perverse precisely because it emanates from 
an historically-oppressed black constituency whose leadership has 
consistently articulated the values of democratic inclusion, albeit in Zulu 
cultural context. 
The chief manner, however, in which the GNU is addressing the challenge of 
institutionalising macro-conflict in society is by way of the nation-building 
project. Built around the scaffolding of the country's emergent 
constitutionalism - its Bill of Rights, its constitutional court, and its state 
commitments to equity, to development, and to the eradication of poverty -
this government-driven project envisages the rapid growth of a single South 
African identity and nation which would supplant, at least in the public 
domain, other identities and forms of incipient group solidarity. Once 
established, this new national culture would become sovereign, and would 
justify concerted national action against deviant sub-national ethnopolitical 
activities. 
In such a form this project has little chance of success. The plural nature of 
South African society defies its viability, particularly under modern 
democratic conditions. The historical analysis offered here points instead to 
contemporary racial, ethnic and exclusivist nationalist tendencies with 
significant historical roots which contest the peaceful emergence of a single 
national identity and culture. At best, emergent constitutionalism will 
mitigate the violent consequences of such tendencies. At worst, aggressive 
government-driven nation-building will exacerbate them. 
The alternative path is the nurturing of the constitutionalism which is 
presently taking root in the society. It is possible that these values will take 
root in a society which continues, possibly more than before, to display 
changing cultural and ethnic features. Strong sub-national identities are not 
necessarily incompatible with growing constitutionalism. And growing 
constitutionalism itself may develop sufficient institutional processes to direct 
macro-conflict away from its violent past toward a more regulated future. 
Nation-building projects in independent Africa have bad track records.As 
Basil Davidson has put it, 
The fifty or so [African] states of the colonial partition, each formed and 
governed as though their peoples possessed no history of their own, 
became fifty or so nation-states formed and governed on European 
models, chiefly the models of Britain and France. Liberation thus 
produced its own denial. Liberation led to alienation.29 
After liberation, South Africa need not follow this path. 
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RACISM, XENOPHOBIA 
/ AND THE 
11 i s l i EXTREME RIGHT: 
A Five-Country Assessment 
Christopher T. Husbands 
[J"! Introduction 
It is of considerable concern that, fifty years after the end of the war against 
Nazism and fascism, political parties of similar pedigree making deliberate 
xenophobic and racist appeals to the mass electorate are playing a significant 
role in the politics of several countries in both western and eastern Europe.1 
It may perhaps seem that the victory thought to have been won against the 
evils of the earlier Nazi and fascist regimes was not a permanent one, as 
contemporary racist politics with personal or cultural or ideological links 
(either direct or implicit) to the right-wing extremisms of the past flourish in 
a number of countries.2 Of course, this matter does need perspective; whilst 
concern about the racist extreme right has increased during the past few 
years, there were earlier postwar periods of apparent success by extreme 
right or racist parties which were eventually to prove only temporary (for 
example, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s or the National Front (NF) in Great 
Britain in the 1970s). Even so, fifty years after the Second World War, there 
are still questions to be asked about the racist politics of the current era. 
General reasons why this resurgence has occurred have already been 
extensively debated by numerous writers.3 There are, however, rather more 
subtle issues about causation, which may have a bearing on the plausibility 
of some of the more general reasons mentioned in the literature. A further 
significant question is: to what extent has there been a harmonised 'wave' of 
extreme right racist politics afflicting western Europe? Second, apart from 
the question of whether or not any such 'wave' is uniform across a number 
ol different countries, are extreme right racist phenomena a danger or an 
irritant, considering the political circumstances of the countries concerned? 
This chapter addresses these separate questions, taking most of its material 
from the circumstances of five countries. 
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The first question has to be addressed through examination of levels of, and 
trends in, mass support for racist political parties in different countries -
where relevant in the light of the geographical distribution of such support, 
This issue may be addressed by inferences from empirical evidence from 
sources such as regular opinion polls and election returns. The second 
question may be answered in part by interpretations from the levels and 
distributional characteristics of support but, as will be argued, it needs the 
further refinement of examination of the institutional positions of the parties 
concerned (for example, whether they have a power-broking role, whether 
they have a well-developed organisational infrastructure, or whelher they 
hold any power at local government level). Specific criteria for assessing the 
question of danger or irritant are presented. 
Much of the analysis and discussion in this chapter focuses on the five 
west-European countries where, during the 1980s and/or 1990s, there have 
been unambiguous examples of successful extreme right parties making 
racism/xenophobia a major, sometimes the major, part of their ideological 
appeal.4 It is further intended to concentrate attention on parties that li;ive 
had a mass appeal sufficient to be captured by opinion-pollsters, although 
mention will sometimes be made of smaller and (on occasion) more extr.ine 
racist parties, as well as of extreme right terrorism, when this derives from 
or is in some way linked to, mass racist politics. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the following cases, which are 
presented in the order in which the countries concerned saw the emergence 
of mass racist politics during the 1980s.5' 
"»* In France: the Front National (FN). This party has had significant support 
since 1983 and its ratings were being trawled in nation-level opinion-poll 
data from early 1982.6 
««+ In the Netherlands: the Centrumdemocraten (CDs) and, to a lesser 
degree, the Centrum Partij '86 (CP '86). The Centrum Partij (CP) attracted 
support in the polls during 1983 and 1984 before a split led to the 
establishment of the CDs in 1984. The original CP went bankrupt but 
was re-founded as the CP '86 in 1986.7 Also intermittently active on the 
Dutch racist right are the Nederlands Blok (NB), founded by some ex-CD 
dissidents in 1992, and the Burgerpartij Nederland (BPN). 
«•+ In Austria: the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) (which in January 
1995 renamed itself merely Die Freiheitlichen (Fs)); this party had a 
postwar history as a free-market liberal party until its take-over by Jdrg 
Haider in September 1986 marked a turn to xenophobia and a more 
exclusionist nationalism, which has produced dramatic i m p r o v e m e n t s 
in its electoral strength.8 
>••*• In Germany: Die Republikaner (REPs) and, to a lesser degree, the 
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Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the NPD; the REPs have existed since 
1983 but emerged as a significant national force after their success in 
elections for the Berlin House of Deputies in January 1989. After 
unification the REPs had modest, lesser success in the new regions.9 
i 
In Belgium: the Vlaams Blok (VB) in Flanders and, to a lesser degree, the 
Front National (FN) in Wallonia. The VB was founded in the late 1970s 
but emerged with particular significance from the indecisive general 
election of November 1991.10 
These parties are not all the same, either precisely in ideology or organisation, 
and at the margin there could be some dispute about whether it is appropriate 
to label one at least of them (the Fs in Austria) as racist as a principal defining 
label; however, there is an incontrovertible presence of racist elements in all 
their programmes. Ethnic hostility operates as a common definitional frame 
of reference, although there are complications in operationalisation. Actually, 
most mainstream right-wing political parties (except perhaps their 
minimalist-state protagonists) favour ethnic exclusionism (even if the ethnic 
dimension needs decoding). However, all the parties being considered as 
racist are inclined to be ethnic-expulsionist, favouring policies that defacto 
or de jure would reduce the indigenous presence of particular ethnic 
minorities. This is their raison d'etre for most of their mass supporters 
(whose virulent racism in the case of parties like the FN, the REPs or the VB 
distinguishes them from mainstream right-wing supporters). However, even 
with this racism criterion, ambiguities persist: supporters of the Austrian 
FPO, for example, are not distinguished attitudinally by their racism from 
supporters of other Austrian parties." The Dutch CDs are much opposed to 
the presence of Turks and Moroccans but are less exercised about the 
Surinamese with legitimately acquired Dutch passports, although a 1970s 
forerunner of the CDs, the Nederlandse Volksunie, was different in being 
overtly hostile to Surinamese and Antillianese. 
[ | Does extreme right racism come in 'waves'? 
There has been much hyperbolic reference during the past few years to a 
so-called 'wave' of extreme right xenophobic/racist growth across western 
Europe, almost as though there were an inexorable trend for such movements 
In each west European country to have similarly expanding growth 
trajectories. When one examines electoral trends in different countries, 
however, varied patterns emerge. This is apparent from the data presented 
in Figure 1 and also from the more refined analyses in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
The basic data used in this analysis are the available monthly opinion-poll 
results collected by respective polling agencies in the five countries 
concerned.12 
99 R ac ism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict iii 
Figure 1 Percentage quarterly opinion-poll support for racist political 
in five west European countries, 1982-94 
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jn the following analyses two time-unit bases are used: monthly data and 
q u a r t e r l y data, calculated as unweighted means from the respective three 
months' figures of the monthly series. Clearly, monthly data contain some 
random error that will be reduced in the quarterly series, but the latter still 
nerniit inference about short-term and long-term components of each 
1 , . i f 
series. 
In Figure 1 the available series of each country's quarterly data are presented 
in order to provide an initial global view of the attractiveness of racist politics 
between 1982 and 1994. The quarterly series have been used in order to 
increase clarity; the monthly series offer a similar overall picture, of course, 
except that it is more cluttered by the threefold plenitude of individual 
data-points. 
It is immediately apparent that the racist/xenophobic right has been 
conspicuously more successful in certain of the five countries than in others. 
Second, the trajectories of support in various countries are not necessarily 
in harmony, an issue which is analysed later using a more sophisticated 
methodology. In France support for the FN has grown steadily since the 
mid-1980s, albeit with occasional temporary reverses of fortune. In Austria 
and Belgium (Flanders) there have been steady growth trajectories since the 
late-1980s, although it will be shown formally that the two series have not 
wholly covaried. In the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany 
the picture has been much more variable. 
One preliminary inference to be drawn from Figure 1 is that the factors 
affccting levels of support for racist parties are often country-specific rather 
than being a manifestation of a Europe-wide Zeitgeist. Despite contacts 
between some of these parties' leaderships, mass support tends to ebb and 
flow according to country-level factors. The only slight exception to this 
observation is the tendency (though not universal) for right-wing racist 
parties to do well in European Parliament elections (for example, the REPs 
in 1989 and the VB in 1989 and 1994), these being'second-order elections'.14 
There are exceptions, however; for example, the FN's best performances have 
not necessarily been in European elections; indeed, its 10.5 per cent in June 
1994 was rather a setback. 
The year 1992 was perhaps the best one for across-the-board performance 
by racist parties; since then there has been a clear divergence in levels of 
support so that, in mid-1995, the five countries concerned are clearly to be 
distinguished as two groups. In Austria, France and Belgium (Flanders) these 
Parties are strongly implanted in their respective political landscapes, 
whereas in both old and new regions of Germany and in the Netherlands they 
are increasingly marginal. In Table 1, by way of summary, are presented 
basic univariate statistics, both for the quarterly series used in Figure 1 and 
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for the monthly series from which the former was derived. Again, the cases 
of France, Austria and Belgium (Flanders) clearly distinguish theniselvp 
emphasising especially in the case of Austria j us t how far the party coi icerned 
has come in public appreciation during the past decade - from near-oblivion 
to being one of the three serious protagonists on the Austrian political stage 
Before exploring further the structure among these data, it will assist 
understanding if some observations are made about what may underlie the 
individual trends revealed in each of the five countries. 
Table 1 Various univariate statistics of quarterly and monthly opinion-poll 
percentage support for racist parties in five west-European countries across 
relevant time-periods' 
1. Quarterly data 
France Nether-
lands (1) 
Nether-
lands (2) 
Austria FRG (old 
regions) 
FRG (new 
regions) 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Mean 9.4 0.9 2.0 11.9 3.4 2.0 9.0 
Standard deviation 3.4 0.6 1.4 5.1 2.3 1.3 2.9 
Maximum 15.3 1.9 5.0 22.0 7.5 4.0 13.0 
Minimum 3.0 0.1 0.5 2.1 1.0 0.5 4.4 
Time-period 82.2-95.2 83.1-86.4 90.1-95.1 86.1-95.1 89.1-94.3 90.4-94.3 90.1-94.4 
2. Monthly data 
France Nether-
lands) 
(1) 
Nether-
lands 
(2) 
Austria FRG (old 
regions) 
(1) 
FRG (old 
regions 
(2) 
FRG (new 
regions) 
Belgium 
Flanders 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Time-
period 
9.3 
3.4 
17.0 
3.0 
82.4 
-94.12 
0.9 
0.6 
2.0 
0.0 
83.1 
-86.12 
2.0 
1.4 
5.6 
0.1 
90.1 
-95.3 
12.0 
5.2 
23.0 
1.3 
86.1 
-95.4 
3.1 
2.5 
10.0 
1.0 
89.1 
-91.4 
4.4 
2.1 
8.0 
1.0 
92.3 
-94.9 
2.8 
1.2 
5.0 
1.0 
92.3 
-94.8 
9.0 
3.0 
13.4 
3.5 
89.12 
-94.12 
Note 
The parties concerned are: Fiance, the Front National; The Netherlands (1), the Centrum Partij; The 
Netherlands (2), the Centrumdemocraten: Austria, the Frelheltllohe Partel Osterrelchs (since January 
1995 Die Frelheltllchen)-, the Federal Republic of Germany, Die Republikaner; and Belgium (Flanders), 
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0 prance 
fhe FN was founded in 1972 but emerged from the political wilderness only 
in 1983 with some moderate successes in the municipal elections in March 
[for example, in* Paris' 20th arrondissement) and later in by-elections in 
several places, including Dreux (west of Par is). Even in 1982, however, it was 
apparently supported by around 3 per cent of the French electorate and, after 
its 1984 European Parliament election success, support grew steadily as it 
consolidated a core of loyal voters. In the mid-1980s its standing was rather 
below 10 per cent, falling away a little for a short time after 1988, when its 
leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, failed to be seen as a king-maker after his 
undoubted first-ballot success in the 1988 Presidential contest and after the 
FN was all but removed from the National Assembly when new legislative 
elections were called in 1988. However, by the early 1990s its support was 
regularly in excess of 10 per cent, one significant dip being associated with 
Le Pen's ill-considered support for Saddam Hussein around the time of the 
Gulf War in late 1990/early 1991. During 1992 and into 1993 there was also 
some falling-away, despite the buoyant support for racist parties elsewhere. 
However, during 1994 the trend was upward and, as the April 1995 
Presidential first-ballot contest showed, the FN (or rather its leader) can 
mobilise 15 per cent of the electorate when circumstances are propitious. 
• The Netherlands 
Despite some recent concern in the Netherlands about the importance of the 
CDs, Dutch extreme right racism is one of the less significant examples of 
the phenomenon. There had been a flurry of support in the early 1980s for 
the CP, which preceded even the take-off by the FN in France and reflected 
the use of the immigration theme as an electoral mobiliser, following the 
example of the NF in Great Britain in the 1970s. The CP fell apart in acrimony 
but the CDs re-emerged on the electoral scene in 1989. The data of the 
Nederlandse Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek show 
support rising steadily to 5 per cent of reported votes in late 1993, fuelled 
by moral panics about illegal immigration and asylum-seekers and by the 
notorious Minderhedendebat in Dutch politics in 1991 and 1992.15 However, 
even this modest success has been followed by decline. By the European 
Parliament elections of June 1994 the CDs were in serious disarray for a 
number of reasons. One was as a consequence of a television programme 
called Deadline broadcast on 29 April 1994 in which one of the party's 
Amsterdam councillors had revealed, in an interview with an undercover 
freelance reporter who was using a concealed recorder, that he had carried 
out arson attacks in 1977 and 1979 against premises used for ethnic 
minorities; another reason was an increasing disenchantment among 
activists at the uncompromisingly authoritarian style of the party's leader, 
Hans Janmaat. The CDs, and to a lesser degree CP '86, did have some 
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temporary successes in municipal elections in March 1994. For example, ule 
CDs won 10.2 per cent of votes cast in Rotterdam (with a further 3.5 per eent 
for CP '86), especially impressive since the electorate in Dutch municipal 
elections includes non-Dutch residents who are unlikely to have voted CD or 
CP '86. Also, because the CDs' support is territorially concentrated within 
the larger cities especially of North and South Holland, there are some 
neighbourhoods (for example, Feijenoord in Rotterdam) in which well over 
a quarter of the Dutch resident population must have voted CD or CP '86. 
Thus, in some inner-city areas, support for the CDs (reflecting associated 
hostility against Turks and Moroccans) has reached considerable levels -
equal to what the British NF was able to obtain in certain local areas in 
1976-77. 
• Austria 
In both electoral and institutional terms, the FPO (now the Fs) is western 
Europe's most successful extreme right racist party. Founded initially in 
1955-56 from the earlier Verband der Unabhangigen, it became a small 
representative in Austrian politics of free-market liberalism, albeit always 
having a more self-consciously nationalist wing. Jorg Haider, drawing on his 
Carinthian power-base, won the leadership in September 1986 at the party's 
Eighteenth Congress; in a general election in November of that year, the FPO 
won 9.7 per cent of the national vote, almost double its support in the 
previous April 1983 general election. Haider has now largely purged the party 
of any free-market liberal influence and after a succession of departures and 
resignations this wing founded a so-called Liberales Forum in early 1993. 
This grouping has not affected the FPO's opinion-poll popularity (despite its 
managing around 5 per cent of the vote). In the general election on 11 October 
1994 the FPO won 22.5 per cent of votes cast overall and its subsequent 
opinion-poll ratings reveal only a positive response to its pivotal role j n the 
Zusammenbruch into which contemporary Austrian politics have fallen. 
• The Federal Republic of Germany 
The REPs were founded in 1983 but by the end of the 1980s had had only 
modest success and had publicly announced at the end of 1988 that they 
were concentrating their efforts on Bavaria, particularly the Munich 
municipal elections of March 1990. However, the REPs' adventitious success 
in Berlin in January 1989 (when the occupation authorities had forbidden 
the DVU or NPD from standing) gave them an opening from which they were 
able to profit for about a year, a period including the 1989 European 
Parliament elections. However, internal party division and the mainstream 
right's exploitation of the unification issue lost them support, which was 
revived quite suddenly by the result in the regional parliament election in 
Baden-Wurttemberg in April 1992, an election that took place at die height 
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of dispute and debate about the political-asylum issue. The reflex effect of 
this lasted into 1994 but by the federal election they were a spent force, 
winning only 1.9 per cent of the national vote (2.0 per cent in the old regions 
and 1.3 per cent in the new ones). Despite expectations before unification 
that the extreme right would make substantial electoral gains in the east, this 
did not happen and its support in the new regions is invariably less than in 
the old ones. The REPs' leader in its halcyon era, Franz Schonhuber, has 
now been replaced, after internal party feuding, by a less glamorous figure 
and the party has finally been put under official surveillance by the 
constitution-protection authorities of the Federal Republic. 
• Belgium 
Until recently the VB's success in Flanders (especially around Antwerp, 
though it has now broken out from this bastion) received rather little 
international coverage, despite a claim to be considered one of the most 
successful contemporary extreme right racist parties in western Europe 
(perhaps competing with the FPO for the title). Still, only in the later 1980s, 
after grafting anti-immigration and anti-Islam themes on to its earlier 
exclusionist Flemish nationalism, did it make serious region-wide gains, after 
the early local successes in the Antwerp area. Its trajectory of growth strongly 
reflects increased support in the light of its success in the Belgian general 
election in November 1991. In the European Parliament election of June 
1994 it won 12.6 per cent of the Flanders vote, though it failed to build on 
this in the general election of May 1995, despite increasing its total vote 
compared with November 1991. It won 12.3 per cent of votes cast in the 
simultaneous vote for the Flemish Council but did pick up 27 per cent in 
Antwerp. It has been suggested that perhaps the VB has now reached a 
plateau of support, although predictions of this sort in the past have often 
proved premature. The FN in Wallonia was established in the mid-1980s in 
part imitation of its French namesake but only belatedly has it made any 
impact, winning 7.9 per cent of the Wallonia vote in the Euro-election and, 
in May 1995, 5.2 per cent in the contest for the Regional Walloon Council. In 
Brussels, however, the FN's support rose to 7.5 per cent. Unfortunately, its 
opinion-poll ratings are not published separately, preventing a comparable 
analysis for Wallonia. 
It is now necessary to move to Table 2, in which are time-series correlation 
coefficients between the available data in each series, for quarterly and 
monthly figures; the latter, probably because they contain both more random 
error and also genuine short-term effects, present a slightly more 
complicated picture than do the quarterly series. Even so, the pattern of 
coefficients ranges from the highly positive (between the trajectories in France 
and Austria for both quarterly and monthly data, as well as between Flanders 
and The Netherlands from 1990 to 1994) and, not unsurprisingly, between 
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Table 2 Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients among levels of 
quarterly and monthly opinion-poll percentage support for racist parties in 
pairs of west-European countries across relevant time-periods' 
1. Quarterly data 
France Nether-
lands (1)2 
Nether-
lands (2)3 
Austria FRG (old 
regions) 
FRG (new 
regions) 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
France - 0.820 0.432 0.777 0.486 0.355 0.194 
Nether-
lands (1) 
83.1-86.4 - - - - - -
Nether-
lands (2) 
90.1-95.1 - - 0.065 0.574 0.631 0.716 
Austria 86.1-95.1 - 90.1-95.1 - - 0.270 -0.140 0.481 
FRG (old 
regions) 
89.1-94.3 - 90.1-94.3 89.1-94.3 - 0.957 0.667 
FRG (new 
regions) 
90.4-94.3 - 90.4-94.3 90.4-94.3 90.4-94.3 - 0.680 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
90.1-94.4 — 90.1-94.4 90.1-94.4 90.1-94.3 90.4-94.3 -
2. Monthly data 
France Nether-
lands 
(1) 
Nether-
lands 
(2) 
Austria FRG (old 
regions) 
(1) 
FRG (Old 
regions) 
(2) 
FRG (new 
regions) 
Belgium 
Flanders 
France - 0.798 0.098 0.701 0.436 0.011 0.075 0.168 
Nether-
lands (1) 
83.1 
-86.12 
- - - - - - -
Nether-
lands (2) 
90.1 
-95.3 
- - 0.030 0.073 0.036 0.131 0.638 
Austria 86.1 
-94.12 
- 90.1 
-95.3 
- - 0.473 -0.040 -0.067 0.413 
FRG (old 
regions) (1) 
89.1 
-91.4 
- 90.1 
-91.4 
89.1 
-91.4 
- - — 0.276 
FRG (old 
regions) (2) 
92.3 
-94.9 
- 92.3 
-94.9 
92.3 
-94.9 
— — 0.688 - 0.028 
FRG (new 
regions) 
92.3 
-94.8 
- 92.3 
-94.8 
92.3 
-94.8 
— 92.3 
-94.8 
""" -0/42 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
89.12 
-94.12 
- 90.12 
-94.1 
89.12 
-94.12 
89.12 
-91.4 
92.3 
-94.9 
92.3 
-94.8 
— 
Notes: 1. Values above the top-left/bottom-itght diagonal of these matrices are the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients. Entiles below the diagonals are the respective time-periods for the corresponding coefficients above 
the diagonals. 
2 The entries for Netherlands (1) are f a the Centrum PartlJ. 
3 The entries for Netherlands (2) are f a the Cenlrumdemocralen. 
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old and new regions of Germany from late 1990 to early 1994) through to 
the moderately negative (as between Germany and France and between 
Germany and Austria in both data-series). Between these extremes are a 
number of low positive or negative relationships. In order further to explore 
the structure among these findings, Table 3 presents the results of two 
principal-components analyses conducted upon matrices of selected 
appropriate coefficients in Table 2.16 That based on the quarterly-data 
coefficients produced a single factor loading France and Austria at the 
opposite location from The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. The second 
analysis, on the monthly data, produced two rotated factors. The first one 
placed France and Austria together on the basis of their opinion-poll 
trajectories over the past ten years, in contrast to both parts of Germany. 
The second factor loaded heavily on The Netherlands and Belgium 
(Flanders), showing that, despite very different levels of overall support for 
their respective racist parties, the trajectories have been rather similar during 
most of the period since late 1989. Only the recent demise of the Dutch CDs, 
occurring at a time of continuing relative buoyancy for the Flemish VB, is the 
real departure from this relationship. Thus, there has been clearly a 
Table 3 Loadings from principal-components analyses of relevant 
correlation coefficients between quarterly and monthly opinion-poll 
percentage support for racist parties in five west-European countries, 
as reported in Table 2' 
1. Quarterly data 
Factor 1 
France - 0.9942 
Netherlands (2) 0.927 
Austria - 0.871 
FRG (old regions) 0.982 
FRG (new regions) 0.984 
Belgium (Flanders) 0.838 
Percentage of variation explained: 87.4 
2. Monthly data 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
France 0.721 - 0.664 
Netherlands (2) -0.040 0.962 
Austria 0.935 - 0.247 
FRG (old regions) (2) - 0.858 -0.431 
FRG (new regions) -0.917 - 0.322 
Belgium (Flanders) 0.325 0.896 
Percentage of variation explained: 52.5 40.8 
Notes 
1 Kaiser normalisation was used and. with the monthly data, the extracted factors were rotated with Varfmax rotation. 
2 Factor loadings of mote than 0.7 or less than 0.7 are italicised. 
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Flemish/Dutch pattern of racist support that may have been a result of mu I ual 
influence; the two parts of Germany share some of this pattern, but France 
and Austria (at least during the periods that share data-points with the former 
countries) do not. 
Mutual propinquity and the same language may seem the clues to the 
Flemish/Dutch covariation, except that the same factors fail to produce a 
similar harmony between Germany and Austria. However, partly because of 
the minority status of the Dutch language, Flanders and The Netherlands are 
much more a single cultural community than the larger germanophone area. 
Moreover, why should France and Austria share similar trajectories over 
such a long period that are not shared with trends in racist support in other 
west European countries? Unless, of course (as is more likely), these 
countries' trends are produced by endogenous factors that happen to have 
approximately coincided. 
Attempts to test for inter-country 'contagion effects', say, with one 
lead-country setting a pattern for racist politics to be followed by others, 
produced mixed results. If there were to be such effects, one would predict 
a stronger relationship between negatively lagged data for the supposed 
lead-country and unlagged data for the follower-country than that obtained 
with simultaneous data for each country. As an example, however, negatively 
lagging the French data and correlating them with unlagged Austrian data 
(on the ground that well-developed racist politics were first in France and 
able in theory to offer a lead to other countries) produces lower coefficients 
than when both countries' series are computed unlagged. Only the 
Flanders/Netherlands relationship is improved, at least for monthly data, by 
lagging. If Flanders, with its strong emergence on to the stage of racist politics 
around 1991, is seen as the lead-country, the monthly-level relationship 
negatively lagged two months with the unlagged Dutch data rises modestly 
from 0.638 to 0.681. This is perhaps a further indication of a specific but 
exceptional Flanders/Dutch pattern. 
A final observation on the 'wave' hypothesis of racist political sentiment: were 
this to occur across different countries, one would predict a similar type of 
equation providing a best fit for the respective data-series. Developing best-fit 
equations even for same-time-period subsets of data for different countries 
in Figure 8.1 shows that different forms of equation (for example, some 
linear, some quadratic, with slopes varying in steepness and direction) are 
needed. 
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The racist extreme right: danger or irritant? 
• Introduction 
What is suggested from the contemporary assessment so far presented is that 
(here are countries where extreme right racism is a mere irritant, from the 
point of view of the stability of the body politic (say, The Netherlands or the 
Federal Republic of Germany, despite the latter's sometime international 
reputation to the contrary), and others where it is a serious player, directly 
or indirectly, on the political stage (say, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), and 
France, even if the FN is not now a presence in the National Assembly). 
What criteria determine the status of being dangerous as opposed to merely 
irritating? There can be no simple answer, unfortunately; almost every criterion 
requires a proviso or qualification or in some cases the obverse may be true. 
However, below are offered a number of factors to be considered in particular 
circumstances, although none can be seen as a self-sufficient criterion. 
• The Level of Mass Support 
The analysis in the first part of this chapter was predicated upon the 
1 hen-unstated assumption that a reasonable minimum of mass support is at 
least an indication of 'danger' status, though as a necessary rather than 
sufficient condition. However, other matters being equal, the exact threshold 
minimum would vary according to the nature of the political system 
concerned. It might be lower in a proportionally-based system (as in The 
Netherlands or Belgium), unless there were a threshold hurdle, as in the 
German case. It might be higher in a first-past-the-post or a double-ballot 
•system. Also, in a system electing on a constituency basis, irrespective of the 
form of the electoral system, a party with a strong regional base (and thus 
able to secure election from constituencies in the region concerned) is more 
significant and, from the present perspective, potentially more dangerous 
than one with the same level of support evenly spread across the country but 
unable to win outright in constituency-based voting. However, this regional 
concentration should not be excessive or the party risks becoming merely a 
regional eccentricity (as were the fates of the Southern-based States' Rights 
Party of J. Strom Thurmond in the American Presidential election of 1948 
and even of George Wallace's American Independent Party in 1968, although 
the latter did attract substantial minority support in many non-Southern 
states). 
Of course, if a movement, despite its regional base, can export mayhem 
beyond the area of its indigenous strength, its potential danger is clearly 
greater, as the examples of the Basque separatists in Spain and the 
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Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Fein in the United Kingdom both 
show. Quite small extreme right racist parties, even ones without any 
particular local strength, may pose a potential threat if they are associated 
with, or allied to, terroristically- inclined groups, or if even their existence 
somehow stimulates terrorist activities. However, as developed modern 
states are usually capable of containing such dangers, the threat is rather to 
civil peace than to the institutions of liberal democracy. 
• The Trend in Mass Support 
An extreme right racist party is likely to be more dangerous if its level of 
support, having reached the respective critical minimum appropriate to the 
political system in which it is operating, is stable or, better still, increasing. 
All successful extreme right leaders in the recent history of western Europe 
have seen the virtue of being regarded universally as growing and expanding; 
leaders such as Le Pen and Haider, for example, have always appreciated the 
importance of publicity, almost any publicity, in maintaining and increasing 
the momentum of support for their party. On the other hand, there are parties 
such as the CP '86 which have reacted to electoral reverse by resorting to 
increasingly extreme postures and activities. However, the authorities of the 
state concerned are usually able to contain any resulting criminality.17 
• The Stability of Mass Support 
An extreme right racist party with a significant stable core of loyal supporters 
having appropriate party identification is a more serious danger than one 
whose mass support exhibits substantial election-on-election turnover. This 
is why the French FN, for example, is so much more a threat to the French 
political system than the REPs ever were to the German one, even when in 
the ascendant. REP voters do not have the same partisan attachment or party 
identification as does the FN's core support. Thus, even though there are 
indeed a large number of adventitious or 'fair-weather' FN voters (including 
those who boosted Le Pen's first-ballot support in April 1995 to 15 per cent), 
the fact that they are additions to a more solid base of loyalists still 
distinguishes the French from the German (or Dutch) cases. 
Several studies have shown that support for the FN, for example, has an 
inter-election loyalty at times greater than that for other French political 
parties.18 A similar demonstration has been made with respect to the VB, 
compared with other parties in Flanders.19 
• The Extent of National Representation 
Self-evidently, the level of national representation of an extreme right racist 
party, as for example seen in seats it holds in the national legislature, reflects 
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in part its level of national electoral support, at least in systems of proportional 
representation. It must be said, however, that the odd deputy from the racist 
extreme right in the national legislature (or even three, as now in the 
Netherlands) is not a disaster, unless in a situation of stalemate when 
mainstream parties have been unwilling to work in coalition; this latter danger 
does not happen in the Netherlands. However, once a critical mass of 
representation has been reached, the extreme right racist party may be 
potentially more influential and so more dangerous. Ostracism by other parties 
and the media, usually pursued with reasonable consistency when extreme right 
representation is small, becomes a less viable policy. On this criterion the 
Austrian Fs are clearly a threat, as they form the principal opposition against a 
somewhat uneasy governing coalition and regularly receive major media 
coverage. Between November 1991 and May 1995 the Belgian VB, though small 
in terms of total seats in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, partly qualified 
because of the brittleness of the government formed by other parties; however, 
the result of the May 1995 general election is seen as having conferred some 
much-needed legitimacy and respect on the coalition government led by 
Jean-Luc Dehaene of the Christliche Volkspartij; the VB now has merely eleven 
of the 150 seats in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies. 
• The Extent of Sub-national Representation 
Local politics, albeit depending in part on their structure and the forms of 
representation and election being employed, often offer extreme right racism 
a far more expanded terrain of insinuation and influence than does the 
national level; the local arena is a much-neglected theatre of activism for 
assessing such influence. Whilst it may at first appear, for example, that the 
French national political system has with impunity excluded and 
marginalised the FN and its supporters without damage to the national 
political fabric, the influence of a substantial number of elected 
representatives and appointees at the regional, cantonal and municipal levels 
mitigates this optimism. Since at least the mid-1980s there has been a 
persisting fear that the FN would at some time make a successful 
breakthrough to win control of a city like Nice or Marseille. For the first time, 
In the municipal elections of 18 June 1995, in the afterglow of Le Pen's 
first-round Presidential success in April, the FN was able to do that; in three 
towns in the south, Toulon, Marignane and Orange, the FN won up to 37 per 
cent of the second-round vote, enabling the party to nominate the mayor. In 
Nice, Jacques Peyrat, formally independent but ideologically close to the FN 
and a former member and confidant of Le Pen, won the mayoralty with 44 
per cent of the vote. The local successes of the VB in especially Antwerp and 
elsewhere have had a major impact upon ethnic tensions in these cities. In 
Austria the Fs are deeply entrenched on the municipal and regional level, 
often holding or sharing power. In Carinthia, their historic power base, they 
are the foremost political force. 
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On the other hand, the potential influence of even a quite high number of 
local representatives of the racist extreme right may sometimes be 
neutralised. The policy of ostracism by other political forces in Ti l e 
Netherlands (maintained despite occasional individual demurrals from 
within one of the mainstream right-wing parties) has denied it any broker 
role in mediating deadlocks between other parties. Even in Antwerp the other 
parties have so far managed to exclude the VB from actual office, all hough 
the size of the latter's representation and electoral strength makes this a 
difficult strategy to maintain. However, in other countries experiences are 
less salutary. During the past ten years some French Regional Councils have 
involved FN representatives in the passing of budgets; of course, conce ssions 
have been demanded in return. In some Bavarian cities (for example, 
Augsburg) in the early 1990s the Christlich-Soziale Union was grateful for 
surreptitious cMy-council support from REPs deputies in order to stay in 
power. 
• The Degree of Influence in Political Agenda-setting 
Even when quite insignificant in electoral terms, extreme right racist parlies 
may affect the profile of party space and the distribution of issue preferences, 
thereby setting political agendas of which mainstream parties must lake 
account. The issues of immigration, political asylum, nationality, 
naturalisation and the definition of citizenship are all particularly relevant 
examples. On the other hand, many such attributions of influence may be ex 
post facto accounts of events that would have happened anyway because of 
jockeying for position between mainstream parties. Immigration, for 
example, was an issue in British politics before the emergence of the NF, 
since the Conservative Party had already appropriated it. The political-
asylum debate in the Federal Republic of Germany was in full swing before 
the rise of the REPs and a good case may be made that eventually Arl icle 16, 
Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law would have been amended anyway. The Dutch 
Minderhedendebat was set in motion by the leader of the Volksparti j voor 
Vrijheid en Democratic (WD) , Frits Bolkestein, not by the CDs. On the other 
hand, few can deny the plausibility of the thesis that a search for FN voles 
was the reason for some of the more outrageous outbursts by mainstream 
French politicians (such as Jacques Chirac and Valery Giscard d'Estaing). 
This may also explain the various recent anti-Islam initiatives by the former 
French Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, although some might argue 
that he would in any case have indulged in such actions, irrespective of 
perceived pressure from the extreme right. 
• The Strength of 'Anti-system' Attitudes 
Giovanni Sartori labelled parties unwilling to accept the rules of 
parliamentarism as 'anti-system parties' and Gordon Smith referred 1o them 
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as 'non-democratic variants'.20 Most extreme right racist parties would qualify 
under the first, if not both, of these designations. The VB, for example, wants 
lo establish a unitary Flemish state with Brussels as its capital. The CDs and 
CP '86 are repeatedly scathing about the legitimacy of the political system. 
So is the FN, all but excluded from the National Assembly by the alteration 
of the electoral system specifically for that purpose. The DVU, the NPD and 
belatedly the REPs are officially regarded as opposed to the democratic state 
and hence anti-constitutional (as well as inciting racial hatred). However, 
other parties are less easy to classify as 'anti-system', despite some of their 
rhetoric; the Fs are only ambiguously anti-system on these criteria, despite 
their recent change of direction. 
In any case, rejection of the political system as being illegitimate and as 
requiring overthrow tends to be the reaction of extreme right parties excluded 
by ostracism or by the operation of electoral laws. Success tends to moderate 
or attenuate such a tendency to rejectionism, as the Austrian case shows. 
Even so, one can still debate whether such parties, were they to achieve 
nation-wide power in their own right, would respect the democratic 'rules of 
the game' (such as regular elections, acceptance of opposition parties, 
independence of the judiciary, due process, and respect for human rights). 
Perhaps they might be excused a little tinkering with the electoral system in 
their own favour, since mainstream parties have often done this without 
becoming seriously accused of being anti-democratic (as, for example, in the 
French case). 
It is instructive to raise the question whether it is possible for an anti-system 
party to metamorphose into a system party. Before resorting to metaphors 
about leopards and spots, the answer is probably a quite emphatic 'yes'. 
There are numerous examples of this, although mostly on the Left rather 
than the right. The various Communist parties (both the larger ones like the 
Partito Comunista Italiano, the Parti Communiste Frangais, the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei (after the collapse of the GDR) and also the 
rather smaller ones like the Communistische Partij Nederland and the Swiss 
Partei der Arbeit) have metamorphosed, sometimes through amalgamations, 
into system parties. On the right, the Flemish Volksunie (VU) changed 
between the 1950s and the 1970s from an anti-system party into a pro-system 
one. The Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) offers, perhaps controversially, a 
further, if recent, example. 
However, it is a historical fact that most examples of such metamorphoses 
are reactions to persistent failure, not to growth and success. This is often a 
repackaging strategy designed to increase mass appeal after loss of support; 
the Communist parties are especially good examples. The change in status 
of the VU was taken in part for other reasons (in particular, a wish to 
participate in power after years of marginality) but may itself have 
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contributed to further decline because of suspicions of a sell-out, in fact 
contributing to the success of the VB as the anti-system party on its right. 
Electorally buoyant anti-system parties do not usually need to repackage, 
even to secure acceptance by the mainstream; like the FN, they exult in their 
pariah status, using this to demonstrate their incorruptibility by the system. 
In any case, whether an extreme right anti-system party would be willing to 
change or to behave as a system party if it were in full-blown power may not 
be the proper criterion if, entirely properly according to the democratic 
procedures, it used its power to implement all the less savoury aspects of its 
programme (for example, expulsion of foreigners or other forms of ethnic 
hostility), irrespective of the social and economic costs or of informed opinion 
to the contrary. Parties like the Fs, for example, make little attempt to hide 
their deep hostility to those whom they do not want or regard as their enemies 
(as shown in Haider's recent attacks on left-wing artists and intellectuals).21 
Given the salience, indeed centrality, of such issues (especially immigration) 
in the programmes of extreme right racist parties, one is drawn to the 
conclusion that they would indeed use democratically-obtained power for 
this purpose, even within the 'rules of the game'. After all, it is on these issues 
that they have built their appeals and their reputations. There may still be 
some sort of gradient between the organised horror of Dachau or 
Bergen-Belsen and the expulsion of foreigners or of particular ethnic 
minorities (a practice of which the past and present offer depressingly 
numerous examples - from Spain and the Jews to contemporary Bosnian 
Serbia and the Muslims). However, the writer, without wanting to make 
dramatic but unsubstantiated associations, would contend that India after 
partition, contemporary Ruanda and the former Yugoslavia all provide 
ghastly reminders of what determined 'ethnic cleansing' can sometimes mean 
and that such practices invariably entail brutality and bloodshed.22 
It may also be relevant to point out, in partial counterpoint to what has been 
argued so far in this section, that, if there do exist extensive racist and 
xenophobic attitudes among the electors of a polity, it may in some 
circumstances actually favour the stability of the political system if these are 
represented in a discrete political party, even an anti-system one. The 
alternative might be their articulation as a 'wing' or faction within a 
mainstream right-wing party. Separate, the party Itself may be ostracised, or 
marginalised, or even accommodated by the others but, whatever its 
treatment, its discrete status means that in the last analysis it is a competitor 
for votes, which usually makes other parties circumspect in their dealings 
with it, especially in a non-proportional voting system where vote competition 
between parties approaches zero-sum conditions. Where racism and 
xenophobia are not separately organised in a political party, their presence 
in right-wing mainstream parties may significantly affect the character of 
those parties, as the influence of Enoch Powell's popularity ethically 
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compromised the British Conservative Party in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
even if giving it an electoral boost.23 Without the extreme right option Le Pen, 
for example, might well have tried again during the 1980s to become active 
within the mainstream right, where indeed he had spent some of his early 
career before a two-decade sojourn in the political wilderness. 
Conclusion 
If the earlier baleful observation about the likelihood of non-moderating 
effects of political power on the racist extreme right is correct, one is drawn 
back to the inference that such parties are a danger where, either nationally 
or even locally, they have made substantial inroads into the political fabric, 
and the more so if these inroads are on a national level or likely to become 
so. On that basis the Fs perhaps represent the most significant threat and, 
notwithstanding their failure to advance in the May 1995 general election, 
the VB follows in seriousness. Both are assisted by the general crisis of 
political legitimacy in their respective polities. Thereafter, follows the FN, still 
a threat but a smaller one because of its lesser penetration at the national 
level and the fact that the French political system does not face the same 
depth of crisis as do those of Austria and Belgium. 
Certainly, nobody who has seen the obvious professionalism and extensive 
resources in the national offices of parties like the Fs, the VB and the FN can 
doubt their potential for major influence or the dedication of those involved. 
These are not the glue-sniffing skinheads or the Hitler-celebrating losers of 
British extreme right racism, nor the mavericks of the Dutch far right, nor 
the Lumpen youths involved in extreme right xenophobic violence in the 
German Federal Republic; instead, they are young, hard-working, 
professionally oriented political ideologues with a clear understanding of 
their goals and also of a strategy for their attainment. It is that distinctive 
feature which makes them a danger. 
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GENETIC VARIATION 
WITHIN AND AMONG 
HUMAN GROUPS 
Guido Barbujani 
C H I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Is there any biological basis for the widespread belief that the human species 
is subdivided into races? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to 
start by agreeing on a working definition of race. After that, two fundamental 
studies addressing levels of genetic differentiation, within and among human 
groups will be described. As we shall see, on average, the genes of two 
individuals belonging to different races appear to differ only marginally more 
than the genes of two individuals belonging to the same community. The third 
section will deal with the patterns of genetic diversity among humans. It will 
be stressed that genetic differences, albeit small, are not distributed at 
random between populations, and that both geography and history have left 
a mark on the genetic structure of our species. In conclusion, the author will 
attempt to summarise some aspects of human evolution, with an eye to the 
origins and maintenance of genetic diversity. 
What is a race? 
The 1985 copy of The Oxford Dictionary of Current English lists four 
definitions of race: 
'each of the major divisions of mankind with distinct physical 
characteristics'; 
'fact or concept of division into races'; 
'group of persons or animals or plants connected by common descent'; 
and 
""* 'genus or species or breed or variety of animals or plants'. 
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Some of these definitions are unsatisfactory. A race, for instance, jS 
indisputably a subunit of a species (which in turn, along with other related 
species, belongs to a genus), and it may include several breeds. But whatever 
idea of a race one may have, it is a fact that our species has been traditionally 
regarded as composed of distinct groups, that the physical differences among 
these groups have often been perceived as obvious, and that such groups are 
commonly termed races. This is in agreement with the first definition. The 
existence of individuals, and even of entire populations, who cannot easily 
be classified into any such major divisions has always been abit of a problem 
but here the third definition seems to settle the issue. If members of each 
race are descended from a different group of common ancestors, the 
individuals of intermediate characteristics come from comparatively recent 
inter-racial marriage or mixing, and their existence does not contradict the 
existence of separate groups. In this way, one may wish implicitly to assume 
that the human species passed through a stage during which it was deeply 
subdivided, when everybody belonged to a 'pure' race. According to this 
assumption, it was only later that inter-racial mixing brought forth 
intermediate types. 
Many, or most, educated people, I believe, would agree upon this definition 
of race. Be it right or wrong, I do not find it suitable to address the question 
of whether human races are really distinct biological entities. This definition 
claims that pure races existed sometime in the past, a claim difficult to 
demonstrate for we know something about the genetic build-up of present 
populations, but very little about our ancestors' genes. Traditionally, this 
shortcoming has been bypassed by identifying racial types from bones, and 
especially from skulls. Fossil bones of our ancestors abound and their size 
and shape can be compared with ours. Studies of biological similarities 
through time are therefore possible, and have actually repeatedly been 
attempted. Their results, however, are inconclusive, particularly wit! 1 regard 
to racial classification. 
First, even within small human communities, skulls have frustralingly 
different shapes, and can hardly be regarded as all belonging to a single type. 
Secondly, as R. R. Sokal and H. Uytterschaut have shown in Europe', the 
bones of past populations tend to resemble each other more than they 
resemble those of current populations living in the same areas. In addition, 
S. Jones2 has reported how cranial measures of children born to rccent 
immigrants in the United States quickly began to differ from those of their 
parents, to approximate the values typical of people who had immigrated 
earlier on. Explanations for these and similar findings are probably based 
on the observation that body measures, including height and weight, do not 
only depend on genes alone, but also on environmental factors, such as 
climate and diet. Even in the absence of genetic changes, in fact, the shapes 
of skulls in populations will rapidly change, if these populations move to a 
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Figure 1. Four snakes of the species Elaphe guttata (corn snake). 
The colour pattern is genetically determined; two genes are involved, for presence/absence of the black and ot 
the orange pigments, respectively, and no intermediate shade of colour is present in nature (From Griffiths, A.J.F., 
Miller, J.H., Suzuki D.T., Lewontin, R.C., Gelbart, W.M., 1993. An Introduction to Genetic Analysis: New York: W.H. 
Freeman; reproduced with permission). 
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different habitat, or if the pool of available resources changes. The idea of 
being able to develop a stable classification of human groups by using cranial 
measures is being abandoned by the scientific community. 
All in all, therefore, a different approach is called for. Let us consider the 
corn snakes of Figure 1. Their colours are genetically determined. An 
individual is orange, or black, or both, or neither, depending only on its genes 
and regardless of the environment in which it has grown up (where 
'environment' comprises all non-genetic factors one may wish 1o consider). 
Intermediate shades are not present in nature. All the differences we perceive 
in this case reflect genetic differences and each member of this species may 
unambiguously be assigned to one of the four groups defined by the skin 
colour. Suppose now that the four groups are also located in different regions 
of the world, say, the Eastern, Central, and Western United Stales, and 
Mexico, respectively (which, by the way, is not the case). In that case, it would 
be legitimate - the author believes - to speak of different races, that is, of 
clearly recognisable groups within the same species. 
In this way, we are getting close to what could be a sensible working definition 
of race: one of some reproductively-separated groups of individuals within 
which genetic differences are small compared to differences between llicm. 
The emphasis on reproductive separation derives from the fact that, 
according to the rules of Mendelian genetics, one generation of random 
mating will blur all existing differences. No assumptions are made about the 
past history of the species, as is the case in the commonsensical definition 
given earlier. It is worth noting that this latter definition is similar to that 
given by the Cambridge Encyclopaedia: a race is 'a biologically distinctive 
major division of a species, in which the differences between races exceed 
the variation within them'. Our question accordingly becomes whether such 
major divisions exist in our species as well. 
Let us try to imagine two extreme scenarios in which a species is, or is not, 
respectively, subdivided into races (Figure 2). In a deeply subdivided species 
(2A), the various groups do not overlap much, and form easy-to-dislingnish 
entities. The fraction of individuals who could belong to two groups is very 
small. As a rule, each individual's characteristics are such that she/he 
necessarily falls within a single group. Another way to envisage the same 
situation is in 2B, where a physical trait is represented in the abscissa of the 
diagram. Each group shows a different distribution of that trait, and only for 
few values of the X variable (where two curves partly overlap) do individuals 
of two groups share the same characteristics. At the other extreme of the 
range, we have a case in which groups do not differ much (2C), so that the 
value of the X variable does not tell us which group one individual belongs 
to (2D). Theoretically, every real species will be somewhere between these 
two extreme cases. It will be legitimate to speak of biological raccs among 
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VARIANCES WITHIN (large i n ® ) 
GROUPS 
Figure 2. Schematical representation of biological differences within 
species In which racial groups do (A, B), or do not (0, D) exist, respectively. 
The left part of the figure represents different groups as sets of objects, which may be clearly differentiated (A), or 
largely overlap (C). In the right part of the figure, t i e same situation Is represented on a graph In which a 
measurable variable (body height, weight, skin reflectance values) Is plotted on the X-axis, and the ordinate 
represents the frequency of that variable. A species Is subdivided in races if certain physical characters are 
discontinuous^ distributed In the different groups (A B), whereas the groups cannot be called races if the variable 
of interest shows similar distributions among them (C, D). Two components of variance, between and within 
groups, are indicated in (E). 
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humans accordingly if our genes appear to be distributed in a 
the case outlined in Figure 2B. 
For the sake of clarity, let us focus for a moment on a comparison only 
between two groups (Figure2E), Here, we are to identify two components of 
variation. There is variation between groups which corresponds to the 
difference between the two averages, ml and m2, defined as variance between 
groups; and there is variation within each group, which is proportional to 
the breadth of the curves and can be called variance within groups. This 
partition of variance can be extended to any number of hierarchical 
subdivisions. What is important is that the two scenarios outlined above can 
now be defined in a more rigorous, quantitative, manner. We may speak of 
races whenever the variance between groups exceeds the variance within 
them. We should avoid the term, race whenever most variation is accounted 
for by the variance within groups. This is not a strict definition sincc one 
cannot distinguish sharply between these two cases. Nonetheless, it is useful 
in addressing more rigorously the issue of genetic variation in humans. 
Genetic variances between and within human races 
Thousands of different genes are known in humans, and for dozens of them, 
a large amount of information is available, in the form of frequencies of the 
various gene variants (or alleles) in different populations. In the late sixties, 
R. Lewontin began to collect all available allele frequencies for nine blood 
group systems and eight serum proteins and blood cell enzymes: 17 genes 
overall. The number of populations screened varied among systems, from a 
few to several hundred, and that caused some statistical drawbacks. 
However, the main problem was how to subdivide the data for analysis. A 
considerable level of disagreement emerged, even among supporters of racial 
classification, when the nature and number of human races was addressed. 
Opinions on their number ranged from a minimum of three (Whites, Blacks 
and Orientals) to much higher figures. Lewontin chose to consider seven 
races, adding South Asian aborigines, Amerindians, Oceanians and 
Australians to the aforementioned groups, a classification most 
anthropologists appeared to agree on, at the time of his study. 
The interested reader will find the details of the statistical analysis in 
Lewontin's article.3 For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that he estimated 
three major components of genetic variation: within populations, between 
populations of the same race, and between races. This is similar to comparing 
each individual in the samples three separate times: first, with other 
members of the same population; secondly, with all members of different 
populations in the same race; and thirdly, with all members of all populations 
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in the other races. These calculations were independently repeated for each 
of the 17 genes. On average, differences between members of the same 
population account for 85.4 per cent of the overall variation. As Lewontin 
explained, there is reason to believe that if such an estimate is imprecise, it 
is because of a downward bias. The differences between populations and 
within races account for another 8.3 per cent of the overall genetic variance. 
Races differ only by the fraction left, 6.3 per cent of the overall genetic 
variance, or less. As expected, different genes do not always yield identical 
percentages. For specific genes, the genetic variance between races never 
exceeds 26 per cent (for the Duffy blood group), and is often less than 3 per 
cent (for Acid Phosphatase, Phosphoglucomutase, and the Lewis, Kell, P, and 
ABO blood groups). Lewontin interpreted these figures as evidence that our 
perception of large differences between human races is based on biased 
preconceptions and does not reflect existing genetic differences. He 
concluded his article with these words: 'Human racial classification is of no 
social value, and is positively destructive of social and human relations. Since 
such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic 
significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance.' 
After the publication of these results, however, the idea that races exist in 
our species was not abandoned . This is partly because the issue has not only 
biological, but also social and emotional implications. Doubts regarding the 
statistical method used, and whether the data were sufficient to justify such 
strong conclusions, were also raised. Accordingly, more data has been 
accumulated and the problem has been addressed again. In 1980, B.D.H. 
Latter4 analysed a wider data set of allele frequencies and used three different 
statistical methods. All of them had been specifically designed to evaluate in 
a reliable way the amount of genetic diversity, within and between major 
human groups. In this paper, the groups under comparison were no longer 
(anthropologically-defined) races, but six geographical clusters, 
corresponding to Europe, Africa, the Near East and India, East Asia, the 
Americas, and Oceania. Latter justified this choice on the grounds that it was 
impossible to agree upon objective criteria for racial classification. Despite 
this difference in group delineation, he found that 84 per cent of genetic 
diversity fell within populations, a figure remarkably close to that of 
Lewontin. Under the three different statistical approaches, the differences 
between the six major geographical groups accounted for a fraction equal to 
10.4 per cent, 7.5 per cent, and 9.6 per cent, respectively, of overall human 
genetic diversity. Once again, differences between groups, whether termed 
races or otherwise, appear only as a modest extension of differences found 
between members of the same population. These results confirm that most 
human genetic variation occurs within populations. 
What Lewontin's and Latter's studies imply is summarised in Figure 3. Let 
us arbitrarily set equal to 100 the average genetic difference between two 
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FRANCE 
KOREA 
THE FILIPINAS 
Figure 3. Expected genetic diversity between pairs of individuals 
Based on the results of Lewontin's (1972) and Letter's (1980) studies. The figures above the arrows represen 
of genetic differentiation, on an arbitrary scale whose maMmum is set at 100. 
persons who are at opposite extremes of the range of variation of our species. 
Consider a Korean and a French person, for example. We all believe we can 
discriminate with 100 per cent accuracy between the French and Koreans, 
on the basis of their physical aspect, and we may well be right. Yet, at the 
genetic level, the difference between each of them and another member of the 
same population will not be 10, as one would then predict from the way they 
look. Rather, it will be close to 85, which implies that each human population 
contains probably more than four-fifths of the genetic patrimony of our entire 
species. The difference between members of different populations of the same 
race, like a Korean and a Filipino, or a French person and a Pakistani, will 
be roughly equal to 94. If we accept Latter's slightly higher estimates • >f Hie 
differences between geographical groups, this figure will drop to 92 per cent 
or 90 per cent, but by no less than that.5 
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The idea that humanity is divided into neatly distinct groups, each with its 
own genes and physical characters that mirror them, is therefore wrong. 
Differences exist, of course, and some of them are inherited. Nonetheless, 
the idea that skin colour reflects a fundamental subdivision of our species 
is, at best, an oversimplification. If we use as a criterion of classification blood 
groups and other .proteins, we find completely different patterns of similarity. 
Some Italians (those from Naples) would be very close to Hawaii islands 
natives, with frequencies of the ABO-O allele around 65 per cent, whereas 
others (from Sassari, Sardinia) would be almost identical to the American 
Apache and the African Tutsi, with 77 per cent of the same allele. From the 
standpoint of genetics, accordingly, human races do not exist. This does not 
mean that human races cannot exist. As is the case with all other organisms, 
with dogs or with corn, humans are able, in principle, to develop into 
genetically different races. We are able to but we do not appear to have done 
so. 
| ." | Geography and history as causes of genetic diversity 
In the light of this evidence, it may be tempting to think we are all alike but 
that would not be a very good idea. It is true that many other species, from 
some invertebrates to our closest living relatives, show much higher levels of 
genetic heterogeneity than we do. In one well-studied region of the genome, 
the mitochondrial DNA, for instance, the common and the pygmy 
chimpanzees who live only a few hundred kilometres apart in Central Africa, 
differ ten times as much as any two humans we may care to compare.6 But 
differences between human populations, small though they may be, do exist, 
and it is possible to recognise a pattern in these differences. Figure 1.4 shows 
the distribution of one allele of the histocompatibility system (HLA) in 
Europe. This is one of the genes that, among other functions, determines 
whether tissues of different individuals can fit together, and hence directly 
affects the success of tissue transplants. As is evident from the figure, the 
frequencies of the HLA-A9 allele are neither uniform, nor randomly 
distributed. Starting from areas of high frequency in the North and around 
the Eastern Mediterranean, they decrease as one moves towards Central 
Europe, and reach a minimum around the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. It 
is legitimate to describe such a pattern as the combination of two large-scale 
gradients converging in central Europe. This is not to claim that all genes 
show equally simple distributions. The rule, however, is that populations in 
neighbouring localities are genetically similar to each other, and in distant 
localities are not. This is a consequence of a well-established genetic 
principle: levels of genetic relatedness depend largely upon the exchange of 
genes between populations, upon what is known as gene flow. The main factor 
determining gene flow is the movement of people, in a word, migration. 
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Figure 4. Distributions of the frequencies of the allele A9 of the 
HLA system in Europe. 
Five shades of grey represent increasing alieie-frequency values, from lighter to darker shades. The figures 1 -5 
indicate sampling localities. The original values have been interpolated to yield a map without gaps (from 
Sokal et al„ 1989; reproduced with permission). 
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Now, in most areas of the world, the rates of migration tend to be inversely 
proportional to the distance separating localities. It is evident that, as a first 
choice, people who need to migrate do not want to go very far. As a 
consequence, contiguous populations tend to exchange more migrants than 
far-flung ones and their genetic characteristics will tend to converge. 
Simultaneously, -the movement of people will be constrained by obstacles, by 
mountain ranges, deserts, seas, and perhaps also by other, more elusive, 
barriers, as we shall see later. Such obstacles will normally reduce gene flow, 
rind populations separated by them will evolve independently. The 
predictable result of independent evolution is the random accumulation of 
genetic differences. Accordingly, there are two major geographical factors 
affecting patterns of genetic variation, namely distance and the presence or 
absence of barriers. 
There are also historical factors. Individuals sharing parents or grandparents 
are genetically closer than unrelated individuals. Intuitively, the same is true 
of populations descended from the same ancestral population. In many 
cases, however, the importance of history in determining population 
similarity cannot be tested directly. Descriptions - many of them inaccurate 
- are available for only some major events which occurred in the last 
millennia and we know very little, if indeed, anything at all, about the history 
of our population. We turn then to indirect sources of historical information, 
in particular to language. Let us consider how languages may be able to tell 
us something about human genes. 
Individual X -GAGCTTTATCTAACGGTG-
Individual Y - -GAGCTTTACCTMCGGTG-
Individual Z --GAACTTTACCTGACGGTA-
® ® ( D 
Figur© 5. Hypothetical sequences of a short fragment of DNA in three individuals (X, Y and Z) and a 
genealogical tree summarizing their differences, and suggesting how such differences came about. A, C, G, T 
represent the four bases constituting the DNA sequence, and a dotted line emphasises the differences. 
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The state-of-the-art approach to quantifying genetic variation is now the 
direct study of DNA, rather than the inference of DNA variation based on 
blood groups or similar traits. When the same DNA fragment is analysed and 
compared in different individuals, most of the bases constituting the DNA 
sequence appear identical, as we may expect given the well-known 
homogeneity of our species. However, certain DNA sites show variation 
(Figure 5, top). This variation is the product of mutation. Small changes are 
introduced in the DNA, as it is passed from one generation to another (and 
on condition that such changes are not detrimental for the individuals who 
carry them, they accumulate through time). As a consequence, individuals 
who differ at a few DNA sites, or who are identical, are considered to derive 
their DNA from a common ancestor who lived in the not-too-remote past. 
Conversely, if several differences between two individuals are observed, their 
most recent common ancestor is considered to have lived way back in time. 
Under certain simplifying assumptions (the so-called molecular clock 
hypothesis7), it is possible to associate a time-frame to the count of genetic 
differences, and thus to estimate the time at which any two individuals had 
a presumptive common ancestor. (Note the assumption that there is always 
a common ancestor who transmitted to any two of us a certain DNA fragment, 
unless we believe, with the 19th century's advocates of multiple human 
origins, that whites and blacks belong to different species8). 
Genealogical trees constructed using this kind of approach (Figure 5, bottom) 
have become a widespread and useful tool in the study of evolution. Once a 
genealogy has been constructed, however, the problem is how to interpret it. 
Which are the factors that were important in generating the observed amount 
of genetic diversity? As we argued above, a simple hypothesis is that genetic 
similarity reflects geographic proximity. This has proved to be true in many 
but not all studies. Consider the group depicted in Figure 6. The people in 
the figure come from Northern and Southern Europe, Southern Africa, and 
Australia. Suppose a drop of blood has been taken from each of them, and 
that the same piece of DNA, perhaps one of the well-known regions of 
mitochondrial DNA, has been sequenced. A genealogy is then constructed. A 
simple way to understand it is to compare it with other representations of 
the relationships between individuals. An obvious one is the tree 
summarising geographical distances between birthplaces of individuals 
(Figure 7, top). In tree form, Northern and Southern Europe are connected 
by a shallow branch because they are close to each other, whereas Oceania 
and Africa are connected to the former by deeper branches, reflecting the 
greater distances between these geographic areas. Although these specific 
people have not been the subjects of this kind of investigation, it seems likely 
that there would be no or little correlation - their genealogies would not 
resemble the geographical tree. In such a case, one would have to c o n c lude 
that spatial distance is not a major factor explaining why some of these 
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Figure 6. A heterogeneous group of people. Members of this group come from Australia, Botswana, 
Great Britain, and Italy. 
Figure 7. Two trees summarizing the geographic (top) and linguistic (bottom) relationships between 
the people of Figure 6. 
Oceania 
Southern Northern 
Africa Europe Europe 
English Italian Setswana 
U LT~ 
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individuals are genetically close and others not. Suppose, on the other hand 
that we take into account the tree summarising linguistic relationships 
(Figure 7, bottom). There are three major branches in that tree 
corresponding to two Indo-European languages (English and Italian, the 
former perhaps divided into two different dialects), and one Bantu language, 
Setswana. It is much more likely that this linguistic tree will be similar to the 
genealogical tree. 
Some may say that this comes as no great surprise. After all, everybody knows 
that most ancestors of present-day Australians came from the British Isles 
during the past three centuries. Accordingly, it is only in the linguistic tree 
(and not in the geographic one) that subjects are located close to such 
ancestors. But that is exactly the point. The geographical tree represents a 
state of affairs as they were at the time these subjects were born, whereas the 
linguistic tree takes into account historical links of longer duration. By 
choosing the latter strategy, we have been able to assemble evidence of a 
migration event by using other historical sources. 
But what of migrations that have not been recorded? During (at least) the past 
150,000 years of human evolution, only a number of population movements 
taking place during the last thirty or forty centuries have been documented, and 
history and myth are intertwined in most of these accounts. Linguistic affiliations 
then act as clues for past population relationships. Whenever people speaking 
similar languages in different parts of the world appear genetically related, it is 
reasonable to suppose they are descendants of a single ancestral population. A 
common language signifies a common origin, and a related language indicates 
a common origin further back in time.9 The argument, clearly, displays a 
number of problems. To mention just one, we know that languages can be 
transmitted between members of the same generation, whilst genes cannot. 
Nonetheless, a relationship between genetic and linguistic differences between 
populations has been shown to exist in many studies10, a result which suggests 
that this assumption is reasonable. 
Figure 8 illustrates this argument in its converse sense: how genetic 
boundaries are often accompanied by linguistic boundaries. The map of 
Europe in the figure contains lines indicating zones of sharpest genetic 
change, or genetic boundaries, as evaluated from the analysis of 19 genes." 
Many genetic boundaries correspond to geographical barriers, and most 
probable result from restricted gene flow. That is the case for major mountain 
ranges, like the Alps, and bodies of water, such as those separating Britain 
from Iceland, Ireland, Norway and France, Finland from the Aland islands, 
Albania from Italy, Italy from Malta, and so on. Other zones of sharp genetic 
change surround two islands, Corsica and Sardinia. Many of these 
geographic barriers are also linguistic boundaries, and it is reasonable to 
imagine that geographic isolation promoted both genetic and linguistic 
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Figure 8. A map of Europe (political boundaries as of 1990), where regions of sharp genetic change, a 
genetic boundaries, are Indicated by solid or dashed lines. Boundaries number 3 (in Northern Finland), 19 
(between Austria and Hungary), 20 (within Romania), and 21 (within Spain), do not correspond to physical 
barriers, but only to linguistic boundaries, respectively between Lapps and Swedish-speakers (3), German-
and Magyar-speakers (19), Romanian- and Magyar-speakers (20), and Basques and Spanish-speakers (21); 
boundary 21 extends beyond the line separating Basques and non-Basques. 
heterogeneity. A few lines on the map, however, require closer scrutiny. There 
is no obvious physical barrier between Lapps and Swedes in Northern 
Sweden, between Austria and Hungary, within Romania, and in Northern 
Spain. In all these cases, the genetic boundaries marked on the map 
correspond to boundaries between a Indo-European and a 
non-Indo-European language. These and similar findings strongly suggest 
that the presence of a cultural barrier may be sufficient to isolate populations, 
thus determining or maintaining genetic differences between them. In fact, 
many cultural factors may influence our reproductive behaviour and thereby 
the distribution of our genes - language is simply one of the easiest to identify. 
Let us summarise two of the points made so far. First, genetic differences 
between human groups are small, and do not account for more than a few 
per cent of the overall diversity of our species. Secondly, these limited genetic 
differences are not randomly distributed in space. In general, they reflect 
varying patterns of gene flow. Areas where populations intermixed tend to 
show gradual genetic variation, whereas barriers to migration, both 
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geographical and cultural, tend to determine comparatively sharp genetic 
differences. 
Although limited in extent, such genetic differences may have practical 
importance. A good example is given by modern techniques of DNA-based 
personal identification. It has become possible to extract DNA from extremely 
small amounts of cells, such as those left by a smoker on a cigarette filter 
In this way, it is now common practice to compare the DNA found in the place 
of a crime with that of a suspect. The test is carried out by comparing several 
different DNA fragments, thus reconstructing the so-called profiles of the 
suspect and of the culprit.12 There are two possible outcomes: either the two 
profiles do not match and the suspect is not the culprit; or the two DNA 
profiles are equal. In the latter case, there are again two possibilities: either 
the suspect is the person who committed the crime or the two DNAs are the 
same by chance. The probability of the latter is called match probability. In 
practice, it is the margin of error if the suspect is convicted based on DNA 
evidence. To evaluate it, one has to consider the fact that alternative types of 
DNA fragments are present in the population at different frequencies. By 
combining the population frequencies of all fragment types shown by one 
person, one can estimate the probability that another person will share the 
same DNA profile. The crucial point is that the frequencies of fragment types 
vary among populations - all types are common in certain groups and rare 
in others. This will deeply affect the estimate of the match probability. If a 
suspect's profile is tested against the frequencies of his or her fragments in 
a population other than his or hers, the match probability will be 
underestimated, with potential disastrous consequences.13 
To better understand this, imagine a witness describing a person as 
'light-haired, blue-eyed, tall'. This description may be sufficient to identify 
the person in a crowd in India (where only a few people will correspond to 
that description), but not in Norway (where many individuals will be like that 
person). The same is true of DNA profiles. If the profile of a person is 
compared with inappropriate frequencies, that is, those estimated in a group 
other than his or hers, some of the person's fragment types will appear very 
rare, and the match probability will decrease accordingly, suggesting strongly 
that the person is the one who left a trace in the place of the crime. That is, 
under certain circumstances, why even small genetic differences may matter. 
In British courts, for instance, it is now customary to ask the suspect to 
declare which ethnic group he belongs to, not in order to discriminate against 
him, but to identify the appropriate reference population. 
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A brief overview of human evolution 
gow did genetic diversity accumulate? Estimates of the age of our species 
based on DNA data and on comparisons with our closest living relatives, the 
big apes, suggest our ancestors were a small (but not tiny) population living 
around 150,000 years ago, or a bit later. Based on the levels of genetic 
polymorphism now present, and on the time necessary for mutation to 
generate it, we can place the size of the initial population at around a few 
thousand individuals.14 We are all their descendants. Paleontological studies 
clearly suggest that our place of origin is Africa, and the genetic data are fully 
compatible with that view. Among others, C.B. Stringer and P. Andrews15 
review the paleontological and genetic evidence, and A.R. Templeton16 
discusses the assumptions underlying recent genetic studies. The adverse 
hypothesis that modern humans originated simultaneously all over Eurasia 
and Africa (the so-called multiregional hypothesis17) has three drawbacks. 
First, it implies unlikely, high levels of migration in the Pleistocene era. 
Secondly, it does not accord to available genetic data18 and thirdly, it appears 
to be contradicted by measures of cranial diversity at various moments in 
the past19 
The first fossil evidence, discovered in Palestine, of modern human presence 
outside Africa can be dated to around 90,000 years ago. Colonisation of other 
continents can be established from fossil evidence.20 We would not be too far 
wrong if we were to say that humans arrived in Australia (which was not an 
island, at that time) about 50,000 years ago, had colonised much of Europe 
more than 30,000 years ago, and had reached America (by way of a 
now-non-existent land bridge between Siberia and Alaska) later, sometimes 
between 30,000 and 15,000 years ago. Colonisation of the Pacific came even 
later, with New Zealand only being reached in the last millennium. If we 
accept that our species is about 150,000 years old, this means that a large 
share of our evolution took place in Africa, and then in Asia, with fairly recent 
expansions to other continents. 
Genetic studies reveal a reasonable measure of agreement with the 
time-pattern given above. Current levels of mitochondrial DNA differentiation 
are highest in Africa. Most non-African populations, to the contrary, show a 
subset of the African genes, plus some recent variants.21 Europeans, in 
particular, may therefore be descended from an early admixture of 
populations ancestral to present-day African and Asians.22 Current levels and 
patterns of genetic diversity are difficult to explain unless we assume that 
some time before 33,000 years ago, human population expanded quickly. It 
is also necessary to assume that, before this expansion, this population was 
subdivided into relatively isolated groups.23 Whether or not each such group 
was ancestral to a distinct human race is open to doubt, and may be 
impossible to establish. There is no evidence, however, of historical 
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continuity between early human groups and populations or races as they are 
now recognised. In any case, most of these previously isolated groups seem 
to have expanded more or less simultaneously. This may have happened 
because climates improved following the retreat of the glaciers. During that 
and successive phases, demographic increase led human populations to split 
and form new regional groups. Simultaneously, these newly established 
populations continued to be in contact with each other. These population 
splits probably played an important role in determining genetic divergence 
but they also appear to have been accompanied by ongoing processes of gene 
flow.24 
In particular, significant contacts between populations occurred in the 
Neolithic era, when a second major population boom has been 
archaeologically documented. Its main cause was the discovery and rapid 
spread of agriculture, starting in several areas of Asia, and later in America 
and Africa. Archaeological, linguistic and genetic data jointly support the 
emergence of a major population diffusion, starting approximately 10,000 
years ago in the Near East. At that time, early farmers began to migrate in 
search of new suitable land, and thereby propagated their subsistence 
technologies, their genes, and their languages across much of the Old World.25 
During these comparatively recent demographic expansions, some new gene 
variants were generated, but the bulk of current genetic diversity was present 
during earlier times, and was probably redistributed among populations. 
Though simplistic and subject to exceptions among a number of local 
populations, the views expressed here have been confirmed repeatedly by 
field studies and statistical tests. Returning then to the question of the origin 
of genetic variation between groups, of that 6 or 10 per cent of human 
diversity, there is reason to believe that it results from the unstable balance 
between the two opposite pressures mentioned above. Populations tend to 
diverge genetically in isolation, as a consequence of natural selection or 
simply by chance, but exchange of individuals brings about increasing genetic 
homogeneity. Throughout much of our history, isolated human groups have 
continued to diversify when isolated, and under other circumstances to mix 
or merge. Tentative though the observation well may be, it would seem that 
the massive migrations of this century will result in a further reduction of 
population differences at the genetic level. On the other hand, as indicated 
above, some barriers to gene flow appear invisible and have been shown to 
affect human migratory behaviour in important and measurable ways. Their 
role may also become more important in the future. 
Sometimes one realises that an issue initially deemed highly relevant is in 
fact less so. This brief description of the patterns of genetic diversity in our 
species aimed to clarify a number of basic biological facts so as to establish 
a context within which an analysis of ethnic conflict could be located. The 
data and theories reviewed here may not have met this aim. Suppose, for 
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instance, that sometime in the future, through new genetic research, 
extensive genetic diversity be shown to exist between races. Could that result 
be used to condone racial discrimination? If our answer is no, the 
implications are by no means trivial for it would imply that a choice between 
a racist or a tolerant attitude does not depend upon the degree of genetic 
differences among groups. It implies that it is our perceptions of such 
differences that matters, whether these differences be small or large. Genetics 
has very little to tell us about that. 
At any rate, the demonstrated absence of large differences among the genes 
of human groups demolishes at least one myth upon which racial 
discrimination is based. Unless new data emerge, we shall have to find a 
better excuse to hate someone than the nature of his genes. This may help 
in conceptualising ethnic conflicts as clashes between cultures, which they 
are. Though limited, this advantage is not negligible. For culture, after all, is 
something that changes, albeit with difficulty, whereas we are condemned to 
carry the genes we inherited throughout our lives. A clearer understanding 
of biological variation may result, accordingly, in the realisation that ethnic 
conflicts are not inevitable. Simultaneously, decisions on how to deal with 
others seem to depend on our willingness to understand one other rather 
than on how much genetics we understand. The crucial issues appear to be 
psychological with social and political, rather than biological, bases. 
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THE OLD AND 
THE NEW CONCEPT 
f ••• 
OF RACE 
Guido Modiano 
| ' | A Premise 
The only scientifically valid way of discussing the concept of race is to do it 
as if racism never existed: by completely ignoring the possible implications 
and ideological exploitation of the objective facts. Prejudice is the worst 
enemy of truth, not only if it is a racial prejudice but also if it is born of an 
anti-racist attitude, or, as is often the case, when it is caused by an 
opportunistic desire to comply with a conformistic and widespread belief. In 
this field, prejudice often exceeds its usual limits because besides not 
requiring answers to prickly issues to be demonstrated, it resists the very 
act of raising these questions (possibly for fear of unwanted answers). This 
is a typical example of a more or less conscious removal of a problem too 
disquieting to face. 
However, the price to be paid for avoiding uncomfortable questions is high 
indeed. Besides placing a severe limit on one's freedom of thought it means 
being contented with preconceived and dogmatic answers rather than 
searching for those that are rational and convincing. 
The moral rights and wrongs of any behaviour cannot be scientifically 
demonstrated because science and ethics belong to different philosophical 
categories ('good' and 'bad' are not concerns of science; its concerns are 'true' 
and 'false'). Thus, on the specific issue of race, science cannot demonstrate, 
for example, that from a moral point of view, it is a 'good' option to be 
anti-racist. To be racist or anti-racist is a moral (not a scientific) decision. 
For example, if one takes on moral grounds the decision to be anti-racist, 
this will mean that the decision to reject racism will not be conditioned by 
the scientific results whatever they turn out to be. However, this also means 
that scientific results must not be affected by ideology: they should be the 
same irrespective of whether the scientist is a fanatical racist or a strongly 
persuaded anti-racist. 
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This does not imply that the layman should ignore positive facts discovered 
through scientific procedures, or not be aware of the many relevant, questions 
not answered by science. On the contrary, this knowledge should be spread 
as much as possible in order to prevent the usage of non-proven (or even 
disproved) facts as arguments in favour or against racism. Inappropriate 
scientific support is often used by both sides. For example, it is used by 
racists when they claim it is scientifically proven that blacks are genetically 
inferior in intelligence quotient or IQ (a vague, arbitrary and culturally biased 
characteristic referring to an ill-defined portion of the overall psychological 
make-up of an individual). But it is also used by anti-racists when they claim 
it has been conclusively excluded by science that inter-race variations in 
psychological characteristics may have a genetic component besides (he 
cultural one, which, on the basis of indirect (but convincing) evidence, 
appears to be the predominant one. These statements are so obvious as to 
seem trivial. Yet it is worth asserting them explicitly because many severe 
misunderstandings in this field continue to arise simply because many 
people, consciously or unconsciously, do not accept the obvious. In a way, 
these people behave as the physicist who, while working out the mathematical 
relationship between matter and energy, takes into account the risks of a 
nuclear war. 
The most extreme example of the influence that extra-scientific 
considerations exerted on scientific attitudes in this field was the radical 
change which took place after the Holocaust. Before the Second World War 
most geneticists were convinced that the possible consequences of massive 
inter-racial crossings were a major problem for the future of mankind. After 
the Holocaust this 'major' anxiety was dismissed even though this tragic event 
did not provide any new data scientifically relevant for this issue (it having 
been instead informative for evaluating the level of civilisation achieved In 
this century by some of the 'civilised' countries). Obviously, the only 
scientifically valid approach to settle this question would be to see what I lie 
offspring of inter-racial crossings turned out to be. Fortunately, tens of 
millions all over the world performed 'spontaneous experiments' and 
showed, beyond any doubt, that these crossings do not cause any major 
consequences, thus confirming what common sense, if it were not so heavily 
conditioned by racial prejudice and fear, should have suggested from the 
beginning. 
Ideally, one should deal with the concept of race in humans in exactly the 
way we do in other animal species where there is no risk of being led astray 
by ideological bias. However, this is only partially feasible because only in 
our species is a cultural subdivision superimposed which strongly interacts 
with its biological subdivision. Biology, or more precisely genetics, should 
have an important role for the problems connected with racism. This role 
should consist of defining an indisputable set of facts in which discussions 
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concerning this issue must be framed: everybody should then be free to adopt 
any ideology but not to support it with statements contradicting the 
ascertained facts: liberty of opinion but not of mystification. 
[ | Inter-group differential inherited characteristics 
The definitions of race - even those commonly used vague and arbitrary ones 
- demand a preliminary clarification of six fundamental concepts because 
they are essential components of any definitions. They are: 
(L) 'quantitative' v 'alternative' characteristics (see Figure 1) 
(2) 'anthropological markers' 
(3) 'gene frequencies' 
(4) 'intra' v 'inter' (group) variations 
(5) 'independent' characteristics v characteristics whose variabilities are 
due to similar (or even identical) causes 
(6) 'concordant' v 'non-concordant' characteristics 
They are the tools through which humans can first be subdivided into discrete 
groups and then these groups can be compared with each other. 
1. 'Quantitative' v 'Alternative' variable characteristics 
Quantitative characteristics are characteristics displayed to some extent by 
everybody. Thus their variation concerns only this extent (examples: stature, 
body weight, blood pressure). Their distribution is usually represented by 
plotting the various observed values in a graph with respect to the abscissa, 
while their respective frequencies are referred to the ordinates. If - as usually 
happens - the distribution of a quantitative characteristic is compatible with 
the normal 'bell-shaped' distribution, then two variables, its mean (m) and 
its standard deviation (s) are sufficient to describe it adequately. Alternative 
characteristics may be present or absent in any given individual (or allele) -
for example Rh positive and Rh negative individuals; Rh and rh alleles. 
If, as is usually the case, the alternative characteristic under study is a 
unigenic characteristic (that is a phenotypic variation depending on the 
variation of a single gene so that the variation is due to the existence of two 
or more alternative forms, or alleles, of that gene) the best way of expressing 
the variation of that unigenic characteristic is given by the frequencies (p, q 
etc) of its alleles. These frequencies may also be graphically represented by 
sub-columns with a height proportional to their respective frequencies and 
with the total height equal to 1. 
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2. Anthropological markers 
Since the subdivision of a species (in this case, Man) into groups (usually 
called 'races') and their successive characterisation is based on the 
differential distribution of 'anthropological markers' in the various groups, 
a definition of 'race' calls for a preliminary definition of an 'anthropological 
marker'. An 'anthropological marker' is a variable (quantitative or 
alternative) characteristic which exhibits hereditarily transmitted 
distributions differing between human groups (Table 1). 
Table 1 - The three prerequisites a characteristic must fulfill to become 
potentially useful to subdivide Man into groups. 
The prerequisite No 'anthropologically meaningful' 
subdivision can be based 
1. VARIABILITY on an invariable characteristic as, tor 
example, the number of eyes per individual 
2. DIFFERENTIAL 
DISTRIBUTION in the 
various groups 
....on a characteristic, even if it is a variable 
one, it it is distributed in the same way in the 
various groups 
3. HERITABILITY (genetical 
and/or cultural) 
....on a characteristic, even if it is a variable one 
and it is differently distributed in the various 
groups, if it is not hereditarily transmitted, 
because only this property implies a 
reasonable duration of the subdivision. (For 
example, no one would propose to subdivide 
mankind into a group of people affected by flu 
and another not affected by this disease, even 
though this would be a variable characteristic 
with a clear-cut differential distribution in the 
two groups). 
3. The concept of 'gene frequency' 
Let us consider a gene A with two common alleles A1 and A2 in a population 
of n individuals. Since each of these n individuals was formed through the 
fusion of 2 gametes (a spermatozoon and an oocyte) and each gamete carried 
either the A1 or the A2 allele, that population was generated by 2n gametes, 
nAi of which carried A1 while the remaining n^ ( = 2n - nAi) carried Az. If, for 
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example, a population of 500 individuals is made up of 180 individuals who 
received from both their parents a gamete with the A1 allele (A'A1 individuals), 
of 240 individuals who received an A' allele from one parent and an A2 allele 
from the other (A'A2individuals), and of 80 AaA2individuals, that is 
A'A' A'A2 A2A2 
180 + 240 + 80 = n = 500 
then the frequency p of the A1 allele is 
nAi (2 x 180) + (1 x 240) + (0 x 80) 600 = ; = = 0 .6 
2n (2x500 ) 1000 
because 0.6 is the ratio between the number nA, of gametes carrying A1 and 
the total number 2n of the gametes under study and the frequency q of the 
A2 allele is 
nA2 (0 x 180) + (1 x 240) + (2 x 80) 400 
= = 0.4 
2n (2x500 ) 1000 
Obviously, if there are only two alleles, as in the present example, the sum 
of their frequencies is necessarily 1 (in this case [0.6 + 0.4]). 
4. Intra vs inter-group variability 
Variable characteristics, namely characteristics exhibiting a variation within 
a species, may present an intra-group variation (be variable among 
individuals of the same group), an inter-group variation (variability between 
individuals of one group with respect to those of other groups) or both these 
variations together. Clearly, the extent to which a given variable characteristic 
can contribute to the distinction between groups depends on the ratio 
between the two types of variability: the larger its inter-group variability with 
respect to its intra-group variability, the more efficient the inter-group 
distinction based on that characteristic. A simple scheme may be useful to 
illustrate the various possibilities (Figure land section (a) of Table 2], 
In its very essence, the possible quantitative relationship between the intra 
and inter-group variation of a given characteristic consists of the extent by 
which the average difference between two random individuals extracted from 
different groups exceeds the average difference between two random 
individuals of the same group. In addition to two extreme and opposite 
possibilities one can envisage infinite intermediate possibilities. 
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FIGURE 1 - The four possible situations one may come across when a variable 
characteristic is differently distributed in two groups of individuals. 
INTRA-group inter-individual variation 
QUANTITATIVE 
'continuous' 
characteristics 
ALTERNATIVE 
'discontinuous" 
characteristics 
The distribution in two groups 
INTER-
group 
variation 
ONLY PARTIALLY 
DISCONTINUOUS 
characteristics 
The gene frequencies in the 
1st group 2nd group 
DISCONTINUOUS 
characteristics 
(=potentially 
useful as 
'CLASSIFICATORY" 
characteristics)5* 
The VAST 
MAJORITY 
of the variable 
characters 
behave like this 
The characteristics of the OLD 
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
The characteristics of the 'MODERN' 
ANTHROPOGENETICS (= 'old' physical 
Anthropology + Human Population Genetics) 
(1) Also called 'qualitative' characteristics 
(2) An "inter-group discontinuous' characteristic is a characteristic that allows one to assign 
unambiguously any s/hgfe individual to his/her group on the basis of that characteristic only. 
Among the discontinuous characteristics, which might in principle (but only in principle) be 
utilized to subdivide our species Into discrete groups, only those which were also 
se/f-ev/cfenf were actually utilized for this purpose thus becoming the so called 'major 
anthropological markers' or really classificatory characteristics. 
The 'major anthropological markers' may be physical (as those of "classical' Physical 
Anthropology. For example: 'Blacks' and Whites', etc.j, geographical (Europeans, Africans, 
Asiatics, Amerindians, etc.) or cultural [religious (Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, etc.), linguistic 
(English-speaking, French-speaking, etc.)| or political [Germans, French, Peruvians, etc.. A 
polytical assignment atone is usually considered insufficient owing to the frequent and 
strong anthropological heterogeneity of political groups. Thus, In most cases, a second 
classificatoiy characteristic accompanies a political denomination (USA "Whites'; Brazil 
Amerindians; etc.)]. 
It is noteworthy that the physical 'major anthropological markers' all belong to box 3 (and, 
more precisely to a subgroup of it, namely to those characteristics which, besides being 
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quarWativ^^ are a/so self-evident) because the rare alternative 
characteristics with a discontinuous inter-group variation (box 4) are never self-evident. For 
this reason class 3 is highlighted by a bold-face frame. 
When dealipg with the continuity-discontinuity of the variable characteristics one has to 
adopt different criteria for Intra- and inter-group variabilities. This is because this definition 
depends on whether the characteristic varies in a continuous or in a discontinuous fashion 
among individuals of the same group in the case of the infra-group variability, or among 
groups in the case of Inter-group variability. 
On this premise one may identify the following four classes of characteristics as depicted in 
the four boxes of the figure (see also (2) in the previous section]: 
a) 'Continuous' intra-group characteristics displaying only a partially discontinuous 
Inter-groap variation. Example: stature in Sicilians and in Swedes. 
b) 'Discontinuous' intra-group characteristics displaying only a partially discontinuous 
inter-group variation. Example: the frequencies of Rh- and Rh+ alleles among Basques (a 
high frequency of the Rh- allele and a complementariiy low frequency of the Rh+ allele) 
and among other Europeans (the Rh+ allele frequency Is higher than that of the Rh- allele) 
where Basques and the other Europeans as well have both Rh alleles, although with very 
different frequencies. 
c) 'Continuous' intra-group characteristics displaying a discontinuous inter-group variation. 
Examples: the height of Pygmies and of other populations; the intensity of skin pigmentation 
among "Whites' and among 'Blacks'. Both these 'inter-group discontinuous' characteristics 
can be used as "classificatoiy characteristics, namely as 'Major anthropological markers', 
since they are also self-evident. 
d) 'Discontinuous' Intra-group characteristics which display a discontinuous inter-group 
variation. Example: the fy allele (of the Duffy blood group system) whose frequency is 100% 
in some West African populations while it Is virtually absent in the other parts of the world (in 
spite of its inter-group discontinuity this characteristic has never been utililized for • 
classificatory purposes since it is not a self- evident characteristic). 
By far the most common variable characteristics belong to classes 1) and 2) of the figure 
and display both types of variability, the intra- and the inter-group variability. Simple 
statistical methods to evaluate the relative contributions of these two components to the 
total variability (apportionement of the overall variance: see the conference by Barbujani) 
are available. — — — •— 
One extreme possibility is when the whole variation is made up by its 
infra-group component. For example, in all groups 90 percent of the 
individuals are Rh positive and 10 percent are Rh negative, so that to take 
the two individuals of each pair from the same group has the same effect as 
to take them from different groups. 
The opposite extreme (the whole variation being of the inter-group type) 
occurs if each group is perfectly homogeneous but the various groups differ 
from each other. For example, all individuals of a group are white and all 
individuals of the other group are black so that all pairs with the two 
individuals coming from the same group consist of individuals with the same 
skin pigmentation, whereas all couples where one individual derives from 
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one group and the other derives from the other group consist of individuals 
with different skin pigmentation. 
The intermediate possibilities are those where the intra and the inter-group 
components of the total variation coexist, even though in proportions which 
may vary from case to case: within each group there are at least two classes 
of individuals (for example, Rh positives and Rh negatives) and, in addition 
to this intra-group variation, there is an inter-group variation as well because 
the relative frequencies of the different classes within the single groups vary 
from one group to the other. For example, the Rh negatives are 3 percent in 
one group and 20 percent in the other, and consequently the Rh positives 
are respectively 97 percent and 80 percent. It is easy to see that in this case 
the probability that two individuals extracted at random (both from the same 
group) happen to be different is (2 x 0.03 x 0.97) = 0.058 and (2 x 0.2 x 0.8) 
= 0.32 respectively for the first or the second group, whereas if the two 
individuals are extracted one from one group and one from the other such 
probability is (0.97x0.2) + (0.03x0.8) + (0.8x0.03) + (0.2x0.97) = 0.436, 
a value higher than both those expressing the intra-group variability of the 
two groups, namely 0.058 and 0.32. 
Up to this point the various characteristics have been considered one at a 
time to ascertain for each one of them whether and to what extent they can 
be utilised singularly as a criterion of subdivision of mankind into different 
groups, namely for classificatory purposes. It has been concluded that each 
of the known inherited characteristics with a self-evident inter-group 
discontinuous variation can form the basis for an unambiguous and 
meaningful subdivision. Thus, one may envisage a number of classifications, 
each based on a single characteristic, and therefore equal to the number of 
such 'classiflcatoiy' characteristics. 
5. & 6. of the list of concepts relevant for the definition of race 
The goal of the next, and fundamental, step consists of working out 
classifications based on more than one 'classificatory' characteristic: the 
greater the number of 'classificatory' characteristics combined to produce a 
given classification the more significant that classification becomes. Thus one 
of the goals of anthropology has been that of proposing classifications based 
on as many different 'classificatory' characteristics as possible. 
In order to decide whether or not to combine two (or more) classifications 
each based on a single 'classificatory' characteristic, one must first verify that 
the causes of the variation of these characteristics are to a large extent 
different and independent from those of the others (otherwise one would 
combine a classification with itself). If it turns out that this is the case the 
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Table 2 - Possible subdivisions of the VARIABLE INHERITED characteristics based 
on some relevant properties of SINGLE characteristics [section (a)] or of 
GROUPS of characteristics [section (b)]. 
SECTION (a) 
Properties referring to SINGLE characteristics (= considered one at the time) 
The property The resulting denomination of the characteristics 
1) The type of intra-group variation QUANTITATIVE c. (body weight, stature etc.) 
vs 
ALTERNATIVE c. (gene frequencies) 
2) The type of inter-group variation ONLY PARTIALLY DISCONTINUOUS 
characteristics (stature, skull shape, most 
gene frequencies, etc.) 
vs 
DISCONTINUOUS c. (skin pigmentation, 
the fy gene frequency in West Africa) 
3) Self-evidence NOT MANIFEST (= not self-evident) c. 
(gene frequencies) 
vs 
SELF-EVIDENT c. (some MORPHOLOGICAL 
characteristics, such as pigmentation and 
stature in Pygmies) plus cultural c. and 
geographical area 
SECTION (b) 
Properties referring to GROUPS of characteristics (each c. compared with the others) 
The property The resulting denomination of the characteristics 
1) CAUSATION 
(= causes and mechanisms) 
characteristics depending on the SAME (or 
similar) CAUSES and MECHANISMS (skin, eyes 
and hair pigmentation; stature and body weight) 
vs 
INDEPENDENTLY DETERMINED c. 
(pigmentation and stature) 
2) CONCORDANCE among 
INDEPENDENT characteristics 
NOT (or only loosely) CONCORDANT 
characteristics (pigmentation and stature)"' 
vs 
STRONGLY CONCORDANT characteristics 
(stature and pigmentation when comparing 
Caucasoids with Pygmies; language and 
'classical' morphological c.)m 
(1) as a rule. pigmentation and stature are not correlated: one finds the whole spectrum of human stature variability within 
African Blacks and almost the whole spectrum within CaucasoMs (a conspicuous exception concerns Pygmies who are black 
and short (besides living all in a limited area of equatorial Africa)). 
(2) for example, Caucasoid speak Indo-european languages, whereas the languages spoken by the other two major races 
(Africans and Asiatics) have different origins. 
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independent classifications can then be combined if they are substantially 
concordant with each other [section (b) of Table 2]. 
In summary, whether or not a given variable characteristic is suitable for 
classificatory purposes or only as an 'accessory' characteristic, depends on 
that characteristic only (Figure 1). On the contrary, the possibility of utilising 
simultaneously two or more characteristics to obtain a combined 
classification and/or to better compare the groups with each other must 
instead consider these characteristics each with respect to the others. Table 
2 presents in a schematic form the properties relevant for the characteristics 
considered one at the time [(1), (2) and (3) of the list of concepts concerning 
the 'tools of anthropology'] and those concerning characteristics each 
considered with respect to the others [(5) and (6) of the same list]. 
| 1 A definition of (human) races 
'Reasonably large' groups of individuals which differ from each other (from 
group to group) for a 'sufficiently large' number of independent 'major 
anthropological markers' (inter-groups discontinuous inherited self-evident 
characteristics) which, in spite of being independently determined, lead to a 
'strongly concordant' subdivision. This definition is vague and arbitrary. 
However, intrinsically vague entities such as races can only be defined in a 
vague way. Indeed, a precise definition should be rejected on the very grounds 
of being precise because, by doing so, it would twist the truth. 
What should the minimal size of a reasonably large group be in order to 
define it as a 'race' (thousands, millions, tens of millions?); for how many 
concordant and independently determined 'major anthropological 
markers' must the individuals of a group be unambiguosly distinguishable 
from all the individuals of the other groups? Even though no sharp answers 
can be given to these questions (taken only as examples of the vagueness of 
the definition of race), it is indisputable that a subdivision of our species into 
major groups (or major races: Caucasoids, Blacks and Orientals) is 
reasonably justified on a number of criteria, including not only the classical 
markers of physical anthropology (mainly skin colour), but also the 
respective geographic distribution and large cultural differences. Beyond this 
rough classification the successive subclassifications become more and more 
subjective (see Table 3). 
The subdivision of our species into major races - which is still substantially 
the same as that originally proposed - has been the main result of traditional 
anthropology. 
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Table 3 - Examples of groups identified by at least two independent, but 
concordant, 'classificatory'1" characteristics. 
Adopted 'CLASSIFICATORY' characteristics IDENTIFIED GROUPS 
SKIN PIGMENTATION 
PHYSICAL 
STATURE 
and 
GEOGRAPHIC 
'Black' Africans; 
'White' Europeans; 
Pygmies 
CULTURAL + GEOGRAPHIC + 
(PHYSICAL) 
Hungarian Gypsies; 
Ashkenazi Jews; 
Amerindians 
POLITICAL + PHYSICAL 'White' French; 
USA'Blacks' 
(1) NONE of them can be provided by POPULATION GENETICS because the gene frequencies are not self-evident. 
The limitation of traditional anthropology 
The classification of our species into major races was based on only a few 
'major anthropological markers' [Inter-group Discontinuous (that is, with 
very large inter-group variability and with no, or only negligible, intra-group 
variability) and Self-Evident characteristics). At the time when this 
subdivision was first proposed the number of characteristics with an only 
partially discontinuous inter-group variation was not terribly overwhelming 
with respect to that of the 'major anthropological markers' (as we now know 
to be the case). The apparently unavoidable extrapolation of this state of 
affairs was that many of the variable characteristics not yet discovered (not 
being self-evident) entail conspicuous interracial differences in spite of not 
being self-evident. In other words, it was commonly believed that the major 
races and, though to a lesser extent, their subgroups, differed from each other 
to an extreme degree for many more characteristics than the few known 
since the beginning. 
We shall see in the next section that later genetic findings have demonstrated 
that this, apparently reasonable, implication was completely wrong. In spite 
of this, and of a number of severe shortcomings (listed below), this general 
classification still provides, as mentioned, the basis for present 
anthropological studies. 
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• Shortcomings of the 'Major Anthropological Markers ' (hence 
of the mankind subdivision based on them): 
>«* The 'major anthropological markers' sufficiently concordant to give rise 
to a self-consistent classification are very Jew (for example, Blacks can 
only be defined on the basis of their skin pigmentation and geographical 
origin). 
The complete lack of knowledge about the genetic determination of the 
major biological markers: they are certainly genetic, but far too complex 
to be understood in genetic terms. In fact, for each of these characteristics 
one does not know which and how many are the genes and the alleles 
involved. The only available information is that they depend on many 
genes and alleles (polygenic characteristics), besides being heavily 
affected by the environment. 
This situation is comparable with that of other sciences like geology and 
meteorology which deal with phenomena too complex to be explained in 
physico-chemical terms: obviously no one casts doubts about their 
ultimate physico-chemical origin, yet these processes can only be 
described in terms of laws encompassing a much higher level of 
complexity. 
«+ These markers do not provide any clue about the history of human 
diversification: for example, they serve to identify the races but not their 
antiquity. 
The reasons for such intrinsic incapacity is that the 'major anthropological 
markers' are typical examples of selectively advantageous markers [markers 
that have become fixed in the populations because they conferred a selective 
advantage with respect to the environment they were exposed to (for example, 
skin-tanning is advantageous where sun radiation is intense)] so that they 
have become 'fixed' (that is, they have reached the frequency of 100 percent) 
within relatively few generations. After they have attained fixation they cannot, 
by definition, increase their frequency any further and the time elapsed from 
fixation becomes irrelevant. Thus the historical information provided by 
these 'selection-dependent' markers concern only the environment, namely 
the selective environmental factors the groups under study were exposed to 
(for example, the fact that lowland Sardinians, but not highland Sardinians, 
present at high frequencies alleles as thalassemia conferring resistance to 
malaria implies only that the former had been exposed to a severe malarial 
endemia for a long period of time). 
On the contrary, the frequency of 'selectively neutral' markers continues to 
change even after the selectively advantageous markers have become fixed. 
Thus, even though their frequency changes very slowly, the extent of the 
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change continues to increase for a period of time much longer than that 
needed for the selectively advantageous characteristics to become fixed, so 
that they keep on functioning almost indefinitly as 'time indicators'. 
'»• Last but not least, the old anthropology implied, from a conceptual 
standpoint, a gross underestimation of intra-race variation. Intra-group 
variation was in fact looked upon only as background noise, namely as a 
factor complicating the subdivision of mankind into discrete groups 
whereas it is by Jar the largest of the two components (intra-race and 
inter-races variation) of whole species variability. This conceptual 
attitude, partially justified insofar as the identification of the major races 
through classificatory discontinuous characteristics was concerned (all 
'Whites' are light-skinned and all 'Blacks' are dark-skinned), could not 
lead very far when trying to characterise the races with respect to each 
other. As we shall see later, major races differ in a discontinuous fashion 
only for the very few characteristics that lead to their identification as 
discrete groups while for all the other, extremely numerous, variable 
characteristics, intra-group variability is much wider than inter-group 
variability. 
| | Variability analysis breakthrough: anthropogenetics 
The breakthrough into the analysis of mankind variability - anthropogenetics 
(c) - is produced by the fusion of the 'Traditional Anthropology' (a) with the 
newly born Population Genetics (b). 
(a) 'Traditional' Anthropology [main concern: inter-group variation of 
morphological (that is, self-evident) quantitative (hence, genetically complex) 
characteristics ]: 
As illustrated in the previous section, the 'old' or 'traditional' or 
'morphological' anthropology of the 19th and the beginning of this century 
was based on quantitative morphological (hence self-evident) characteristics 
(boxes 1 and 3 of Figure 1) because they were the only characteristics that 
could be studied at that time. 
Some of these characteristics, besides being self-evident, displayed a 
'discontinuous inter-group' variation and were therefore used as 'major 
anthropological markers' ( = 'classificatory' characteristics) leading to an 
unambiguous subdivision of our species into major races (box 3 of Figure 
1). Most of the other characteristics displayed only a partially discontinuous 
inter-group distribution (box 1 of Figure 1) and could only be used as 
'accessory' characteristics, where the term 'accessory' indicates that they are 
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useful to characterise further the groups identified through 'classificatory' 
characteristics. For example, morphological characteristics such as stature, 
body weight and skull shape, as a rule, although showing largely overlapping 
distributions in the different groups, exhibit means which differ from group 
to group. 
In conclusion, the descriptive part of 'traditional' anthropology largely 
consisted of two steps: 
1 Identification of the 'major races' through the few available 'major 
anthropological markers' (or 'classificatory' characteristics, namely 
inherited, discontinuous and self-evident characteristics). 
2 Their characterisation through as many morphological 'accessory' 
characteristics as possible. 
Examples of subdivisions based on combinations of 'classificatory' criteria 
of different kinds (morphological, geographical and cultural) are presented 
in Table 3. 
(b) Population Genetics: 
Human population genetics differs from traditional anthropology for three 
major reasons: 
emphasis is given to intra-group rather than to inter-group variability. 
the variable characteristics it is concerned with are not self-evident, thus 
they cannot be used as 'classificatory' characteristics, but only as 
'accessory' characteristics, even in the few cases when they turned out to 
exhibit a 'discontinuous inter-group variability'. 
»«+ these variable characteristics are unigenic (meaning their genetic 
transmission and, in most cases, the molecular basis as well, are perfectly 
clear), instead of polygenic as in the 'old' anthropology. 
The science of population genetics deals only with the intra-group variation 
of alternative (hence genetically simplex) characteristics. The variation of 
these characteristics is expressed in terms of allelic frequencies p, q, etc of 
genes which turned out to be polymorphic (a gene is said to be 'polymorphic' 
when at least two 'common' alleles (frequency in the order of 1 percent or 
more) of that gene are known to exist in a given population). 
The population genetics investigations most pertinent to the subject of this 
chapter consists, as a rule, of the following two steps: 
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1) The search for polymorphic geries: 
This search is performed by examining a number of random genes (or, more 
generally, of DNA sequences) on a sample of random subjects to identify those 
which exist in at least two common alternative variants (= alleles) in the 
population under study. This is done, for each of the genes examined, by 
looking for the common variation of that gene among individuals of the same 
group. Clearly, the higher the sensitivity of the method adopted to search for 
these variations, the greater the proportion of polymorphic genes present in 
the sample of genes under study which are destined to be identified as 
'polymorphic genes'. 
The old, pre-molecular genetics held two rooted and universally accepted 
beliefs: (a) only few genes are polymorphic; but (b) the vast majority of the 
few genes which are polymorphic are subjected to strong selective forces. The 
new molecular genetic technology, with its high sensitivity, demonstrated that 
practically all genes are polymorphic, instead of only few of them, and that 
they are, as a rule, selectively neutral (or very nearly so). The reason why old 
genetics had reached those grossly wrong conclusions was its very low 
sensitivity in detecting variation: it was in fact only able to discover the very 
few polymorphisms with so large phenotypic effects as to almost necessarily 
entail relevant selective consequences as well. One should then not be 
surprised that at a time when only few polymorphisms were known and those 
few caused important selective consequences the belief was that the genes 
are only exceptionally polymorphic and that these few cases are quite relevant 
from a selective point of view. On the contrary, molecular genetics, 
particularly during the last decade, has become able to detect genetic 
variations at the DNA level, irrespective of whether they cause phenotypic 
and selectively relevant consequences. 
2) The estimate of the frequencies of common alleles (identified in the first 
step) in the populations under study: 
Obviously, this is feasible only for polymorphic genes whose common alleles 
are easily identifiable (because many individuals need to be examined). 
Clearly, the type of (genetic) variation analysed by the population genetic 
approach is primarily an intra-group variation which may, or may not, be 
followed by studies aiming to ascertain whether or not one, or more, genes 
exhibiting an intra-group variability (polymorphic genes) also exhibit an 
inter-group variability. A fundamental feature of this approach, when 
compared with that of traditional anthropology, is that it examines random 
characteristics instead of characteristics selected for the very reason that 
they showed an inter-group variability much higher than the intra-group 
variability. Thus the variable characteristics of population genetics are likely 
to be bias-free when they evaluate the intra-group and the inter-group 
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variation singularly as well as with respect to each other (by comparing the 
gene frequencies observed in different groups). On the contrary, those of 
traditional anthropology are certainly severely biased in the sense that they 
dramatically overestimate the inter-group variation with respect to the 
intra-group variation. 
(c) Anthropogenetics [ = 'Traditional' Anthropology (a) + Human Population 
Genetics (b)l (one of its major concerns: the apportionment of the total 
variability of the alternative characteristics used as 'accessory' 
characteristics into its two components, intra-group and inter-group 
variability): 
Its aim is to compare the gene frequencies of discrete groups unambiguously 
defined on the basis of one or more 'classificatory' characteristics (Negroids 
v Caucasoids; Africans v Europeans; Italians v Spaniards; Jews v neighbour 
non-Jews; etc). The genes under study are polymorphic genes whose alleles 
are well identified and in most cases perfectly characterised at the molecular 
level: the very opposite of the morphological characteristics of 'traditional' 
anthropology. Since these alleles can be counted it becomes possible for each 
of the polymorphic genes under study to quantify precisely the relative 
contributions of intra- and of inter-group variations to the total variation. In 
other words, one can evaluate for each of the genes under study the degree 
of diversification existing among the groups examined with respect to that 
existing within these groups. 
Retrenchment of the traditional concept of race 
As already illustrated in detail, the anthropogenetic approach provided for 
the first time a wealth of random variable genes which could be used as 
'accessory' characteristics to compare quantitatively the average variation 
existing within the single groups (defined by classificatory characteristics) 
with that existing between these groups (their sum is the total intra-species 
variation). 
The result of this unbiased comparison, reported in detail by Barbujani in 
his chapter of this book, was unambiguous: the variation between groups is 
but a minor portion of the total genetic variation of our species. The impact 
of this unexpected finding, which caused a full inversion of the old concept 
of race, is presented schematically in Table 4. 
Among the numerous implications of the new data provided by 
anthropogenetics, two deserve to be discussed because related 
misunderstandings have considerably affected the layman's attitude towards 
racial differences and racism. 
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Table 4 - The two concepts of PHYSICAL races: 
the OLD one based on the 'classical' morphological Anthropology 
and 
the PRESENT one derived from the FUSION of 'classical' Anthropology with 
Human Population Genetics 
i 
the OLD concept of Race the PRESENT concept of Race 
Races display so large Races differ widely from each other 
inter-races variations for very few adaptive c. (the 
as to even attain discon= self-evident morphological c. of 'tra-
OBSER tinuity for an appreciable ditional' Anthropology) and very 
VAT portion ol the tested little for millions neutral 
IONS characters c. (the gene frequencies of the 'modern' 
Human Population Genetics) 
Races differ dramatically the few c. with extreme inter-
from each other for racial differences discovered since 
many more c. than the the onset of the 'traditional' anthrop. 
EXTR few tested ones. are the only ones (or very 
APOLA In other words, the mor- nearly so) with such extreme 
TIONS phological c. are repre- differences since they have been 
sentative of the variable (1) the only ones so showy as to 
c. in general become detectable by 
including the non self- selective adaptation and (2) 
evident ones. to cause deliberate constraints 
to inter-racial gene flows. 
• D o 'biologically superior' races exist? 
A prima facie answer is that 'superior races' do exist because the 
classificatory characteristics which led to the identification of the major races 
are selectively advantageous characteristics; and these characteristics are, 
by definition, present in one race with a 100 percent frequency and 
completely absent in the other races. However, when examining this problem 
more closely, one realises all the selectively advantageous characteristics 
which are specifically associated with the various races are not advantageous 
per se since the selective advantage they confer to a race is an advantage with 
respect only to the specific environment which that race is exposed to: it is 
in fact an adaptation to a particular adverse environmental factor. For 
example, the dark skin pigmentation of Blacks is a strong selective advantage 
with respect to intense sun radiation, whereas in a polar habitat such as that 
of the Eskimos, it would be disadvantageous. The latter, on their side, are 
'superior' with respect to their own habitat. In other words, the rule is that 
every race, thanks to its 'adaptive' alleles, is biologically (and in most cases, 
also culturally) superior to any other race, but this 'superiority' is strictly 
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limited to its particular environment (the habitat where it has settled lor 
many generations, namely for a period of time sufficient to induce a genelic 
adaptation). 
One may argue that a race where an 'intrinsically advantageous' allele (an 
allele conferring a selective advantage in every possible condition = 
unconditionally advantageous allele) has a frequency of 100 percent while it 
is absent in all other races, would be a 'biologically superior' race. However, 
alleles of this kind have never been found by comparing not only races 
(groups of individuals of the same species) but even very distant species: in 
principle, our human genes are neither better nor worse than bacterial genes. 
They are better if they have to work in a human (genetic and environmental) 
context and worse in a bacterial context. 
On the whole, then, it appears that common variations consisting in the 
coexistence of unconditionally advantageous and of unconditionally 
disadvantageous alleles, do not exist. This conclusion is based on the lack 
of even a single observed example of such an imaginary situation as compared 
with thousands of well described examples of selectively neutral or 
conditionally advantageous genetic variations. 
In conclusion, such terms as 'biological superiority and inferiority' of 
different races appear to be scientifically meaningless in general terms and 
meaningful (perfectly justified) if referred to specific selectively stringent 
environments. This notion is admittedly to a large extent obvious a priori. 
Yet, its direct verification should be looked upon as a major achievement of 
anthropogenetics. It is worth pointing out that people who refrain from even 
asking whether or not superior and inferior races exist (because they 
consider this to be a taboo question, and thus consider as heretics those who 
want to think about it with no custom-made preconceived certainties) do not 
realise that now we are in the position of rejecting such concepts because 
observed facts show them to be false. 
• Do races exist? 
As shown in Table 4, the traditional subdivision of humankind into biological 
and geographical 'races' was based on very few but large and self-evident 
differences observed, and on many more differences as large as the previous 
ones, yet not as manifest, which were only supposed to exist between these 
groups. After 30 years or so of anthropogenetics, the observed differences 
are obviously still there whereas the large supposed, but not manifest, 
differences turned out not to exist at all, rather than not to be manifest. Thus 
there is no doubt that human groups traditionally named 'races' do exist but, 
considering that they turned out to differ from each o+her much less than it 
was previously believed, one may argue about whether one should continue 
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to use the same term or switch to a new one such as, for example, variety, 
stock or the like. It clearly appears that, were it not for the tremendous 
socio-political impact of the term 'race', such a problem would not have been 
raised at all: on purely scientific grounds one would keep the old term and 
simply say that races differ biologically from each other much less than it 
was believed,-' though certainly no one would say that the traditional 
subdivision of human species was pure fiction. Therefore the real question 
is whether or not the substitution of the term 'race' with a new term may 
substantially contribute to the fight against racism (a question comparable 
with that of the true effectiveness of substituting 'Negroes' with 'Blacks' or 
'Jews' with 'Israelites'). 
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4 % 
Ethnic conflicts, during the era of the Cold War, were widely 
perceived to be problems of the developing world. With the end 
of that war, this has changed. Nation-states react defensively 
as local politics and global politics increasingly articulate 
demands for human and cultural rights and for equity in access 
to resources. Such demands are apparent in eastern Europe and 
other parts of what used to be the Soviet empire, in western 
Europe and the Middle East, in the former first, second and third 
worlds. These demands have become universal. Racism and ethnic 
conflict, accordingly, allied as they are to such demands, have 
become global problems today. Chapters in Part One of this book 
discuss these threats by using a number of key ideas: identity, 
territory, language, nation, and international intervention. 
Chapters in Part Two of the book discuss three case studies: 
security and the peace process in Northern Ireland, 
democratisation and conflict in contemporary South Africa, and 
the rise of racism in political parties of five western European 
countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Identities based on racial criteria are common in 
many societies of the modern world. Theories claiming that these 
identities are based upon biological and genetic factors are also 
common. The two chapters in Part Three, written by trained 
geneticists, address and refute these theories and their 
inferences. 
^SMl 
j J 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
